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INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court's decision in Nevada Department of Human
Resources v. Hibbs' appeared to mark a pause in the Court's fifteenyear-long string of cases that have generally bolstered states' rights and,
specifically, have cabined the federal government's authority to enforce
federal laws against the states.2 In Hibbs, the Court held that states do
not have immunity from damages suits filed by state employees under
the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 3 reasoning that, with respect to
forms of discrimination given heightened scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause, such as gender discrimination, courts must give

greater deference to Congress's authority to enact remedial legislation
under the Fourteenth Amendment's enforcement provision. 4

Viewed narrowly, the Hibbs opinion did not deviate from the
Court's relatively recent Eleventh Amendment decisions, such as Kimel
v. FloridaBoard of Regents5 and Board of Trustees of the University of

Alabama v. Garrett,6 which emboldened the states' immunity from suit

while also signaling that such immunity has constitutional limitations. 7
However, if we consider what was at stake in Hibbs-as Chief Justice

Rehnquist put it in his majority opinion, "the pervasive sex-role
stereotype that caring for family members is woman's work" 8-then the
Court's decision appears to mark a significant departure from what has
become a widely declared tenet of federalism: Law and policy relating

1 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
2 See, e.g., Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Savings Bank of Fla., 527
U.S. 627 (1999) (holding that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment does not empower
Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity from claims under patent infringement statute);
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (holding that Congress may not use its Article I,
Section 8 powers to override state sovereign immunity from private suits in state court); City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (holding that Congress exceeded its powers under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act);
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 929 (1997) (observing that Congress may not use its
Commerce Clause authority to "commandeer" state executives); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 175-76 (1992) (announcing that Congress may not use its Commerce Clause authority
to "commandeer" state legislatures to enact or enforce a federal program).
3 29 U.S.C. §§ 2612(a)(1)(C), 2617(a)(2) (2000); see also Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 725.
4 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736 ("Because the standard for
demonstrating constitutionality of a gender-based classification is more difficult to meet than a
rational-basis test ... it was easier for Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional
violations.") (citations omitted).
5 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding that Congress lacked authority under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate state sovereign immunity from damages suits by private
individuals for violations of the Age Discrimination Act).
6 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (holding that Congress lacked authority under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate state sovereign immunity from damages suits for violations
of the Americans with Disabilities Act).
7 See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 80-81; Garrett, 531 U.S. at 364.
8 Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 731.
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to domestic relations, or family law, falls under the exclusive authority
of the states.
From this perspective, it is significant that one of the few
federalism decisions of recent years to have upheld Congress's authority
to abrogate state sovereign immunity involves an area of law that bears
directly on family relations-in this case, the gendered allocation of
care-giving roles within a family. In 1991, Chief Justice Rehnquist took
a very different stance when he announced that certain provisions in a
9
proposed version of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)
violated a basic principle of federalism because they "could involve the
10 He
federal courts in a whole host of domestic relations disputes."'
articulated that theory as law in the majority opinion in United States v.
Morrison,"I which invalidated VAWA's civil rights remedy for "gender
motivated violence" as an unconstitutional exercise of congressional
authority. Rehnquist reasoned that the provision blurred the distinction
between what is "truly local" and "truly national" 12 in part because it
"may. . . be applied equally as well to family law and other areas of
13
traditional state regulation."'
In this respect, Hibbs and Morrison appear to embody alternative
visions of federal authority over family law and policy. Hibbs affirmed
the national legislature's authority to enforce FMLA against the states
in part because the Equal Protection Clause does not allow states to
perpetuate gendered allocations of care-giving responsibility within
families, while Morrison reasoned that the national legislature exceeded
Commerce Clause authority when it enacted VAWA's civil rights
remedy in part because that provision could potentially impact domestic
relations. That the Court-and the Chief Justice himself-seems to
have endorsed incompatible visions of the relationship between the
national government and the states in the specific area of domestic
relations is reason enough to revisit the platitude that the regulation of
domestic relations is, and always has been, a matter of "truly local"
concern.
Defenders of the notion that federal regulatory and adjudicative
powers do not reach domestic relations-what I will call the state
sovereignty paradigm of domestic relations-tend to employ two
distinctive, but not incompatible, defenses or explanations of the states'
The first
purported special sovereignty over domestic relations.

9 See Violence Against Women Act of 1994, P.L. 103-322, §§ 40001-40703, 108 Stat. 1796,
1903-53 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
10 William H. Rehnquist, ChiefJustice's 1991 Year-End Report on the FederalJudiciary, 24
THIRD BRANCH 2 (1992).
11 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
12 Id. at 617-18.

13 Id.at 615.
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justification invokes the rhetoric and logic of history. 14 In this mode,
jurists contend that federal involvement in domestic relations is
improper because, by tradition, the states possess special sovereignty
over the family. 15 The second justification is that domestic relations
are, by definition, local in nature. This essentialist mode of reasoning
about jurisdiction and domestic relations has been identified and
described by Judith Resnik, who argues that, "[b]y essentializing both
categories of law and the proper spheres of governance of state and
federal courts, such claims reduce each to a caricature."'1 6 These two
types of reasoning about federalism-historical and essentialist-work
together to render federal regulation of the family abnormal and
invasive.
In this article, I examine the empirical grounding of both the
historical and the essentialist justifications of the state sovereignty
paradigm of domestic relations. First, with special focus on the first
half of the nineteenth century, I reconsider the standard perception that
there is a long-standing tradition of federal non-involvement in
domestic relations law and policy. I do not make an originalist
14 Jill Hasday has provided a searching analysis of the role of history as a primary
justification of what she terms the "localist" vision of domestic relations. See Jill Elaine Hasday,
Federalismand the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1297 (1998). As she argues:
Localists do not simply rely on history for additional support; they absolutely depend
on it to establish family law as uniquely, inherently, and exclusively local, one arena
that the federal government categorically may not enter in an age in which the
boundaries of federal jurisdiction are otherwise ambiguous and subject to change.
Id.at 1301.
15 See sources cited in infra notes 21-23, 52; see also Heron v. Office of Pub. Guardian, 878
F.2d 13, 14 (1st Cir. 1989) ("[G]iven 'the long history of state predominance and federal deferral
in family law matters,' the federal government lack[s] a substantive interest in child custody
matters sufficient to justify an assertion of federal supremacy in that area.") (citations omitted);
Rollins v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 863 F.2d 1346, 1350 (7th Cir. 1988) ("By long tradition, family
law is almost exclusively the domain of the individual states; there is, for all practical purposes,
no federal domestic relations law. These facts militate in favor of looking to state law rather than
fashioning a uniform federal law in the present situation."); Sylvander v. New England Home for
Little Wanderers, 584 F.2d 1103, 1112 (1st Cir. 1978) ("[T]here is a long history of state
predominance and federal deferral in family law matters."); Bromley v. Bromley, 30 F. Supp. 2d
857, 862 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (finding "no reason to deviate from this history [of federal abstention]
and move domestic litigation to federal court" where British petitioner sought certain parental
rights relating to his American children pursuant to an international treaty); Dibbs v. Gonsalves,
921 F. Supp. 44, 52 (D.P.R. 1996) ("To continue this action would also be contrary to the
tradition followed by federal courts in abstaining from exercising jurisdiction over domestic
relation controversies."); In re Greene, No. 98-35663DWS, 1999 WL 138905, at *8 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. Mar. 5, 1999) ("Matters of family law are by tradition within the domain of the states, and
federal courts are generally adverse to taking on these issues: alimony, maintenance, or support
are not standard debtor/creditor situations, but involve important issues of family law.").
16 Judith Resnik, Trial as Error,Jurisdictionas Injury: Transforming the Meaning ofArticle
I1, 113 HARV. L. REv. 924, 1006 (2000) [hereinafter Resnik, Trial as Error]; see also Judith
Resnik, CategoricalFederalism:Jurisdiction,Gender, andthe Globe, 111 YALE L.J. 619, passim
(2001) [hereinafter Resnik, Categorical Federalism]; Judith Resnik, "Naturally" Without
Gender: Women, Jurisdiction,and the FederalCourts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1682, 1717-30 (1991)
[hereinafter Resnik, Naturally].
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argument for a specific understanding of the federal government's
17
authority over matters relating to the family. Rather, I dig deeper into
historical sources of the pre-Civil War era, from the 1790s to the 1850s,
to examine how national-level actors of that period exercised their
authority to regulate and adjudicate matters involving domestic
relations.
By examining the history of the federal government's role in the
regulation of the family, this article joins the work of others who in
recent years have begun to piece together the history of the federal
8
government's role in crafting domestic relations law and policy.'
Much of this attention has focused on federal involvement in domestic
relations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with
relatively less consideration given to the pre-Civil War period. Though
19
recent contributions to this field have helped to cure this imbalance,
there remains a strong sense, especially among lawyers and judges, that
17 Although proponents of the state sovereignty paradigm often employ originalist rhetoric,
there is little evidence that the framers of the Constitution understood domestic relations to
occupy a special place in the structure of the federal system as compared with any other area of
substantive law. Thus, while Alexander Hamilton referred to "the law of descent" as an example
of an area of substantive law that would remain under the control of the states, see THE
FEDERALIST No. 33, at 204 (Alexander Hamilton); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 29, at 183
(Alexander Hamilton), there appears to be little in the constitutional debates that would
distinguish the law of descent or any other aspect of domestic relations law from other areas of
substantive law. See Hasday, supra note 14, at 1320-24 & n.95. Hasday has observed that
the Founding's great discourse on federal-state relations hardly speaks to family law
and the arguments identifying it as particularly local.... Family law may have been
firmly local at the nation's inception, but the Framers did little to distinguish family
law [from other areas of law].... Instead, the men who participated in the original
constitutional debates left most subjects to the states and devoted scant attention to the
family.
Id. at 1320. Sylvia Law similarly concludes that "[s]ilence, absolute and deafening, is the central
theme of the original founders' discussion of women and families.... Virtually nothing in the
original constitutional debates directly addresses the situation of women and families, or
illuminates the difficult issues we confront today." Sylvia A. Law, The Founders on Families,39
U. FLA. L. REv. 583, 586 (1987).
18 See, e.g., NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC Vows: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION

(2000); HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 258-77 (2000) (analyzing
the role of federal full faith and credit jurisprudence in the development of divorce law); THEDA
SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY

INTHE UNITED STATES (1992); Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex
Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 998-1003 (2002) (analyzing latenineteenth and early-twentieth century arguments made in opposition to a federal woman suffrage
amendment on the basis that a federal amendment would violate state sovereignty over domestic
relations); Katherine M. Franke, Becoming a Citizen: Reconstruction Era Regulation of African
American Marriages, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 251 (1999) (examining the role of Reconstructionera federal officials in the enforcement of marriage laws and norms of monogamy among recently
emancipated freedmen); Hasday, supra note 14, at 1355-70 (analyzing Reconstruction-era federal
regulation of polygamy and freedmen's family rights); Resnik, Naturally, supra note 16, at 174651 (analyzing the role of gender in federal courts jurisprudence of the late nineteenth century).
19 Nancy Cott's thoroughgoing analysis of the ways in which national law and policy has
shaped marriage as an institution, including during the pre-Civil War period, is especially notable
in this respect. See COTT, supra note 18, at 56-76.
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prior to the general expansion of federal authority and administrative
capacity during the Reconstruction and New Deal eras, federal actors
played no role in the development of the law and policy of domestic
relations.
Because proponents of stronger state sovereignty tend to embrace
the pre-Civil War period as an authentic and persuasive model for
current practice,2 0 the relative under-examination of federal involvement
in domestic relations during that period has significant jurisprudential
consequences. In Morrison, for example, while Chief Justice Rehnquist
admitted that a return to pre-New Deal Commerce Clause jurisprudence
was implausible, he turned to "the founders"' understanding of what
was "truly local" to determine the kinds of activities Congress may not
reach using its commerce powers. 2' With more sustained analysis, legal
20 In other words, though most agree that the Reconstruction Amendments "sanctioned
intrusions by Congress into.., spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the States,"
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.), new federalists continue to look to
the founding era and the early national period to determine the proper allocation between federal
and state authority. See Richard H. Fallon, Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV.
1141, 1143-45 (1988); cf Vicki C. Jackson, Holistic Interpretation:Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer and Our
Bifurcated Constitution, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1259, 1273-75 (2001). Indeed, Norman Spaulding has
argued that the recent federalism decisions have perilously erased the history of the
Reconstruction era and the structural changes brought about by the Reconstruction Amendments.
See Norman W. Spaulding, Constitution as Countermonument: Federalism, Reconstruction, and
the Problem of Collective Memory, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1992, 2006 (2003) ("I contend that
federalism, in the strong sense the Court has endorsed, is viable only as an expression of
monumental historical consciousness-that is to say, only as the result of memory work
predicated on forgetting the structural significance of the Civil War and Reconstruction
Amendments."). Because of the significance assigned to history in the modem evaluation of
the
federal government's role in the regulation of domestic relations, for purposes of this article I put
aside the important issue of whether history should inform present allocations of authority in our
federalist system. For critical analyses of the role of history in legal reasoning, see LAURA
KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM (1996); Robert Gordon, Historicism
in
Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017 (1981); Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the
Original Understanding,60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980).
21 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-18 (2000) ("The Constitution requires a
distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local. In recognizing that fact we
preserve one of the few principles that has been consistent since the Clause was adopted.")
(citations omitted). The turn to history is not always a turn to originalism, however, and it is
often simply articulated as a need for the "return" of domestic relations matters to the states and a
declaration of the inherent value of "tradition"-phrases that sound with a nostalgia for a bygone
understanding of federalism. The opening sentence of the Fourth Circuit's en banc opinion in the
Morrison litigation provides a good example of such nostalgia: "We the People, distrustful of
power, and believing that government limited and dispersed protects freedom best ..
"
Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 825-26 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc),
affid sub nom, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); see id.at 826 ("[W]e are
constrained to conclude [that VAWA] simply cannot be reconciled with the principles of limited
federal government upon which this Nation is founded."). A district court considering the
constitutionality of VAWA prior to Morrison expressed a similar view, even as it affirmed
VAWA's constitutionality under Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The court stated:
While there is no doubt that violence against women is a serious matter in our society,
this particular remedy created by Congress, because of its extreme overbreadth, opens
the doors of the federal courts to parties seeking leverage in settlements, rather than
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scholars have drawn on a similar historical vision in arguing that "[t]he
era of dual federalism witnessed universal agreement that government
regulation of the family fell within the constitutionally protected sphere
of state sovereignty," 22 and that "[f]rom the earliest days of the Republic
until the recent past, family law has unquestionably belonged to the
states. '23 The relative under-examination of federal regulation of the
family during the pre-Civil War period has allowed these claims to
shape modem jurists' reasoning about federalism without ascertaining
their empirical accuracy.
The historical sources reveal two important things about the early
history of federal regulations concerning domestic relations. First, as I
demonstrate in Part III, during the pre-Civil War era all three branches
of the federal government were actively engaged in creating and
enforcing laws and policies that bore directly on families, whether it
was the creation and administration of widows and orphans' war
pensions, the regulation of married women's citizenship, or-perhaps
most surprisingly-the resolution of an array of domestic relations
issues in federal court, often pursuant to uniform federal standards.
These sources evidence the fact of federal actors' involvement in
domestic relations, and also show that federal actors brought national
Specifically, federal
norms and values to bear on such issues.
connection between
important
the
recognized
lawmakers and jurists
republicanism (as they understood that concept) and domestic
relations. 24 Thus, contrary to the contention that the task of regulating
true justice. The framers of the Constitution did not intend for the federal courts to
play host to domestic disputes and invade the well-established authority of the
sovereign states.
Seaton v. Seaton, 971 F. Supp. 1188, 1190-91 (E.D. Tenn. 1997).
22 Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1787, 1821 (1995); see also
id. at 1825 ("[S]tate authority over family law is an essential feature of our liberal constitutional
order. Implicit in the design of the Constitution is the understanding that the states have
responsibility for developing a shared moral vision of the good family life."). Dailey does not
support the complete exclusion of the federal government from domestic relations, see id. at
1880-88, but her historical characterization has been used as support for a very strong version of
the state sovereignty paradigm, see Motion for Leave to File Amicus Brief and Amicus Brief of
the Center for Marriage Law in Support of Respondent at 21, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003) (citing Dailey, supra).
23 Dailey, supra note 22, at 1821. Bruce Hafen has offered a similar analysis: "[T]he
Founders consciously accepted the regulation of family life embodied in the civil
legislation ... [and] did not view individual rights arising from family relationships-though
there were many-as political liberties needing protection by the Bill of Rights." Bruce C.
Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy; Balancing the
Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 571 (1983).
24 Throughout this article, I use the term "republicanism" broadly to refer to the concept of
government founded on consent-as opposed to a monarchy or aristocracy-and the often
divergent views regarding the qualities essential to a republican polity. As Rogers Smith
explains, "[riepublicanism became in America the key term announcing one's allegiance to
'popular' government founded on consent and to the Revolution, as opposed to aristocracy and
monarchy founded on natural allegiance and the mixed British constitution." ROGERS M. SMITH,
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domestic relations was intentionally and exclusively delegated to the
state governments in order to protect local values and to secure a liberal
polity, historical sources demonstrate that national jurists and
lawmakers played a role in the process, slow and halting as it was, of
examining and sometimes even displacing the hierarchical principles
that were part and parcel of the common law of domestic relations.
My second task in this article is to evaluate the accuracy of the
claim that, as a matter of theory or principle, state sovereignty over
domestic relations is fundamental to American federalism. I do so by
demonstrating that, in fact, the state sovereignty paradigm is not a fixed
federalism principle, but has evolved over time in the context of heated
debates over various proposed federal regulations that, in some respect,
touched on domestic relations. As I explain in Part IV, the scope of the
federal government's authority over domestic relations has always been
a disputed issue-although one that received limited attention until the
late nineteenth century. At that point, the woman suffrage campaign,
polygamy, liberalized divorce laws, and interracial marriage attracted
national attention as threats to the traditional family. In the course of
debates over proposed regulatory responses, the proper place for the
family in the national republic emerged as a heavily contested issue, and
the notion that domestic relations fall under the exclusive authority of
the states took shape and gained force as a theory of federalism. Thus,
the history of the state sovereignty paradigm reveals that it is not an
organic, transhistorical principle of American federalism. Rather, it
developed as a theory of convenience, strategically invoked and easily
dismissed or ignored.
The contingent and expedient nature of the state sovereignty
paradigm helps explain the inconsistencies in our current federalism
jurisprudence-such as the dissonance between Hibbs and Morrisonas a continuation of the indeterminacy that has typified this area of law
for decades. Given that the historical sources are replete with evidence
of ideological and ends-justified invocations of the state sovereignty
paradigm, history counsels that we should be skeptical of reliance on
the state sovereignty paradigm as a basis for invalidating otherwise
legitimate exercises of federal power. This is not because the state
sovereignty paradigm is necessarily associated with a specific
ideological agenda, 25 but because its history demonstrates it to be a

CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 82 (1997).

25 Critics of exclusive state authority over family law have correctly observed that the history
of localism is rife with egregious abuses of power and have noted that the state sovereignty
paradigm of domestic relations has been invoked in debates concerning a host of federal
legislative initiatives, such as opposition to the Missouri Compromise, opposition to freedmen's
right to marry, and opposition to woman suffrage. See Siegel, supra note 18, at 1031; Hasday,
supra note 14, at 1400; Resnik, Naturally, supra note 16, at 1751; see also infra Part IV.
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theory of convenience, rather than a meaningful or principled limit on
federal power.
In Part I, I describe the inconsistency with which the state
sovereignty paradigm is invoked in modem federal adjudicative and
legislative processes. In Part II, I provide a brief introduction to the
status-based common law of domestic relations that Americans
inherited from England-important background for understanding the
nature of federal involvement in domestic relations during the pre-Civil
War era. In Part III, I examine the federal government's significant
involvement in domestic relations during the pre-Civil War era,
specifically through the creation and administration of pensions for war
widows and orphans, the regulation of domestic relations though
citizenship law (and vice versa), and the federal courts' adjudication of
a wide variety of disputes concerning domestic relations. In Part IV, I
provide a broad overview of the emergence of the state sovereignty
paradigm as a generally applicable theory of federalism in the context of
several perceived crises in American family law in the late nineteenth
century. I close with some considerations of the implications of these
historical findings for current federalism debates.
I.

MAKING, BREAKING, AND IGNORING FEDERALISM RULES

The view that the individual states possess special and exclusive
regulatory authority over domestic relations is announced as a firm
principle of law, resolute and clearly defined: "[T]he whole subject of
the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to
the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States. ' 26 With
the arrival of new federalism in the last few decades, this
pronouncement has been used to preclude or limit federal adjudicative
and regulatory involvement in matters touching on domestic relations in
a number of contexts, even when federal regulatory involvement is
Certainly, the state sovereignty paradigm
otherwise authorized.
27
informed the Court's recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence,
Congress's overhaul of federal welfare programs in the 1990S,28 and, in
29
the 1970s, opposition to the proposed Equal Rights Amendment. It is
26 Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 692 (1992) (quoting Ex parte Burrus, 136 U.S.
586, 593-94 (1890)).
27 See infra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
29 See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT: GUARANTEEING
EQUAL RIGHTS FOR WOMEN UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 22-23 (Clearinghouse Pub. No. 68, June

1981) (defending the proposed Equal Rights Amendment against the charge that it would
interfere with the states' historic power to regulate domestic relations); Extending the Ratification
Period for the Proposed Equal Rights Amendment: Hearing on H.J. Res. 638 Before the
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the animating concept behind the "domestic relations exception" to
federal diversity jurisdiction, 30 and is routinely invoked by federal
judges as a principle of statutory interpretation. 3' Most recently, in Elk
Grove United School District v. Newdow, the state sovereignty
paradigm animated the creation of a "prudential" limit on Article III
standing 32 (over the somewhat surprising objection of Chief Justice
33
Rehnquist).
The state sovereignty paradigm of domestic relations is informed
by a type of reasoning that underlies much of the Supreme Court's
recent federalism jurisprudence: categories or bright lines are used to
enforce a boundary between distinctive federal and state spheres of
power. Strict demarcation of state and federal authority purportedly
leads to greater accountability in government, increases predictability in
judicial enforcement of federalism, and preserves the states' important
role in the republic. 34 The practice of identifying a certain type of law
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 179
(1978) (letter of Phyllis Schlafly) (arguing that the "ERA is the centerpiece of the women's lib
movement for more Federal control over our lives, lesbian privileges to teach in the schools and
have child custody, government-funded abortions, and Federal child-care to replace mothercare").
30 See infra notes 200-02, 325-30, 367-74 and accompanying text.
31 See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 185 (1988) (holding that the Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act does not create a private federal cause of action, observing that
domestic relations have "traditionally been the province of the States"); Brandon v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 18 F.3d 1321, 1326 (5th Cir. 1994) (observing in the context of ERISA preemption analysis
that "[flederal respect for state domestic relations law has a long and venerable history" and that
"[w]hen courts face a potential conflict between state domestic relations law and federal law, the
strong presumption is that the state law should be given precedence" because "the law of family
relations has been a sacrosanct enclave carefully protected against federal intrusion"); Rollins v.
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 863 F.2d 1346, 1350 (7th Cir. 1988) (in the course of interpreting ERISA
provision, observing that "[b]y long tradition, family law is almost exclusively the domain of the
individual states; there is, for all practical purposes, no federal domestic relations law. These
facts militate in favor of looking to state law rather than fashioning a uniform federal [rule]").
The domestic relations exception has also been invoked as a basis for abstention in cases that
otherwise fall under the courts' federal question jurisdiction. See, e.g., Firestone v. Cleveland
Trust Co., 654 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1981); Bergstrom v. Bergstrom, 623 F.2d 517, 520 (8th Cir.
1980); Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625, 632-34 (6th Cir. 1978); Hernstadt v. Hernstadt, 373
F.2d 316, 318 (2d Cir. 1967).
32 See 542 U.S. 1, 26 (2004) ("When hard questions of domestic relations are sure to affect
the outcome, the prudent course is for the federal court to stay its hand rather than reach out to
resolve a weighty question of federal constitutional law.") (citing Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504
U.S. 689, 703 (1992)).
33 Although the Chief Justice has repeatedly endorsed a broad application of the state
sovereignty paradigm of domestic relations in the context of federal court jurisdiction, in a
concurring opinion in Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 32-35 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring), he took a
narrow view of Ankenbrandt and related case law.
34 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992) ("[W]here the federal
government compels States to regulate, the accountability of both state and federal officials is
diminished."); FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 636 (1992) ("Federalism serves to
assign political responsibility, not to obscure it."); Deborah J. Merritt, The GuaranteeClause and
State Autonomy: Federalismfor a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 61 (1988) ("[I]f the
national government compels the states to enforce federal regulatory programs, state budgets and
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as an area of "traditional state concern," and, hence, off-limits to federal
regulation, presents an attractive means of achieving these goals: one
need only determine, as an empirical matter, which areas of law were
historically under the states' exclusive control and then ban federal
regulatory and adjudicative activities in those areas. Although this
method of policing federalism famously collapsed in the Court's preNew Deal era jurisprudence and, more recently, in its Tenth
Amendment jurisprudence, 35 it has been revived in the Court's
Commerce Clause jurisprudence in United States v. Lopez and in
36
Morrison, and is alive in modern abstention jurisprudence as well.
Despite the appeal of the strict formalist approach to federalism, its
critics are numerous. Justice Breyer has called attention to the random
outcomes that accompany "[c]omplex Commerce Clause rules," noting
in Morrison that such formalist rules in federalism jurisprudence "create
fine distinctions that achieve only random results [and] do little to
37
further the important federalism interests that called them into being.
Others have articulated concern that bright line rules in federalism are,
in fact, easily manipulated by federal judges, who tend to "selectively
'38
invoke[]" federalism rules "only when ideologically convenient.

executive resources reflect federal priorities rather than the wishes of local citizens.").
35 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 641-45, 648 & n.8 (Souter, J., dissenting) (discussing the rise
and fall of the categorical approach to federalism in pre-New Deal Commerce Clause
jurisprudence and modem Tenth Amendment jurisprudence).
36 See id.at 615-16 (reasoning that even if violence against women has an economic impact,
federal regulation of such violence is not permissible under the Commerce Clause); United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 577 (1995) ("Were the Federal Government to take over the regulation of
entire areas of traditional state concern, areas having nothing to do with the regulation of
commercial activities, the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority would
blur and political responsibility would become illusory."); Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S.
689, 703 (1992) (finding a judge-made exception to the federal diversity jurisdiction statute that
"divests the federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees").
37 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 659 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In Morrison, Breyer concludes that
under the majority's approach, "substantive limitations will apply randomly in terms of the
interests the majority seeks to protect." Id.
38 Frank B. Cross, Realism About Federalism, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1304, 1306 (1999). Cross
argues that "[r]eferencing the concept of federalism pays lip service to tradition and... can be
used selectively to advance favored ideological policies." Id.at 1324. In addition to the Supreme
Court justices who dissented in Morrison, Judith Resnik is likely the most vocal critic of what
Justice Souter labeled "categorical formalism," Morrison, 529 U.S. at 644 (Souter, J., dissenting);
id.at 640 (observing that "categorical exclusions [in federalism jurisprudence] have proven as
unworkable in practice as they are unsupportable in theory"), and what Resnik calls "categorical
federalism." Resnik argues that categorical federalism
is inaccurate as a description of current practices, .. . undermines the ability to hold
actors politically accountable,... disserves federations to assume that any single level
of government is a consistent source of certain sorts of social change.. . [and] does
special harm to those seeking to alter gender relations.
Resnik, CategoricalFederalism,supra note 16, at 625; see also Resnik, Trial as Error, supra
note 16, at 1003-11; Resnik, Naturally, supra note 16, at 1740-50. For an empirical analysis of
the ideological application of federalism by the Court, see Sue Davis, Rehnquist and State
Courts: FederalismRevisited, 45 W. POL. Q. 773 (1992).
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The legislation and litigation histories of VAWA and FMLA
suggest that these concerns are indeed warranted with respect to the
state sovereignty paradigm of domestic relations. The civil rights
remedy declared unconstitutional in Morrison did not specifically target
domestic relations, and was crafted so as to limit federal judicial
involvement in any family law litigation that was factually related to a
claim brought pursuant to VAWA. 39 Moreover, although Congress did
consider data regarding domestic violence while drafting the Act,
especially during the beginning of the legislative process, 40 the
legislators considered domestic violence as a subset of violence
perpetrated against women in various settings (work, school, and on the
streets) where such violence was likely to affect women's ability to
participate in the economy. 4 1 As such, VAWA is easily understood as
an anti-harassment and anti-discrimination provision that, after
enactment, joined the ranks of dozens of federal civil rights laws passed
pursuant to Congress's commerce powers. Nevertheless, criticism of
VAWA focused on its tendency to embroil the federal government, and
42
specifically the federal courts, in domestic relations matters.
39 As originally introduced, VAWA's civil rights remedy would have applied to a broader
range of violence against women. However, partially in response to federalism-based criticisms
of the bill, Congress limited the remedy to those cases of violence where plaintiffs could show
that the violence was "due... to an animus based on the victim's gender." 42 U.S.C. §
13981(d)(1) (2000). Congress also prohibited concurrent jurisdiction over any state law claims
involving alimony, divorce, or child custody, see id. § 13981(d), (e)(4), and prohibited any
VAWA actions brought in state court from being removed to federal court, 28 U.S.C. § 1445(d)
(2000). For discussions of the legislators' efforts to address criticism that early forms of VAWA
would improperly involve the federal government in domestic relations matters, see Victoria F.
Nourse, Where Violence, Relationship, and Equality Meet: The Violence Against Women Act's
Civil Rights Remedy, 11 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1996); Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae
in Support of Petitioners at 1-3, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
40 See, e.g., Hearing on Domestic Violence: HearingBefore the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary,
103d Cong. (1993); Domestic Violence: Terrorism in the Home: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Children, Family, Drugs and Alcoholism of the Sen. Comm. on Labor and Human Resources,
101st Cong. (1990); Women and Violence: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary,
101st Cong. (1990); see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 629-31 & nn. 2-8 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(listing Congress's findings relating to domestic violence and violence against women generally).
41 See, e.g., Hearing on Domestic Violence: The Need to Concentrate the Fight Against an
Escalating Blight of Violence Against Women: HearingBefore the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary,
103d Cong. 16 (1993) (statement of James Hardeman, Manager, Counseling Department,
Polaroid Corp.); Violence Against Women: Fighting the Fear, Examining the Rise of Violence
Against Women in the State of Maine and in Other Rural Areas: HearingBefore the Sen. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 13-17 (1993) (testimony of Lisa); Violence Against Women:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 102d Cong. 55-58 (1992) (testimony of Jane Doe of New York City); Violence Against
Women: Victims of the System: Hearing on S. 15 Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d
Cong. 239-41 (1991) (statement of Elizabeth Athanasakos, National President, National
Federation of Business and Professional Women, Inc.); S. REP. No. 102-197, at 53 (1991) (noting
studies reporting that almost 50 percent of rape victims lose their jobs or must quit because of the
severity of the crime).
42 For discussions of federalism-based criticism of VAWA, see Siegel, supra note 18, at
1025-30; Resnik, CategoricalFederalism,supra note 16, at 626-29; Nourse, supra note 39, at 13-
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In stark contrast to VAWA, the Family Medical Leave Act did not

set off federalism alarms in the halls of justice. There is no doubt, of
course, that FMLA is a regulation about family-a fact Congress made
no attempt to obscure in naming the statute or during the legislative
debates. Congressional proponents of the bill repeatedly emphasized
the importance of FMLA for American families and articulated very
clearly that the Act was intended in part to disestablish the gendered
social practices that cast women as care-givers and men as
Although Congress considered the federalism
breadwinners. 4 3

implications of FMLA, the discussion was cursory and little, if any,
attention was given to the fact that the statute directly addressed the

relations of family members, hence involving the federal government in
a purported enclave of traditional state authority."a

Moreover, when

FMLA was challenged on federalism grounds before the Supreme
Court, much attention was given to the fact that FMLA was intended to
foster gender equality in the allocation of care-giving responsibilities
within families. 45 However, that statutory purpose was not seen as a
barrier to congressional regulation; instead, it was cited by the Hibbs

18; Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love ": Wife Beatingas Prerogativeand Privacy, 105 YALE L.J.
2117, 2196-201 (1996) [hereinafter Siegel, Rule of Love].
43 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(2) (2000) (finding that "it is important for the development
of children and the family unit that fathers and mothers be able to participate in early childrearing
and the care of family members .... "); see id § 2601 (a)(5) (finding that "due to the nature of the
roles of men and women in our society, the primary responsibility for family caretaking often
falls on women .. "); id. § 2601(b)(1) (listing among the purposes of FMLA, "to balance the
demands of the workplace with the needs of families, to promote the stability and economic
security of families, and to promote national interests in preserving family integrity .... ");
Parental and Medical Leave Act of 1987: Hearings on S. 249 Before Subcomm. on Children,
Family, Drugs and Alcoholism of the Sen. Comm. on Labor and Human Relations, 100th Cong.
440 (1987) (hearing testimony that employers generally award family leave to women, hence
"rob[bing] the baby of a father's nurturing influence,. .. [and] perpetuat[ing] the stereotype that
it is the mother's sole responsibility to raise the child.") [hereinafter Hearings on S. 249].
44 Although federalism emerged as a basis of opposition to FMLA during congressional
debates, the fact that the proposed legislation would involve Congress and the federal government
in domestic relations appears to have received little if any consideration. For example, an
Assistant Attorney General from the Office of Legal Policy testifying in opposition to an early
version of FMLA provided a substantial discussion of federalism implications of the bill, but did
not at any point suggest that the proposed legislation was inappropriate because it involved
Congress in domestic relations. See Hearings on S. 249, supra note 43, at 524-30 (testimony of
Stephan J. Markman, Assistant Attorney General, United States Department of Justice, discussing
objections to the Parental and Medical Leave Act based on the Tenth, Eleventh, and Fourteenth
Amendments).
45 See Brief for the Petitioner at 10-14, Nevada Dep't of Human Res. Servs. v. Hibbs, 538
U.S. 721 (2003) (reciting Congress's focus on the "family-care crisis" as one of the primary
purposes of FMLA); Brief for United States at 22, Nevada Dep't of Human Res. Servs. v. Hibbs,
538 U.S. 721 (2003) (noting that FMLA was enacted in part as a response to "stereotypes
presuming a lack of domestic, family-care responsibilities for male employees"); Brief for the
National Women's Law Center at 5, Nevada Dep't of Human Res. Servs. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721
(2003) (noting that the workplace discrimination targeted by FMLA thwarted "the ability of men
to serve a caretaking function").
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majority as a basis for upholding the statute against an Eleventh
Amendment challenge. Because the Court construed FMLA as a statute
that addresses gender discrimination-even where such discrimination
necessarily involves private allocations of care-giving responsibility
within the family-the Court gave Congress greater latitude to abrogate
46
the states' immunity.

Why the disregard for Congress's intentional foray into an area of
law and policy, purportedly reserved to.the states, in FMLA? It is likely

that FMLA is more easily seen as a labor regulation and, as such, is
more readily understood as addressing a "federal" issue.47 And because
the Court understood Congress's Fourteenth Amendment enforcement

powers to authorize enactment of FMLA, but not VAWA, the gender
discrimination at issue in Hibbs was cognizable as a federal matter,
while the gender discrimination targeted by VAWA was not. 48 Of
course, these explanations do not answer the logic of exceptionalism

that animates the state sovereignty paradigm-which in theory operates
as a categorical exclusion of domestic relations from the ambit of
otherwise legitimate federal regulatory authority. 49 Rather, the
46 See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736 (noting that because FMLA redresses gender discrimination
with respect to the award of family leave, "it was easier for Congress to show a pattern of state
constitutional violations").
47 The Brief for the United States at 20-2 1, Nevada Dep't of Human Res. Servs. v. Hibbs, 538
U.S. 721 (2003), articulates this position:
The FMLA's family-care provision... targets lingering and hard to root out effects of
manifold state statutes and practices that have limited women's opportunities to
participate in the workforce on equal terms, and that perpetuated the stereotypical
employer view of women as workers as less reliable employees because they are
presumed to be the family care givers.
48 See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 727-36; United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619-27 (2000).
The fact that the Court found FMLA to be a permissible exercise of Congress's Fourteenth
Amendment enforcement powers, and found that VAWA was not, has superficial appeal as an
explanation for why FMLA's family-policy dimensions did not give rise to the same sorts of
federalism criticism as VAWA. Given that constitutional sex equality principles are often used to
redress gender stereotypes that derive from women's historically circumscribed roles as wives
and mothers, the argument goes, Congress may very well enact laws concerning domestic
relations when enforcing the sex equality commitments of the Fourteenth Amendment. This
explanation for the disparate treatment of FMLA and VAWA in terms of family and federalism is
ultimately unconvincing. First, notwithstanding the fact that constitutional equality and due
process protections are frequently applied in ways that limit the states' authority to regulate the
family, not everyone agrees that the state sovereignty paradigm is inapplicable in all instances
where constitutional rights are at stake. See, e.g., Nicholson v. Scopetta, 344 F.3d 154, 168 (2d
Cir. 2003) (certifying questions to the New York Court of Appeals in federal constitutional
challenge to the practices of state child welfare agency, noting the need to "defer to state primacy
in areas of traditional state concern, such as family law"). Second, it is not at all clear why
Congress's Article I powers-such as its commerce powers-should not be informed by the
commitments to gender equality embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment. See Jackson, supra
note 20, at 1259. Third, the Court's failure to understand the enactment of VAWA as a legitimate
exercise of Congress's Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers is itself a subject of concern.
See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination
Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441,474-86 (2000).
49 See sources cited in supra notes 26-36 and accompanying text.
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dissonance between the legislative and litigation histories of FMLA and
VAWA confirms the fears of critics of formalist federalism by
demonstrating the ease with which the state sovereignty paradigm of
domestic relations can be-and often is-manipulated or disregarded
entirely.
The existence of hundreds of federal statutes and regulations that
bear on domestic relations in some fashion means that this
inconsistency between federalism theory and federal practice has the
50
potential to destabilize a wide range of federal legislation.
Unsurprisingly, recent judicial attention to the state sovereignty
paradigm has led to speculation about and challenges to the
constitutionality of a host of federal statutes, 5' and has informed debates
50 According to a report prepared by the House Committee on the Judiciary in 1996, "[t]he
word 'marriage' appears in more than 800 sections of federal statutes and regulations, and the
word 'spouse' appears more than 3,100 times." H.R REP. No. 104-664, at 10 (1996), reprintedin
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2914; see, e.g., Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-611, §§ 6-10 94 Stat. 3569 (1980) (codified in pertinent part at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2000))
(extending full faith and credit standard to child custody determinations); Child Support
Enforcement Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-69b (2000) (establishing national program to work with
states in developing and implementing child support enforcement policies and procedures); Child
Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-07 (2000) (establishing comprehensive
federal program directed toward the prevention and treatment of child abuse and neglect); Safe
Homes for Women Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261-66 (2000) (making domestic abuse a federal
crime when the perpetrator crosses state lines).
51 For recent opinions in which federal judges have entertained Commerce Clause challenges
to a federal statute on the basis that it involves the federal government in domestic relations, see
United States v. Cummings, 281 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2002) (rejecting a Morrison-based
constitutional challenge to the International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act); United States v.
Monts, 311 F.3d 993 (10th Cir. 2002) (rejecting a Morrison-basedconstitutional challenge to the
Child Support Protection Act (CSRA)); United States v. Lewko, 269 F.3d 64 (1st Cir. 2001)
(same); United States v. Faasse, 227 F.3d 660, 672 (6th Cir. 2000), rev'd en banc, 265 F.3d 475
(6th Cir. 2001) (invalidating the CSRA as unconstitutional under logic of Morrison); United
States v. Bongiorno, 106 F.3d 1027 (1st Cir. 1997) (rejecting a Lopez-based constitutional
challenge to the CSRA); United States v. Holbrook, No. 2:01CR10023, 2001 WL 672058 (W.D.
Va. Jun. 15, 2001) (rejecting defendant's argument that under Morrison and Lopez, federal law
criminalizing false statements made to firearms dealer violated Commerce Clause where false
statement concerned conviction for misdemeanor domestic violence conviction); United States v.
Kegel, 916 F. Supp. 1233, 1235 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (upholding the CSRA against a challenge based
on the Tenth Amendment and Commerce Clause); United States v. Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. 360
(D. Ariz. 1995), rev'd sub nom, United States v. Mussari,95 F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding
CSRA unconstitutional, citing the states' traditional sovereignty over domestic relations). See
also Brief of the States of Washington, Arkansas, Colorado, Massachusetts, Montana, Oklahoma,
Utah, Vermont, and West Virginia, as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 5 n.1,
Egelhoffv. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141 (2001) (citing Morrison in support of a narrower construction
of ERISA's preemption provision). For examples of scholarly consideration of the impact of
Morrison on federal statutes that arguably address domestic relations, see Daniel R. Zmijewski,
The Child Support Recovery Act and Its ConstitutionalityAfter U.S. v. Morrison, 12 KAN. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 289 (2003); Elizabeth S. Saylor, Federalism and the Family After Morrison: An
Examination of the Child Support Recovery Act, the Freedom of Access to Clinic EntrancesAct,
and a Federal Law Outlawing Gun Possession by Domestic Violence Abusers, 25 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 57 (2002); David B. Kopel & Glenn H. Reynolds, Taking Federalism Seriously:
Lopez and the Partial-BirthAbortion Ban Act, 30 CONN. L. REv. 59 (1997); Joanna S. Liebman,
The Underage, the "Unborn," and the Unconstitutional: An Analysis of the Child Custody
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over the propriety of proposed federal regulation, including regulation
52
of same-sex marriage.
One way to understand the lack of clarity regarding the federal
government's authority to regulate domestic relations is as a
consequence of the growth of federal power in the post-New Deal era,
and the concomitant blurring of the boundaries between federal and
state spheres of power. That historical narrative animates the call for a
"return" of domestic relations to the states: restore, to the greatest extent
possible, the sovereignty of the states over "areas of traditional state
sovereignty" in order to protect the values of federalism. In the process
of restoring these boundaries, some confusion may result, but that is the
price to pay for a return to the proper ordering of federal-state authority.
Protection Act, 11 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 407 (2002); Diane McGimsey, Comment, The
Commerce Clause and Federalism After Lopez and Morrison: The Case for Closing the
Jurisdictional-ElementLoophole, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1675 (2002); Ronald Curtis, Note, Does the
Commerce Clause Provide ConstitutionalRefuge for the Child Support Recovery Act of 1992?:
United States v. Faasse, 46 HOw. L.J. 147 (2002).
52 For example, during congressional debates leading to the enactment of the Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA), Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996) (codified at 1
U.S.C. § 7 (2000) & 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000)), both proponents and critics of DOMA relied on
the notion that states have traditionally enjoyed special sovereignty over family regulation to
support their respective positions. In support of DOMA, Professor Lynn Wardle provided the
following historical explanation:
Since 1789 the broad authority of the states to regulate family relations, and the
concomitant absence of virtually any authority of the federal government to directly
regulate family relations, has been one of the clearest boundary lines of our federalism.
The regulation of family relations historically has been, and as a matter of
constitutional law still remains, primarily a matter of state law.
Concerning S. 1740: A More Perfect Union-Federalism in American Marriage Law: Hearing
Before Sen. Judiciary Comm., 104th Cong. 28 (1996) (written statement of Professor Lynn D.
Wardle). Similarly, Gary Bauer, the President of the Family Research Council, testified in
support of DOMA, stating: "We cannot afford to let judges usurp any more power and tyrannize
an already besieged moral code." Id. at 23 (statement of Gary L. Bauer, President, Family
Research Council). While also relying on a purported history of deference to states in matters
relating to domestic relations, Rabbi David Saperstein took an opposing position on DOMA:
As a doctrinal matter, while the proponents purports [sic] to be protecting states' rights
and interests, they are, in fact, diluting those rights and interests ....
[W]ithout
exception, domestic relations has been a matter of state, not federal, concern and
control since the founding of the Republic.
Defense of MarriageAct: Hearingon H.R. 3396 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 205 (1996) (statement of Rabbi David Saperstein,
Director and Counsel, Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism). Representative Abercrombie
also reasoned from history while urging his colleagues to vote against the pending bill:
If there is any area of law to which States can lay a claim to exclusive authority, it is
the field of family relations. How can someone reconcile being for States' rights while
at the same time taking away a basic, constitutional right given to States by the
Framers of our Constitution?
142 CONG. REC. H7449 (July 11, 1996) (statement of Rep. Abercrombie). In papers filed in
Lawrence v. Texas, defenders of the states' right to criminalize sodomy also invoked the states'
traditional sovereignty over domestic relations. See Motion for Leave to File Amicus Brief and
Amicus Brief of the Center for Marriage Law in Support of Respondent at 23, Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003) (citing Morrison to support the proposition that state sovereignty over
domestic relations protects the states' right to criminalize same-sex sodomy).

FEDERALISM'S FALLACY

2005]

1777

That account sounds plausible, but the historical sources provide a
different explanation for the inconsistency with which the state
sovereignty paradigm is applied. Domestic relations matters have never
existed as a clear fault line between federal and state power. Rather, as
I demonstrate below, federal actors and agencies have always played a
role in the creation of laws, policies, and benefits programs that have
defined and supported families-even during the era of dual federalism,
when the boundaries between federal and state power were most clearly
demarcated. The insistence that the federal government's involvement
in domestic relations matters abrogates state sovereignty effectively
erases that history, and incorrectly portrays federal family regulation as
aberrant and invasive.

II.

THE INHERITED TRADITION OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW

Today, the terms "domestic relations law" and "family law" refer
to those legal principles that govern family formation (who has
membership in a certain family?) and the legal significance attached to
family membership (the rights and duties that arise from one's status in
a family). Although that description seems straightforward, the body of
law it describes is enormous and complex, affecting our rights and
liabilities with respect to almost every area of law, including property,
tort, criminal law, citizenship, tax, evidence, and constitutional law.
Domestic relations law as it was inherited from England by eighteenth5 3 However, because
century Americans was similarly broad in scope.
the common law of domestic relations entrenched rigid status
hierarchies between husband and wife, father and child, and brother and
sister, it was much better suited to an English monarchy than an
American republic.5 4 The dissonance between status-based domestic
relations law and republicanism did not go unnoticed by jurists and
lawmakers of the pre-Civil War era, but reform was a gradual process,
replete with fits and starts. Given the platitude that domestic relations
are, and always have been, a special area of state sovereignty, one might
expect that this process of recognition and reform would have been
53 See MICHAEL GROSSBERG,

GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN

NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 3-4 (1985) (describing the wide range of sources for domestic
relations law in early-nineteenth century America).
54 As historian Linda Kerber has explained, the founders "radically transgressed inherited
understandings of the relationship between kings and men, fathers and sons, ... [but] refused to
destabilize the law governing relations between husbands and wives, mothers and children."
Linda K. Kerber, The Paradoxof Women's Citizenship in the Early Republic: The Case of Martin
vs. Massachusetts, 1805, 97 AM. HIST. REV. 349, 351 (1992) [hereinafter Kerber, Paradox]. See
generally LINDA K. KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC: INTELLECT AND IDEOLOGY IN

REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA (1980) [hereinafter KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC].
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solely a state-level endeavor. In this Part, I briefly introduce the basic
principles of the common law of domestic relations, which are
necessary for understanding the role that federal judges, lawmakers, and
administrators, as well as lawyers appearing in federal court, played in
examining and sometimes disestablishing the unrepublican aspects of
the common law of domestic relations, a topic I turn to in Part III.
Through the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the
disparate components of the common law and equity jurisprudence that
bore on the family were gathered together in volumes and chapters
labeled as the law of "domestic relations" or "baron and feme. '' 55 In
these tomes, William Blackstone and his American disciples-Tapping
Reeve, James Kent, and Nathan Dane-described the various rights,
duties, and liabilities that created the legal relationship between husband
and wife, parent and child, and master and servant, in the household. 56
Under a principle that resembles the modem doctrine of respondeat
superior, the father-husband was the head of the household (or
"householder") and had varying degrees of liability for the conduct of
dependent members of the household (his wife, children, and servants).
In turn, the householder gained certain rights over his dependants with
respect to their person and property. This constellation of rights and
duties, unequal and hierarchical as it was, provided the legal structure
that governed relationships between members of the household
(intrafamily relationships), the relation of the dependants to society, and
even the status relationships between different families (interfamily
relationships).
The rights and duties of marriage provide a useful and welldocumented introduction to the hierarchical logic of the household.
Under the doctrine of "coverture" (variously referred to as "marital
unity" and "merger"), the married couple was a single entity in the eyes
of the law.5 7 Coverture institutionalized a sort of legal guardianship that
55 See GROSSBERG, supra note 53, at 3, 15-16 (discussing early-nineteenth-century treatise
writing on the subject of domestic relations).
56 See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *421-73 (chapters entitled "Husband and
Wife," "Parent and Child," "Guardian and Ward"); 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON
AMERICAN LAW 129-229 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 12th ed. 1873) (1827) (chapters entitled
"Of Husband and Wife," "Of Parent and Child," "Of Guardian and Ward"); 4 NATHAN DANE, A
GENERAL ABRIDGEMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW 289-311, 363-83, 513-24 (Boston,

Cummings, Hillard, & Co. 1824) (chapters entitled "Marriage," "Parent and Child," "Case on
Torts: Bastard Children"); TAPPING REEVE, THE LAW OF BARON AND FEMME (New Haven,
Oliver Steele 1816). For a discussion of the early American chroniclers' departure from and
criticism of Blackstone's articulation of the common law, see NORMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF
THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND PROPERTY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK 43-54

(1982).
57 William Blackstone provided the classic articulation of the doctrine of"marital unity":
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being, or
legal existence of the woman is suspended during marriage, or at least is incorporated
and consolidated into that of the husband: under whose wing, protection, and cover,
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secured the husband's legal and physical control over the wife. Under

coverture, the wife had a duty to obey the husband in virtually all
matters, and enforcement of that duty could be accomplished by the

husband through physical "correction. ' 58 Because of the common law's
presumption that the wife was "acting by [her husband's] compulsion,"
she could not commit any voluntary act: "[A]ll deeds executed, and acts
done, by her, during her coverture, are void .... -59 And because a
married woman was under her husband's legal "protection," she also
was unable to sue for injury to her person or property unless he joined
her in the suit. 60

In short, the husband's role as his wife's private

governor gave rise to his public authority to act on her behalf and her
legal disenfranchisement in nearly every respect.
Other domestic relations (parent-child and master-servant) were
similarly structured. The father exercised extraordinary authority over
the children and servants in his household. As the head of the
household, he had an unquestionable right to punish his children and his
servants using corporal punishment, 6 1 and he had a cause of action for
the loss of their services. 62 Wives had no such rights or claims with

she performs everything; and is therefore called ... afeme-covert ... her husband, [is
called] her baron, or lord; and her condition during marriage is called her coverture.
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 56, at *430. As explained by James Kent, "the legal effects of
marriage are generally deducible from the principle of the common law, by which the husband
and wife are regarded as one person, and her legal existence and authority in a degree lost or
suspended, during the continuance of the matrimonial union." 2 KENT, supra note 56, at 129.
58 In discussing the husband's power over his wife, Blackstone explained that because the
husband was required to "answer for her misbehaviour, the law thought it reasonable to intrust
" I1.BLACKSTONE, supra
him with this power of restraining her, by domestic chastisement .
note 56, at *444-45; see also REEVE, supra note 56, at 65. For a comprehensive discussion of the
husband's right to "correct" his wife through physical "chastisement" in nineteenth-century
America, see Siegel, Rule of Love, supra note 42, at 2123-42, 2154-57.
59 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 56, at *444. Similarly, a married woman could not devise any
property to her husband, "for at the time of making [her will] she is supposed to be under his
coercion." Id.
60 See 2 KENT, supra note 56, at 155 (noting the exception to the rule that afeme sole may not
bring suit without her husband when "the husband was banished, or had abjured the realm, it was
an ancient and another necessary exception to the general rule of a wife's disability to ... sue and
be sued, as afeme sole"). As Linda Kerber has demonstrated, in the late eighteenth century, a
married woman risked dismissal of her suit if she proceeded on her own-even when her husband
was unavailable to join her in court. See KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC, supra note 54, at
151 & n.27.
61 Reeve explained that "moderate corporal correction.., for disobedience .... negligence in
his business, or for insolent behavior" was acceptable for "apprentices and menial servants, who
are members of his family." REEVE, supra note 56, at 374; see also 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note
56, at *452 (discussing the father's right to "correct his child"); 2 KENT, supra note 56, at 204-05
(observing the father's "right of inflicting moderate correction [on his child], under the exercise
of sound discretion"); id. at 261 (noting that a master may give "moderate corporal correction to
his servant, while employed in his service"); TIMOTHY WALKER, INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN
LAW 233, 285 (Philadelphia, Nicklin & Johnson 1837) ("The power of the master over the person
of the apprentice is similar to that of the parent or guardian. If necessary, he may correct him
with moderation, but nothing more.").
62 See JAMES SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 345 (Boston,
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respect to their children. Procedural rules similar to those governing
actions of married -women and giving husbands authority to sue on their
wives' behalf also governed court access of children and, to a lesser
63
degree, servants.
As with the law of persons, the law of property defined the rights
and duties of family members vis-d-vis each other and society at large.
Most infamously, marriage for a woman resulted in the near-complete
abdication of all her property rights. 64
However, although the
unrepublican aspect of laws governing married women's property did

not go unnoticed, 65 the rules governing inheritance were the aspect of

domestic relations property law that most concerned colonists and early
citizens of the United States. In England, the intestate descent of real

property was governed by the doctrine of primogeniture, which had
ensured that real property devolved to the eldest son. 66 Just as "titles of

nobility" and "bills of attainder" were, according to Jack Balkin, forms
of aristocratic and monarchical status that the Revolutionary generation

sought to "dismantl[e] ...in the name of liberty and equality," 67
primogeniture was understood by many as a perpetuation of the oldworld monarchical order. The interfamily hierarchies that resulted from
primogeniture-and the inequalities of wealth and influence between
eldest and younger sons (as adults)-were viewed by many as an
outgrowth of aristocracy that needed to be reformed. 68 Notably, most of
Little, Brown & Co. 1870).
63 See REEVE, supra note 56, at 265. The master could sue third parties for injury to his
servant, or for any action that "deprive[d] him of the services of his servant." CHARLES M.
SMITH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 78 (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson
1852). The "familial" nature of the master-servant relationship was recognized in the procedural
rule that the master could help his servant bring suit without encountering problems of collusivity
("the crime of maintenance"). See REEVE, supra note 56, at 378.
64 As described by Marylynn Salmon in her study of the women and property law in early
America, this common law rule remained in full force in the American states after independence:
After marriage, all of the personal property owned by a wife came under the exclusive
control of her husband. He could spend her money, including her wages, sell her
slaves or stocks, and appropriate her clothing and jewelry. With regard to real property
his rights were almost as extensive. He made all managerial decisions concerning her
lands and tenements and controlled the rents and profits.
MARYLYNN SALMON, WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA 15 (1986); see
also CAROLE SHAMMAS ET AL., INHERITANCE N AMERICA FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE

PRESENT 36 (1987). Laws governing married women's property rights, and the various ways that
wives-to-be (and usually their fathers) used the law of trusts to escape them, are examined in Part
III.C infra.
65 See KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC, supra note 54, at 139-56; BASCH, supra note 56,
at 43-54.
66 See SHAMMAS, supra note 64, at 27; Stanley N. Katz, Republicanism and the Law of
Inheritance in the American Revolutionary Era,76 MICH. L. REV. 1, 10 (1977).
67 Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution ofStatus, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2351 (1997).
68 See Stanley N. Katz, Thomas Jefferson and the Right to Property in Revolutionary
America, 19 J.L. & ECON. 467, 471-72 (1976); Katz, supra note 66, at 11-17. The preambles of
various statutes dismantling primogeniture suggests that concern for equality of inheritance was a
common impetus for reform of property and inheritance laws. See, e.g., 1 THE PUBLIC ACTS OF
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the colonies (or new states) abolished primogeniture, a move that, in
Thomas Jefferson's words, helped to create "a system by which every
aristocracy; and a
fibre would be eradicated of antient [sic] or future
69
foundation laid for a government truly republican."
The fairly dramatic reform of inheritance laws during the late
colonial and early republican periods was exceptional. American states
(and the national government) by and large adopted the canon of
domestic relations law wholesale from England, including laws
governing married women's property. 70 Together, this web of laws
created a hierarchy of reciprocal, but unequal, rights and duties within
the family. Domestic relations law also shaped the relationships among
the family, its individual members, and the polity. For subordinate
members of a household, family membership resulted in an indirect
relationship between the individual and the state, one that was mediated
by the householder in contract formation, litigation, public service, and
sometimes criminal and civil liability. For the householder, family
membership increased his participation in public social relationships
such as lawsuits, jury service, contract formation, commercial
transactions, and other forms of social and political life. Because
householders were men, this system of domestic relations law
necessarily entrenched a gender-based allocation of political, social, and
legal authority throughout the new country.
Though not well sensitized to these tensions, American jurists and
lawmakers of the early national period were not blind to the
inconsistencies between the common law of domestic relations and
various republican ideals, such as participatory citizenship and equality.
At different times, pressure built up around certain aspects of domestic
relations law, requiring jurists and lawmakers to consider whether this
or that practice or legal doctrine could be reconciled with broader tenets
of republicanism. Government actors would sometimes ignore the
obvious tension, sometimes justify the contradiction, and sometimes
propose reform. 71 As I show in the next Part, federal actors, together
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA ch. 22 (James Iredell ed., F.X. Martin Rev.

1804) (declaring that abolition of primogeniture "will tend to promote that equality of property
which is of the spirit and principle of a genuine republic"); Act of Jan. 29, 1794, 2 DEL. LAWS
1172 (1797) (noting that "it is the duty and policy of every republican government to preserve
equality amongst its citizens, by maintaining the balance of property as far as is consistent with
the rights of individuals"). But see SHAMMAS, supra note 64, at 66 (questioning the influence of
"republican sentiment" on the transformation of American intestacy laws). For a comparison of
the views of James Madison and Thomas Jefferson on the subject of republicanizing property
laws in America, see JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 31-34 (1990).

OF

69 THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 44 (Merill D. Peterson ed., 1984).
70 See BASCH, supra note 56, at 43-54.

71 See GROSSBERG, supra note 53, at 3-30 (describing the gradual republicanization of
American domestic relations law); KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC, supranote 54, at 139-55
(discussing contemporary recognition of the apparent tension between republican values and
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with their state-level counterparts, enforced the status-based domestic
relations law that was part of the common law, and also played a part in
the gradual process of reconciling or remedying the inconsistencies
between that body of laws and republican-inspired theories of fairness
and equality.

III.

DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE NATIONAL REPUBLIC

What follows in this Part is a discussion of instances during the
pre-Civil War era in which the federal government took legislative or
adjudicatory action that directly shaped domestic relations law and
policy: the creation and implementation of a pension system for war
widows and orphans; the determination of citizenship rights of married
women; the adjudication of the rights of nonmarital children; and the
determination of the scope and force of what we now call prenuptial
agreements. Together, these cases evidence an early tradition of federal
involvement in domestic relations, and call into question the contention
that the states enjoyed exclusive authority over domestic relations
during the nation's early decades. My point is not that jurists of the preCivil War period understood the federal government to have broad,
unfettered jurisdiction over domestic relations matters. Nor do I ignore
the fact that during the pre-Civil War era some jurists urged that
domestic relations were a matter of exclusive state concern (a fact I
examine more carefully in Part IV.A). Rather, the goal of this Part is to
demonstrate that, as a matter of practice, during the pre-Civil War era,
the federal government did not operate according to the principle that
the states possessed exclusive authority over domestic relations, and, if
judged by their conduct, federal actors did not understand federalism to
require as much.
A.

Widows and Orphans' Revolutionary War Pensions

In the early 1990s, congressional proponents of national welfare
reform argued that "returning" welfare to the states-largely by
dismantling the federal welfare program known as Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC)--comported with a proper understanding
of federalism, and would help remedy the apparent ill-effects of the
welfare system: the creation of a welfare-dependent class of families,
the concomitant breakdown of family unity, and increased out-of-

coverture).
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wedlock births. 72 Implicit and explicit in the rhetoric of return that
dominated the debates over welfare reform in the 1990s was the notion
that, at one point in history, the states rather than the federal
government had been responsible for family assistance programs.
Representative Joe Scarborough of Florida provided a good example of
such rhetoric when, from the House floor, he argued that regulation of
welfare benefits by the national government was inconsistent with early
understandings of American federalism. He explained that a national
government that provides welfare to families "is not the type of
government that Thomas Jefferson and James Madison and George
Washington and Benjamin Franklin and our Founding Fathers intended
for this country":
It was about individualism. It was about the power of communities
and families working together, not looking to Washington to try to
figure out every single problem, but to band together, ... as a
community and as a family and as a State. But that was the whole
idea of States' rights. That is what the Federalist Papers were all
about, about the power of States to conduct a type of welfare reform
or conduct a type of health care reform that they wanted to conduct
instead of having one highly centralized government unit. Is that not
what we were trying to get away from when we had a Revolution
over 200 years ago,. . . to allow families, individuals and
communities to once again decide their own destiny, instead of
having the Federal Government that tells us what doctor we want to
choose, how we want to protect our family....?73
As jingoistic as this invocation of "the founders" is, it nevertheless
tracks the common belief that federal regulation of family welfare
benefits constitutes a centralized intrusion into a regulatory matter that
74
was the one-time province of state governments. It is also an example
of the more general contention-at work in the Supreme Court's
decisions in Lopez and Morrison-that law and policy relating to the
family is an "area[] of traditional state concern" in which Congress may
72 See CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN By REP. NEWT GINGRICH, REP. DICK
ARMEY AND THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO CHANGE THE NATION 65-77 (Ed Gillespie & Bob

Schellhas eds., 1994) (proposing dramatic changes to Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) in order "[t]o reverse skyrocketing out-of-wedlock births that are ripping apart our
nation's social fabric"). The effort to reform AFDC culminated in the Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat.
2105 (1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-17 (2000)).
73 141 CONG. REC. H377-01, H377-01 (Jan. 19, 1995) (statement ofRep. Scarborough).
74 Theda Skocpol explains this common perception of the history of federal welfare policy:
Above all, we have been taught that the U.S. federal government did virtually nothing
about public social provision until the Great Depression and the New Deal of the
1930s. Then at last, in a 'big bang' of social reforms that accompanied many
extensions of federal power into the country's economic and social life, the United
States enacted nationwide social insurance and public assistance policies.
SKOCPOL, supra note 18, at 3-4.
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not intervene. 75 In this section, I examine historical sources that record
and evidence Congress's creation and implementation of the first
national family benefits program, widows and orphans' war pensions:
the pension statutes, their legislative histories, and debates concerning
individual widows' pension applications. 76 These sources call into
question the empirical claim, articulated variously in national legislative
debate and federal jurisprudence, that the federal government's
involvement in domestic relations is a product of modem expansion of
federal power.
Starting with the Continental Congress, the national legislature
enacted a series of pension statutes that provided cash benefits to war
widows and orphans.
Pursuant to these statutes, early national
legislators oversaw the review of thousands of widows and orphans'
pension petitions-a task that involved federal actors in the review of
petitioners' family histories. 77 Congressional debates over the widows
and orphans' war pensions also occasioned charged discussions in
Congress concerning the relationship between republicanism and
domestic relations law: How did women's legal disabilities under
coverture affect their eligibility for a pension? If, in a republic, men
75 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 577 (1995); id at 564 (identifying family as an area
of traditional state concern); see United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615, 615-16 (2000)
("Petitioners' reasoning, moreover, will not limit Congress to regulating violence but may, as we
suggested in Lopez, be applied equally as well to family law and other areas of traditional state
regulation since the aggregate effect of marriage, divorce and childrearing on the national
economy is undoubtedly significant."); sources cited in supra notes 39-42 (describing federalism
objections to VAWA as articulated in legislative debates); see also sources cited in supra note 52
(describing federalism objections to DOMA as articulated in legislative debates).
76 William Glasson's work on military pensions contains the best available overview of the
pre-Civil War pension statutes. See WILLIAM HENRY GLASSON, HISTORY OF MILITARY
PENSION LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1900). Laura Jensen's ground-breaking book on
pre-Civil War pensions provides a sustained analysis of the early military pension system, and
argues that the pension statutes "establish[ed] a vital new source of national-level income
assistance for thousands of citizens and a new partner for state and local entities charged with
caring for the poor." LAURA JENSEN, PATRIOTS, SETTLERS, AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN
SOCIAL POLICY 3 (2003). John Resch provides a sustained analysis of the imagery and rhetoric
that motivated early pension reform in SUFFERING SOLDIERS: REVOLUTIONARY WAR VETERANS,
MORAL SENTIMENT, AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC (1999).

Theda

Skocpol's work on Civil War pensions remains the definitive work on early military pensions, but
does not focus on the pensions of the pre-Civil War era. See SKOCPOL, supra note 18, at 105.
Linda Kerber has also addressed federal and state Revolutionary War widows' pensions in
WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC, supra note 54, at 87-99.
77 In her review of Revolutionary War widows' pension applications, historian Constance
Schulz provides a view into the kind of information regarding widows' marital and childbearing
histories that was submitted in support of widows' pension applications. See Constance B.
Schulz, Daughtersof Liberty: The History of Women in the Revolutionary War Pension Records,
16 PROLOGUE 139, 141, 149 (1984) (observing that widows' pension applications" "shed[] light
upon the courtship patterns of poor women, many of them frontier residents either at the time of
their marriage or after the peace" and contain important information about "poor women's child
bearing experience"); see also text accompanying infra notes 101-13 (examining Congress's
consideration of the pension petition of the widow of Captain William White).
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could articulate a claim against the government, could women make
similar demands? Did women's service as mothers of future citizens of
the republic justify the award of a pension? Although the national
pension system gave rise to significant controversy during the early

national period-and was frequently the subject of congressional
debate-it appears that no one urged that the creation and
administration of the war widows and orphans' pension system was
improper because it embroiled Congress (and other federal actors) in
In Part III.A.1, I provide a general
domestic relations issues.
background to the administration and development of a national war
pension system. In Part III.A.2, I turn to the specific issues that
animated debates concerning widows and orphans' pensions, giving
special attention to how republican theories of family and gender
equality informed the first federal family cash benefits awards.
1.

Republicanism, Equality, and National War Pensions

Had Representative Joe Scarborough been a congressman in the
1790s rather than the 1990s, he would have found that many individuals
and families regularly "look[ed] to Washington" for basic welfare
assistance. As a Representative during that period, Scarborough would
have been aware that over a decade earlier, his predecessors in the
Continental Congress had established a pension system that provided
78
for certain war veterans, widows, and orphans. He would have known
war
that thousands of Revolutionary War veterans, war widows, and
79 He
system.
pension
the
under
relief
orphans petitioned Congress for
78 In 1776, the Continental Congress resolved
[t]hat every commissioned officer, non-commissioned officer, and private soldier, who
shall lose a limb in any engagement, or be so disabled in the service of the United
States of America as to render him incapable afterwards of getting a livelihood, shall
receive, during his life, or the continuance of such disability, the one half of his
monthly pay from and after the time that his pay as an officer or soldier ceases.
5 J. CONT. CONG. 702-705 (1776) (Res. of Aug. 26, 1776). In 1780, the Continental Congress
of
also awarded officers a lifetime half-pay service pension. See 18 J. CONT. CONG. 960-62 (Res.
pension
half-pay
seven-year
a
awarded
Congress
Continental
the
year,
Oct. 10, 1780). The same
to the widows and orphans of officers. See 17 J. CONT. CONG. 773 (1780) (Res. of Aug. 24,
who
1780) (resolving to award a seven-year half-pay pension "to the widows of those officers
have died, or shall hereafter die in the service").
79 See NATIONAL GENEALOGICAL SOCIETY, INDEX OF REVOLUTIONARY WAR PENSION

APPLICATIONS IN THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES (1976) (cataloging veterans' and widows'
Revolutionary War pension applications) [hereinafter INDEX]. John Resch estimates that the
Revolutionary War pension files in the National Archives contain approximately 88,000
See
applications for pensions and bounty lands, including 23,000 widows' pension applications.
RESCH, supra note 76, app. A., at 203. For examples of congressional consideration of veterans'
AND
and family pension applications, see AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: DOCUMENTS, LEGISLATIVE
EXECUTIVE, OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES: CLAIMS 5, at No. 1 (report to Congress
&
concerning the petition of Revolutionary War widow Ruth Roberts) (1790) (Wash. D.C., Gales
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would have been aware that many other veterans and widows who,
strictly speaking, were not pension-eligible under the governing statutes
petitioned Congress for private relief by submitting to Congress
accounts of the hardships they had experienced for their country.8 0 Had
Seaton, 1834) [hereinafter AM. STATE PAPERS: CLAIMS]; AM.
STATE PAPERS: CLAIMS 30, at No.

1 (1791) (report to Congress on the petitions of the widows and orphans
of eight Revolutionary
War officers); H.R.J. 2d Cong., 1st Sess. 440 (Oct. 27, 1791) (considering
petitions of widows or
orphans of six Revolutionary War officers); H.R.J. 2d Cong., 1st
Sess. 500 (Jan. 31, 1792)
(considering petitions of a number of veterans, widows, and orphans of
the Revolutionary War);
H.R.J. 26th Cong., I st Sess. 281-87 (Feb. 5, 1840) (considering petitions
of a number of veterans,
widows and orphans of the Revolutionary War); H.R.J. 27th Cong., 2d.
Sess. 519 (Mar. 12, 1842)
(granting approximately thirty-five petitions of veterans, widows,
and orphans of the
Revolutionary War); see also sources cited in infra note 80.
80 See, e.g., AM. STATE PAPERS: CLAIMS 9, at No. 4 (1790) (report by
the Secretary of War
recommending denial of claims by artillery artificers for a pension of
the amount awarded to
Army officers); AM. STATE PAPERS: CLAIMS 22, at No. 11 (1790) (report
by the Secretary of War
recommending against a pension for officers in the service of state troops);
H.R.J. 2d Cong., 1st
Sess. 500 (Jan. 31, 1792) (considering the petition of Temperance
Holmes, widow of David
Holmes, "late a Physician and Surgeon in the Connecticut Line, praying
that the allowance
granted to the widows of those who died in service, may be extended
to her"); H.R.J. 2d Cong.,
1st Sess. 537 (Mar. 16, 1792) (considering the petition of Ann Gibson,
widow of a colonel "who
died of his wounds received in the late action against the Indians ...
praying that the allowance
granted to the widows and orphans of officers who died in the service
of the United States, during
the late war, may be extended to herself and children"); H.R.J. 2d Cong.,
2d Sess. 662 (Jan. 5,
1793) (passing and referring to the Senate "[a]n engrossed bill to
make compensation to the
widows and orphans of certain persons, who were killed by Indians, under
the sanction of flags of
truce"); AM. STATE PAPERS: CLAIMS 70-71, at No. 35 (1793) (report
by the Secretary of War
recommending that Congress grant the petitions of several widows of the
Battle of Bunker's Hill,
even though their husbands were not in the service of the Continental Line
at the time of death);
AM. STATE PAPERS: CLAIMS 192, at No. 77 (1797) (committee report
recommending denial of
petitions by the heirs and representatives for award of land grants promised
in 1776 to officers
and soldiers of the Revolutionary War); 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: DOCUMENTS,
LEGISLATIVE
AND EXECUTIVE, OF THE CONGRESS OF THE U.S.: INDIAN AFFAIRS 621,
at No. 73 (1797) (Wash.
D.C., Gales & Seaton, 1832-1834) (report of the Committee on Claims
regarding the petition of
the widow of Scolacuttaw, a Cherokee chief killed by frontier settlers);
AM. STATE PAPERS:
CLAIMS 196-97, at No. 85 (1797) (report of the Committee on Claims,
recommending denial of
the petition of Anna Welsh, widow of a Navy captain); AM. STATE PAPERS:
CLAIMS 222, at No.
108 (1800) (report of the Committee on Claims, recommending denial
of the petition of Susannah
Fowle, widow of a deceased Army officer); AM. STATE PAPERS: CLAIMS
282, at No. 140 (1803)
(report of the Committee on Claims, recommending denial of the petition
of Ann Elliot, widow of
an Army contractor who was slain by a party of Indians on the basis that
"[tlhe provision made by
law for the relief of widows and orphans is not sufficiently broad
to embrace cases of this
description"); AM. STATE PAPERS: CLAIMS 508, at No. 341 (1817)
(Committee on Claims
recommendation to grant the petition of the widow and orphans of
Arnold Henry Dohrman, a
merchant who rendered services to the United States during the Revolutionary
War); H.R.J. 16th
Cong., 2d Sess. 236-37 (Feb. 15, 1821) (considering the pension petition
of Catharine Gale, wife
of lieutenant colonel of the Navy who had been dismissed due to "mental
derangement"); H.R.J.
19th Cong., 2d Sess. 108 (Jan. 3, 1825) (considering the petition of Deborah
Davis, "representing
that her husband was a pensioner under the law of 1818; that, after the passage
of the law of 1820,
his name was stricken from the role of pensioners; that he is now very old
and infirm, and subject
to mental derangement; she prays that his name may be again inscribed
on the pension role"); 3
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: DOCUMENTS, LEGISLATtVE AND EXECUTIVE,
OF THE CONGRESS OF
THE UNITED STATES: NAVAL AFFAIRS 24, at No. 332 (1827) (Wash. D.C.,
Gales & Seaton, 18341861) (recommendation by the Committee on Naval Affairs to grant the
pension application of a
widow whose husband had died as a prisoner of war during the
War of 1812, rejecting
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he lived into the early years of the nineteenth century, he would have

known that Congress expanded the federal family pension system to

provide pensions and awards to the widows and orphans of fallen
soldiers and officers of the War of 1812, of frontier battles with Native
8
Americans, and of naval encounters. ' These various pension statutes
H.R.J.
determination of Navy Department) [hereinafter AM. STATE PAPERS: NAVAL AFFAIRS];
the widow of
20th Cong., 2d Sess. 211-12 (Jan. 27, 1829) (considering the pension petition of
Arnold); 4
John Paulding, one of the captors of Major Andre, a British accomplice of Benedict
CONGRESS OF
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: DOCUMENTS, LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE, OF THE
& Seaton,
THE UNITED STATES: MILITARY AFFAIRS 282, at No. 436 (1830) (Wash. D.C., Gales
of the
1832-1861) (recommending denial of petition of the widow of a murdered superintendent
4
AFFAIRS];
MILITARY
PAPERS:
STATE
AM.
[hereinafter
Ferry)
Harper's
United States armory at
of the
AM. STATE PAPERS: NAVAL AFFAIRS 93, at No. 472 (1832) (recommending expansion
statutes); 7
Navy pension fund to extend to certain widows not contemplated under then-current
that
AM. STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS 926-27, at No. 777 (1838) (recommendation
deceased
a
of
widow
the
by
submitted
enhancement
pension
for
Congress grant the application
A. Mark, The
Army officer). For analyses of the early national petition system, see Gregory
FORDHAM L.
66
Petition,
to
Right
the
of
Significance
and
History
The
Vestigial Constitution:
for the
REV. 2153 (1998); Stephen A. Higginson, Note, A Short History of the Right to Petition
(1986).
142
L.J.
YALE
96
Redress of Grievances,
81 See, e.g., Act of Mar. 16, 1802, ch. 9, § 15, 2 Stat. 132, 135 (1802) (providing a five-year
peace
pension to the widows and orphans of any commissioned officer in "the military
death or
establishment of the United States," and further providing that "in the case of
years, the half
intermarriage of such widow before the expiration of the said term of five
ch. 54, §
pay... shall go to the child or children of such deceased officer"); Act of Apr. 10, 1812,
officers
the
of
orphans
and
widows
the
for
pension
five-year
a
(providing
2, 2 Stat. 704 (1812)
against
and soldiers, "volunteers or militia," who were killed "in the late campaign on the Wabash
of such
intermarriage
or
death
the
of
case
the
"in
that
providing
further
and
the hostile Indians,"
widow, before the expiration of the term of five years, the half pay, for the remainder of the term,
shall go to the child or children of such deceased officer or soldier .. "); Act of Jan. 20, 1813,
orphans of
ch. 10, 2 Stat. 790, 790-91 (1813) (providing a five-year pension for the widows or
death or
the
of
case
the
"in
that
providing
further
and
service,
in
die
who
Navy
officers of the
for the
pay
half
the
years,
five
of
term
the
of
intermarriage of such widow, before the expiration
2, 1813, ch. 40,
Aug.
of
Act
officer");
deceased
such
of
children
or
child
the
to
go
shall
remainder
of militia
3 Stat. 73, 74 (1813) (providing a five-year pension to "the widows and orphans
of the death or
case
the
"in
that
providing
further
and
States,"
Unites
the
of
service
the
in
slain...
pay for the
intermarriage of such widow, before the expiration of the term of five years, the half
1814, ch. 20,
4,
Mar.
of
Act
officer");
deceased
such
of
children
or
child
the
to
go
shall
remainder
§ 1, 3 Stat. 103 (1814) (providing a five-year pension to the widows or orphans of "any officer,
of
seaman or marine serving on board any private armed ship or vessel bearing a commission
the
of
case
the
"in
that
providing
further
and
service,
letter of marque," or in the Navy, who die in
half-pay
death or intermarriage of such widow before the expiration of the term of five years, the
Apr. 16,
of
Act
deceased");
the
of
for the remainder of the term shall go to the child or children
and
1816, ch. 55, § 1, 3 Stat. 285, 285-86 (1816) (providing a five-year pension to widows
death
of
case
the
"in
that
providing
further
and
1812,
orphans of soldiers who died in the War of
for the
or intermarriage of such widow before the expiration of said five years, the half pay
ch.
1817,
3,
Mar.
of
Act
decedent");
said
of
children
or
remainder of the time shall go to the child
of Navy
60, 3 Stat. 373, 373-74 (1817) (providing a five-year pension to widows and orphans
and further
seamen or officers who died as a consequence of injuries sustained in the line of duty,
of
providing that "in the case of the death or intermarriage of such widow, before the expiration
or
child
the
to
go
shall
term,
the
of
remainder
the
for
the said term of five years, the half pay
the
children of the deceased"); Act of June 30, 1834, § 1, ch. 134, 4 Stat. 714 (1834) (extending
"provided that
term of a previously enacted pension for the widows of naval officers and seamen,
Act of July 4,
every pension hereby granted shall cease on the death or marriage of such widow");
of officers
widows
to
pension
five-year
a
(providing
(1836)
128
1836, ch. 362, § 3, 5 Stat. 127,
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and awards-and perhaps especially the Revolutionary War pension
statutes-were a source of protracted congressional debate, not because
they tread into an area of law and policy reserved to the states,
but
because of deep disagreement over how to craft a pension system
that
was consistent with republican values. 82
Indeed, any suggestion that Congress's administration or review of
pensions violated state sovereignty would likely have been met
with
incredulity, not because pensions were a military-related benefit,
but
because the states had initially been given the responsibility
to
administer the pension system, and had failed to honor a substantial
portion of the claims filed by pension-eligible veterans, widows,
and
orphans. 83 In 1792, Congress nationalized the administration
of the
pension system, enlisting federal judges to make initial determinations
regarding individuals' pension eligibility, subject to the approval
of the
Secretary of War and Congress. 84 This plan was rebuffed by
federal
judges who, soon after the 1792 statute was enacted, opined
in
Hayburn 's Case that the statute violated separation of powers principles
implicit in Article III by allowing Congress to review decisions
of
federal judges. 85 In part as a consequence of that opinion, Congress
and
its designees assumed significant responsibility for the evaluation
of
individual pension applications. 86 Significantly, Hayburn's Case
did
and soldiers who died in the service of the United States prior to
April 20, 1818).
82 As the recent works of Jensen and Resch have ably demonstrated,
attitudes toward military
pensions varied significantly during the first three decades of the
nation's existence. Many were
concerned that any pension system was an unrepublican class-based
benefits program, while
others believed that republican values mandated pensions and
that the existing system was
miserly and discriminatory. See JENSEN, supra note 76, at 65
(observing that many identified
military service pensions with a standing army, and viewed both
as an affront to republican
values); id.at 72-79 (describing shifts in attitudes toward military
pensions); RESCH, supra note
76, at 5, 65-92 (describing the image of the "suffering soldier" as
a trope in pro-pension rhetoric,
and arguing that it was "the catalyst for legitimizing the Continental
Army as a republican
institution, and for reversing the Founders' policy against service
pensions").
83 Under the early design of the Revolutionary War pension system,
claims were evaluated by
the states and pensions paid out of state coffers, to be reimbursed
by the national treasury upon
application to Congress (an early form of "cooperative federalism,"
to be certain). See GLASSON,
supra note 76, at 15; INDEX, supra note 79, at xi-xii.
84 See Act of Mar. 23, 1792, ch. 11, §§ 2-4, 1 Stat. 243, 243-44
(1792). In 1789, and then
again in 1792, Congress officially obligated the federal government
to honor the pensions
promised by the Continental Congress. See id.§ 1; Act of Sep.
29, 1789, ch. 24, 1 Stat. 95, 95
(1789). Officers and soldiers who were "disabled in actual service"
received a half-pay pension
for life, while widows of officers who died in service received
a seven-year half-pay pension
under the terms established in 1780. See 17 J. CONT. CONG. 773
(1780) (Res. of Aug. 24, 1780);
§ 1, 1 Stat. at 243-44; see also sources cited in supra note 78 and
accompanying discussion.
85 See Haybum's Case, 2 U.S. (I Dall.) 408 (1792).
86 Responding to Hayburn's Case, Congress modified the administration
of the pension
system in 1793. See Act of Feb. 28, 1793, ch. 17, 1 Stat. 324
(1793). Under the 1793 Act the
federal judiciary was still required to assist in the administration
of pension claims by taking the
oaths of individual claimants living in their judicial district.
See id.§ 1. That evidence was
transmitted to the Secretary of War, who then presented the
evidence to Congress for final
decision making. See id.§ 2. Congress slightly revised the process
of reviewing Revolutionary
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not occasion the return of the administration of the pension system to

the states, nor does that appear to have been entertained as a viable

option for redressing the separation of powers defects identified in the
1792 pension statute. After the 1792 Act and the reforms following

Hayburn's Case, direct administration of federal military pensions by
national actors was standard procedure.

Nationalizing the administration of the military pensions did not
resolve the more fundamental difficulties of the system. The early
military pensions were relatively limited in scope and drew what many

thought to be arbitrary lines between those who were pension-eligible
and those who were not. As historian Laura Jensen has argued,
"[b]ecause most of America's original entitlement programs were very

selective, distributing benefits to relatively small subsets of the
American people, they gave rise to debates both in and out of Congress
about the meaning of distributive justice[,] redistributive obligation"

and, ultimately,
government.

87

of the nature of citizenship in a republican

Congress frequently received petitions from veterans

seeking more substantial pension awards, longer periods of 88eligibility,

Despite
and pensions for those not provided for by existing statutes.
patriotic support for veterans, there was significant principled and
with
practical resistance to service-based pensions (as contrasted
89
To
unobjectionable).
generally
disability pensions, which were
their
and
veterans
overcome the resistance to expanded pensions,

supporters invoked battlefield valor and sacrifice as a basis for veterans'

1793 Act. See Act of
War pension applications in 1803, but retained the basic framework of the
gave the Secretary of
Congress
Act,
1803
the
In
(1803).
243
242,
Mar. 3, 1803, ch. 37, 2 Stat.
see id. § 2, but
War final decision making with respect to Revolutionary War invalid pensions,
pensions,
military
other
many
to
respect
with
authority
Congress retained final decision-making
of Mar. 3, 1815, ch.
see, e.g., Act of Apr. 10, 1806, ch. 25, §§ 1-5, 2 Stat. 376, 377 (1806); Act
thirty-seven
80, 6 Stat. 153 (1815) (directing the Secretary of War to place approximately
veterans on the pension roles); see also sources cited in supra note 80.
87 JENSEN, supra note 76, at 11; see id. at 54 ("Arguments over the provision [of federal
attempt to construct the
service pensions] were thus an integral part of the American people's
76, at 5 (observing that
note
supra
RESCH,
also
see
nation.");
new
the
in
meaning of citizenship
"helped to shape
pensions
military
over
the image of the "suffering soldier" prevalent in debates
bill [of
pension
the
over
debate
public
and
congressional
the
during
national identity
of
spread
the
and
man
common
1818][and]... reinforced the elevation of the
virtue").
civic
of
ideal
republican
the
retained
also
it
Yet,
democracy ....
88 See, e.g., sources cited in supra notes 79-80.
contrasted with
89 See JENSEN, supra note 76, at 50 (observing that service pensions, as
57-58, 76
53-54,
at
id.
army);
standing
a
to
disability pensions, were believed to be a prelude
the pension
of
expansion
that
basis
the
on
legislation
pension
proposed
to
(examining objections
4 (observing that "the
system would create unjust inequality); RESCH, supra note 76, at
the resistance to
informed
army"
standing
a
of
distrust
ideological
generation's
Revolutionary
system would
pension
the
expanding
that
service pensions). Congressmen also complained
("If every man who
(1791)
216
CONG.
OF
ANNALS
3
e.g.,
See,
government.
national
the
bankrupt
had suffered in the cause of America was to be relieved in proportion to his losses and distresses,
of the claimants could
the whole revenue of the United States would be drained before one half
taste the bounty of Congress, &c.").

1790

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:5

claim on the national coffers. Veterans urged congressmen, and propension congressmen concurred, that in a republic veterans should be
compensated for their service to the nation: "It was for the nation at
large that these men fought and bled; it was for the country they
encountered all their hardships, and it is from the national Treasury that
they ought to be reimbursed." 90 In the words of one Representative,
veterans "have not wasted their time in the pleasures of the ball room,
and in the amusements of fashionable circles," but rather
foregoing the endearments of domestic life, [they] have sought the
tented fields. They have met your enemy, trodden the bloody arena,
sustained your eagles, and achieved victory in the jaws of death.
They have borne from the plain of battle the laurels of conquest; but
have returned, seamed with scars, disfigured by frightful wounds, or
deprived of their limbs.... In these they exhibit the mournful, yet
proud, monuments of their valor and devotion to their country. 9 1
Because of veterans' battlefield service, republican governments had
a
"duty" to ensure that they did not die in penury. Using the language of
republicanism, a national magazine admonished the national
government for failing to fulfill that duty:
Are republics necessarily framed to be, in all respects, ungrateful?
Will they bestow on their champions and benefactors neither riches
nor honours, gratification nor fame? Must their warriors fight in the
character of amateurs, purely for the sake of killing and dying and
when they fall must Oblivion receive them to her blighting
embrace? ...[Piosterity must never be allowed to blush for their
forefathers, from finding unperformed a task which primarily and
peculiarly belongs to those of the present day.92
By and large, veterans were fairly successful in their efforts to
extend and expand pension benefits. In 1818, the class of pensioneligible Revolutionary War veterans was enlarged to include any
veteran-officer or soldier-who was, "by reason of his reduced
circumstance in life, . . . in need of assistance from his country for
support, ' 93 thus introducing the first needs-based test for
benefits into
federal law. By the end of the pre-Civil War period, the federal
government was spending, on average, approximately $958,000 per
90 31 ANNALS OF CONG. 196 (1818) (statement of Sen. Goldsborough);
see RESCH, supra
note 76, at 85-89, 93-95 (examining the rhetoric of republicanism and gratitude
that typified propension advocacy by and for the veterans of the Revolutionary War).
91 31 ANNALS OF CONG. 538 (1818) (statement of Rep. Comstock)
(advocating invalid
pensions for the officers of the Army wounded in the War of 1812).
92 Oliver Oldschool, To Readers and Correspondents,4 PORT FOLIO
340 (Sept. 1814) (3d
series).
93 Act of Mar. 18, 1818, ch. 19, §1, 3 Stat. 410, 410 (1818). For
a discussion of the
legislative debates leading to the enactment of the Pension Act of
1818, and the important
ideological shift in the reasoning behind military pensions that Act represented,
see RESCH, supra
note 76, at 99-118.
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year on military pensions (which, inflation adjusted, is equivalent to
94
about $19 million per year). While these numbers were later dwarfed
by the pension system created for Civil War veterans, they represented a
handsome portion of federal spending: between 1819 and the mid1830s, military pension payments 95accounted for twelve to twenty
percent of the annual federal budget.
2.

Equal Pensions for Widows

Widows and orphans' pensions were, from the beginning, a
standard component of the military pension system. But, like veterans'
pensions, the size and scope of family pension entitlements were a
source of disagreement. During the 1790s and 1800s, Congress
received thousands of applications from war widows seeking pensions,
and various congressmen adopted the cause of expanding statutory
96
coverage for widows. Like veterans, widows and their advocates met
with resistance from those who believed that a pension system was
inconsistent with republican values, such as equality and selfsufficiency, and those who simply thought that the public fisc was better
97 The process of seeking votes for expanded
spent on other matters.
pensions for widows required advocates to invoke a different model of
republican citizenship than the heroic-soldier ideal that typified
advocacy for expanded veterans' pensions-a model of citizenship that
accommodated the legal restrictions that domestic relations law
imposed on women. Accordingly, in their effort to justify a claim on
the public coffers, as I show below, widows could not allude to valorous
deeds in battle or courageous conduct in the face of grievous wounds,
but they could, and did, invoke their service to the nation as mothers.
On a more basic level, Congress's involvement in the
administration of the pension system also consistently involved
94 See GLASSON, supra note 76, at 70 (calculating that on the eve of the Civil War, "[t]he
actual expenditure
aggregate annual value of [federal military pensions] was $958,000, and the
the inflation-adjusted
during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1861, was $1,072,000"). I calculated
Because
figure using a widely available inflation calculator at http://www.westegg.com/inflation.
the U.S. government did not begin collecting data currently used to calculate inflation until 1913,
somewhat
the calculation of the inflation-adjusted value of money prior to 1913 is necessarily
speculative.
95 See JENSEN, supra note 76, fig. 3.9, at 118.
96 See sources cited in supra notes 79-80.
97 See, e.g., 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 396 (1818) (statement of Rep. Simkins) (arguing against a
of 1812 militia on
five-year extension of the pension granted to widows and orphans of the War
id. at 408
enterprise");
and
industry
of
spirit
the
"weaken
would
it
alia,
inter
the basis that,
to
granted
pension
the
of
extension
(statement of Rep. Butler) (arguing against a five-year
result in
would
extension
the
that
basis
the
on
militia
1812
of
War
the
of
widows and orphans
"discrimination between the families of the militia and of the regulars").
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national-level actors in the details of family pensions, and hence

domestic relations law and policy. Widows seeking war pensions were
required to provide Congress with documentation demonstrating a valid
marriage to a properly ranked veteran, a sworn statement that they
had

not remarried, and details regarding any children they had born. 98 That
information was frequently directed to the Department of War, which

would make a recommendation regarding the proper disposition of
the
application to the House of Representatives.99 The House Committee

on Claims would typically review the recommendation and application,
and then present the matter for a vote by the House. 100 This process of

review, along with the process of debating the proper scope of widows'

pension statutes, brought congressmen into the world of domestic

relations law, and brought domestic relations law into the national
legislative and administrative systems.
One widow's petition for private relief aptly demonstrates how

family pension statutes involved congressmen in domestic relations

matters, and tracks the larger debate regarding widows' pensions.
The

petitioning woman was the widow of Captain William White, who was

killed in battle during the Revolutionary War.' 0 ' Because Captain
White had been an officer in the Continental Line, the legislators did
not
question that his widow was due seven years' half-pay under
the
pension scheme established in 1780.102 However, owing to either
the
petitioner's own misfeasance or the government's misadministration,
her pension application had not been processed until after the expiration
98 The Index of Revolutionary War Pension Applications in the National
Archives provides
the following description of the pension application process for widows:
Generally the process required an applicant to appear before a court
of record in the
State of his or her residence to describe under oath the service for which
a pension was
claimed. A widow of a veteran was required to provide information
concerning the
date and place of her marriage. The application statement or "declaration,"
as it was
usually called, with such supporting papers as property schedules,
marriage records,
and affidavits of witnesses, was certified by the court and forwarded
to the official ....
INDEX, supra note 79, at xii; cf Schulz, supra note 77, at 141, 149
(noting that women often
submitted depositions in order to prove their marriage to a deceased
Revolutionary War soldier or
officer, and that widows' pension applications generally contained
information regarding the
widow's childbearing history).
99 See, e.g., Act of Feb. 28, 1793, ch. 17, §2, 1 Stat. 324 (1793); AM.
STATE PAPERS: CLAIMS
70-71, at No. 35 (1793) (report by the Secretary of War recommending
that Congress grant the
petitions of several widows of the Battle of Bunker's Hill, even though
their husbands were not in
the service of the Continental Line at the time of death).
100 See, e.g., AM. STATE PAPERS: CLAIMS 196-97, at No. 85 (1797)
(report of the Committee
on Claims, recommending denial of the petition of Anna Welsh,
widow of a captain of the
marines); AM. STATE PAPERS: CLAIMS 222, at No. 108 (1800)
(report by the Committee on
Claims, recommending denial of the petition of Susannah Fowle,
widow of a deceased Army
officer); HOUSE COMM. ON CLAIMS, 1 th Cong., REPORT ON
THE PETITION OF ELIZABETH
HAMILTON 3 (Comm. Print 1810); see also sources cited in supra
note 80.
101 See 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 213 (1791).
102 See id; AM. STATE PAPERS: CLAIMS 25, at No. 15 (1791)
(discussing the petition of the
Widow of Captain William White).
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of the statute of limitations. Statutes of limitations were easily waived,

but Widow White's claim was further clouded by the fact that she had
remarried after her seven years of pension eligibility ended. 10 3 Under
the 1780 pension statute, remarriage immediately terminated a widow's

pension benefits. 04 In Widow White's case, Congress faced a novel
question: if Congress waived the statute of limitations, could it treat the
widow's pension application as if it had been received while she was
unmarried, and thus pension-eligible, or did waiver of the limitations
period simply allow the widow to apply for the pension in her current
status as afeme covert?

The requirement that only unmarried widows could receive a
pension was common to virtually all pre-Civil War family pension
statutes. 10 5 If a widow with no children remarried-or "intermarried,"
10 6 If a
to use the statutory language-the pension simply terminated.
widow with children remarried, the pension was paid to the officer's
children rather than the widow. Under this rule, the War Claims
Commission recommended that Congress deny Widow White's
application for payment of the pension to her directly, and instead
10 7
recommended that Congress award the pension to her children.
Although this result complied with the governing statute, Widow White
petitioned Congress to reject the Commission's recommendation. Her
supporters urged that her petition be granted on the basis that "the
widow of a deceased officer, even in case of intermarrying, was ...still
entitled to that part of the half-pay annuity which had accrued previous
to the marriage; more especially [because] ...she had in the interim
10 8
incurred some expense for the maintenance of the orphan children."'
103 See 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 213 (1791).
104 See 17 J. CONT. CONG. 773 (1780) (Res. of Aug. 24, 1780) (noting that "in case of her
death or intermarriage, the said half pay [pension] be given to the orphan children of the officer
dying as aforesaid, if he shall have any left").
105 See sources cited in supra note 81. This rule appears to have been modified slightly only
once. In 1837, Congress provided that a Revolutionary War widow would not be deprived of a
pension under the Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 362, § 3, 5 Stat. 127 (1836), "in consequence of her
having married after the decease of the husband for whose services she may claim... :Provided,
That she was a widow at the time [that the Act of July 4, 1836] was passed." Act of Mar. 3,
1837, ch. 42, § 1, 5 Stat. 187, 187 (1837). Thus, after 1837, re-widowed Revolutionary War
widows were pension-eligible.
106 See 17 J. CONT. CONG. 773 (1780) (Res. of Aug. 24, 1780); see also sources cited in supra
note 81.
107 See AM. STATE PAPERS: CLAIMS 25, at No. 15 (1791); 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 213 (1791).
108 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 213 (1791) (Statement of Rep. Smith). Similarly, Representative
Sedgwick argued:
[T]hat the claim to the annuity accrued to the widow immediately on the death of the
officer; that she had a right, from day to day; that, if the contract of Government had
been performed, she would have received the whole previous to her marriage. He
would therefore move to strike out 'the orphan children,' for the purpose of inserting
the name of their mother.
Id.(statement ofRep. Sedgwick).
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Widow White's petition created significant confusion among
congressmen, and their debates serve to highlight the ways in which
married women's legal and financial dependency confounded their legal
rights and their relationship with the polity. Some members of
Congress argued that Widow White had an "indisputable title" to the
pension-an ostensibly liberated view of her right to a pension. Thus,
Representative Livermore observed that as Widow White had not
remarried during the seven years for which she was entitled to the halfpay, "her claim must still hold good; it was a right given to her for her
own use-not to pay her husband's debts."' 109 Because of the operation
of coverture, however, others argued that Captain White's orphans
should receive the pension, as the widow was now under the care of a
new husband. Under this model, the widow was simply the beneficiary
of a debt owed to her late husband-a debt that was better paid directly
to the deceased officer's children once the widow acquired an
alternative source of support. 110 One representative took a fairly rigid
position regarding Widow White's claim:
[T]he only right acquired by the widow, on the death of her husband,
was the right of applying for the provision; instead of making the
application, she had intermarried; and that intermarriage operate[s]
as a renunciation of the provision .... As to any expense by her
incurred for the maintenance of the children; if the children receive
an estate from the public, that estate becomes chargeable with their
maintenance; and the widow will come in like every other
creditor. I I
According to other legislators, the logic of coverture also counseled
redirection of the pension to the deceased officer's children on the basis
that, by operation of coverture, any money Widow White received was
the property of her new husband. Recognizing this fact, Representative
Williamson and others warned that "if it now be given to her new
husband, [the children] will be excluded from all participation in it."1 12
Widow White's case illustrates the practical and theoretical
difficulties created by the tension between republican conceptions of
109 Id. (statement of Rep. Livermore).
110 See id at 214 (statement of Rep. Williamson) ("[O]n the marriage of the widow she had
forfeited her claim, which then devolved to her children; he wished, therefore, the half-pay should
go to them."). Representative Bourne similarly explained that:
[B]y the intermarriage (though after the expiration of seven years) the widow had
relinquished her claim to the pension: the right she had acquired by the death of her
husband, was only what the law calls "chose in action;" it had only accrued to her
conditionally; and as she had not reduced it into possession previous to her marriage,
she could have no pretensions to it after, as the resolution of Congress expressly says,
that if the widow marries, the pension shall go to the children.
Id. at 214 (statement of Rep. Bourne).
Ill Id. at 213 (statement of Rep. Ames).
112 Id. (statement of Rep. Williamson).
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citizenship and the status-based household. On the one hand, at least
some of the legislators seemed to recognize that Widow White had an

independent claim for a pension, as it was a right given to her "for her
own use."

On the other hand, they also knew that once remarried,

widows lost ownership of all chattel property and cash. In the end, the

congressmen effectively dodged the issue by deciding that Widow
it was a
White's predicament was better left for a court of law,1' as
"question of property between the widow and the orphans." 13

The conceptual conundrum caused by widows' pensions was not
so easily evaded, however, and was writ large in debates over various
legislative proposals to expand family pensions: extending the duration
of widows and orphans' pensions,' 14 extending the statute of limitations

for widows' claims, 115 or broadening the category of widows and
16
orphans who could receive a pension.' Widow White's claim in 1791
that she personally should be awarded the widow's pension because of

the costs she encountered raising her children presaged arguments that

would become standard during the heated congressional pension

debates of the 1810s: that widows deserved more generous pensions as
compensation for their service to the republic in raising the next
generation of republican citizens. This understanding of women's role
in the republic challenged, albeit gently, the traditional understanding of

women as subjects of the household, and promoted a model of national
citizenship based on women's service to the republic.
For example, in 1818, while supporting a bill to provide an
additional "five years' half-pay to the widows and children of officers
113 Id. at 215 (statement of Rep. Smith); see also Act of Mar. 27, 1792, ch. 13, 6 Stat. 6 (1792)
(awarding the widow and orphans of Captain William White a pension of "seven years' halfpay").
114 Because widows' pensions were awarded for terms of five or seven years, the issue of
extension arose frequently. See, e.g., H.R. 37, 15th Cong. (1818) (a bill to extend the duration of
pensions awarded to the widows and orphans of the War of 1812 for five years); Act of Jan. 22,
1824, ch. 15, 4 Stat. 4 (1824) (half-pay pensions to widows and orphans of veterans who died in
the War of 1812 extended for five additional years); Act of Apr. 9, 1824, ch. 34, 4 Stat. 18 (1824)
(five-year pension extension granted to widows and orphans of privateers who died in service to
the United States); Act of May 23, 1828, ch. 72, §1, 4 Stat. 288 (1828) (five-year pension
extension granted to widows and orphans of naval officers, seamen, and marines who died in the
War of 1812); Act of July 7, 1838, ch. 189, 5 Stat. 303 (1838) (granting five-year pension to
certain widows of Revolutionary War veterans).
115 See, e.g., Act of Mar. 23, 1792, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 243 (1792) (extending the statute of
limitations on widows and orphans' pensions by two years); Act of May 26, 1824, ch. 190, 4 Stat.
71 (1824) (extending the statute of limitations for pension applications by widows and orphans of
privateers who died in service to the United States).
116 See 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 852 (1793) (considering a bill that would expand the class of
pension-eligible Revolutionary war widows and orphans); SEN. J., 12th Cong., 1st Sess. 84-85
(Mar. 26, 1812) (considering a bill to expand family pensions to include widows and orphans of
"the non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the volunteers or militia" who served in a
campaign against the Wabash Indians); Act of Mar. 3, 1837, ch. 42, 5 Stat. 187 (1837) (providing
a pension for Revolutionary War widows who had remarried and were re-widowed, but only for
the limited period during which they remained unmarried).
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and soldiers" of the War of 1812,117 Representative Southard of New
Jersey maintained that "the needy families of those who lost their lives
in the conflict [are] entitled to the attention of the Government," in part
because by providing such support the government would reward the
widowed mothers for tutoring a new generation of republican citizens:
[I]n monarchical and despotic Governments, injustice and oppression
may answer; but in a Republic, a different line of conduct must be
pursued. The interest of despots is to lay upon the body of their
subjects the iron hand of poverty, and by oppression to extort
obedience and command their services. But our interest is to be just
and liberal to that class of citizens on whom the liberty and
independence of their country so much depend. Do ample justice to
surviving widows, and they will teach their sons to revere the
Government that has nourished them in their feeble infancy-that
country which became their protector when deprived of a father's
guardian care.
Let tyrants oppress their slaves, and compel them to fight in the
battles of their oppressors: but such a system of policy will not suit
the genius of a Republic.... Regard the widow of the fallen soldier;
feed and nourish his orphan children; let the Government become
their guardians; impress these ideas on the public mind; let them
realize your bounty; and your liberties will be secure. 118
Republican government-and a republican conception of
citizenship-required Congress to nurture the allegiance of its people,
and such nurturing started at home with the widows of fallen soldiers.
Representative Harrison of Ohio used a similar rhetorical tactic, adding
that women were uniquely qualified to undertake the tasks of republican
education that would protect Americans' "liberties":
The pious and patriotic mothers to whom [the pension] will be given
will employ it in the education of their sons, and they will never
cease to remind them of the obligations they owe to their country.
"Emulate the patriotism of your father," will be the reiterated lesson
117 31 ANNALS OF CONG. 872 (1818); see also H.R. 37, 15th Cong.(1818).
118 Id.at 875-77 (statement of Rep. Southard). Like Representative Southard, Representative
Harrison understood that a pension system should reflect the values of republicanism, thus
distinguishing American republicanism from European monarchy:
[H]owever true [a principle of economy] may be when applied to monarchies, I deny
its correctness when applied to a republic. The strength of a republic consists in the
correct principles of its citizens. Money is therefore never misapplied when it is used
to disseminate correct principles among the people.... Ask [the American
ploughman] if he is willing that [the families of fallen soldiers] should be supported
from the Treasury, and he will answer, that, although poor, he is just and honest;
although not a lettered man, he knows the source of happiness he enjoys; of the
immense distance, as to rights, which separates him from the ploughman of Europe-a
distance as great as the wide ocean which rolls between them.
33 ANNALS OF CONG. 382 (1818) (statement of Rep. Harrison).
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from childhood to manhood. To have such lessons taught to every
youth in the country, I... should be willing to give the yearly
balances which may remain in the Treasury for fifty years to come.
There is something in the female character admirably calculated to
gain an ascendancy over the minds of those violent but generous
youths, who are formed by nature to act a splendid part upon the
theatre of the world; and who, when a proper direction is given to
their passions, become the friends and benefactors of mankind. They
listen with more attention to the mild admonitions1 19of the mother,
than to the rougher mandates of an imperious father.
Under this theory, the American mother-like the soldier-played a
direct role in the creation of the republican polity, and through that role
she earned her right to a pension. As articulated by one Representative,
"[t]hey are the widows and orphans of the great American family-they
belong to the Republic, and it is our solemn duty to provide for
20
them."1
The view of motherhood that animated the various attempts to
enlarge widows' pensions represented, at least rhetorically, a
recognition of women as participants in the construction of a republican
nation-a departure from the legal theories underpinning the common
law household, theories in which women were cast in the role of legal
and political dependants with no place in the political realm and no
121
In the rhetoric used to promote
direct relationship with the state.
increased benefits, congressmen transmogrified a widow's claim to a
pension from an indirect claim (based on their relationship of
dependency to their fallen soldier-husbands) to a direct claim based on
her personal service as a mother. Just as soldiers had earned their
pensions on the battlefield, widows earned theirs through their work as
the educators and care-givers of the next generation of soldiers and
citizens. This model of female citizen is what Linda Kerber has called
"Republican Motherhood": a woman who, as a type, "integrated
political values into her domestic life ...[by] nurtur[ing] public-spirited
male citizens [and] guarantee[ing] the steady infusion of virtue into the
Republic."' 122 The ideology of republican motherhood-hard at work in

119 Id. at381.

120 31 ANNALS OF CONG. 873 (1818) (statement of Rep. Johnson) (supporting a bill that would
award an additional five-year pension to the widows and orphans of the War of 1812).
121 See sources cited in supra notes 57-70 and accompanying text.
122 KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC, supranote 54, at 11. As Kerber explains:
The woman now claimed a significant political role, though she played it in the home.
This new identity had the advantage of appearing to reconcile politics and domesticity;
it justified continued political education and political sensibility. But the role remained
a severely limited one; it had no collective definition, provided no outlet for women to
affect a real political decision. If women were no longer prepolitical, they certainly
were not fully political.
Id. at 12.
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debates over widows' pensions-offered a model of citizenship to
women, and made the woman's role as mother a subject of national
importance and national legislation.
Of course, not all mothers of future citizens and soldiers were
awarded pensions--only war widows, and then only certain among
them, benefited from the system. 23 Consequently, family pensions, like
veterans' pensions, posed a quandary: in a republic, how do legislators
justify special treatment of some families over others? Because the
pension statutes drew divisions between groups of widows and families,
debates over the scope of widows' pensions were deeply preoccupied
with the republican concept of equality.
The problem of the pension system's unequal treatment of families
gained early recognition in the 1790s, when both the Senate and the
House considered bills that would have expanded the national pension
system to include the families of state militia officers.1 24The debate
emerged more fully in the 1810s, when opponents of a proposed
increase in family pensions contended that the system was already too
generous and risked entrenching unrepublican class-based privileges.
Responding to this well-worn criticism, Representative Harrison turned
the logic of republicanism on his opponents, developing a theory of
republican equality that would allow, or even require, more generous
family pensions. In a republic, Harrison observed, "[t]he public burdens
are to fall equally upon all in proportion to their means. No individual,
and no family are to furnish more than their just share, either of money
or of personal service, without an equivalent."'' 25 To illustrate a
123 For example, the pension statutes drew distinctions based on whether the widow's husband
had served in the militia or the "regular army," and at times excluded families based on the
husband's rank, the duration and dates of his service, and whether he died in battle or soon after
service. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 23 1792, ch. 11, § 2, 1 Stat. 243, 244 (1792) (recognizing the
service pensions for Army officers, but not for soldiers); Act of Mar. 18, 1818, ch. 19, 3 Stat. 410
(1818) (awarding service pensions to veterans who served in the Continental Line only, to the
exclusion of the militia); 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 408 (1818) (statement of Rep. Butler) (opposing a
bill to extend the pensions awarded to widows of the War of 1812 militiamen without also
extending the pensions of widows of "the regulars"); AM. STATE PAPERS: CLAIMS 18-19, at No. 8
(1790) (report by the Secretary of War recommending denial of the pension application of a
former first deputy quartermaster general for a pension equivalent to that awarded a colonel); AM.
STATE PAPERS: CLAIMS 70-7 1, at No. 35 (1793) (report by the Secretary of War recommending
that Congress grant the petitions of several widows of the Battle of Bunker's Hill, even though
their husbands were not in the service of the Continental Line at the time of death); 33 ANNALS
OF CONG. 395 (1818) (statement of Rep. Rich) (proposing modification to pension bill to "destroy
the distinction in the amount of pension between [families of] the officers and privates" of the
War of 1812); 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 376 (1818) (considering bill "allowing half-pay pensions of
five years to the widows and orphans of those soldiers enlisted for twelve months, for eighteen
months, and of the militia who died within four months after their return home, of sickness
contracted while in service").
124 See 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1240-41 (1798) (considering a Senate proposal to strike a specific
provision in a pending bill that would have extended certain pension benefits to the widows and
orphans of militia officers).
125 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 378 (1818) (statement of Rep. Harrison). The particular provision
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republican government's duty to compensate families, Harrison
imagined a republican world elsewhere:
Let us suppose, then, that one hundred families were settled upon an
island in the Pacific ocean, at such a distance from every civilized
State as to make it necessary to form one of themselves-their
situation would make it purely republican. All possessing equal
right, and all bound to defend their little community against every
aggression. The savages of a neighboring island attempt to
dispossess them; a battle ensues, in which our little community is
victorious, with the loss of five of their number killed and five
wounded. The situation in which they would find themselves is one
for which they have not provided. The wounded men would say to
the others, as we have been rendered unequal to the maintenance of
our families by wounds received for the benefit of all, it is just that
we should receive assistance from you to cultivate our farms. The
claim would be readily admitted. As would, in the first instance, the
claims of the widows and orphans of those who had fallen-but, at
the end of five years, before the children of the widows have reached
that age when they could labor for themselves and their mothers,
they are told that they can receive no further aid while the wounded
men are provided for life. If this principle is admitted in our
Government, our militia laws are most unjust and oppressive. They
require the same personal service to be rendered by all, the rich and
the poor. But the rich married man is allowed to furnish a
substitute-the poor married man, unable to hire one, is obliged
when called upon to serve in person. As the poor, then, fight all your
battles ... it is just and right the consequences126of their services
should fall as lightly as possible on their families.
In the context of family pensions, the logic of republicanism required
that the nation compensate families in a manner proportionate to their
service and their need, and ensure some level of equal treatment to the
families of all veterans.
On a certain level, the equality principle also applied to notions of
just compensation for the work of mothering and the work of soldiering.
Representative Harrison urged that widows' pension be equal to those
awarded to disabled veterans, on the basis that widows' sufferings and
losses were at least equal to that of wounded soldiers. Harrison
described "two kinds of suffering, . . . in the public service, which are
recognized by our laws as giving a claim to the public bounty"-'[t]he
one in the case of disability," and "[t]he other, an indirect suffering, as
or children, who had lost their husbands or
in the case of widows
'127
parents in that way.
under consideration would, inter alia, extend the pension to militiamen and soldiers who had died
within four months after returning home. See id. at 376.
126 Id. at 378-79.
127 Id. at 377.
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The claims of the first are not questioned. It is admitted by all that
the man who has lost a leg or an arm serving the nation, as it lessens
his ability to maintain himself, should be provided for during the
continuance of his disability. But what appears to me ... to be a
singular inconsistency; to the woman who has lost her husband who
supported her, the child its parent, on whose exertions alone it
depended for maintenance and education, our laws allow a limited
assistance, leaving the sufferers often in a worse situation than it
28
found them. 1
In a different session, Representative Johnson of Kentucky articulated a
similar concern that widows and soldiers receive equal benefits from the
government:
I have asserted that [widows] have claims upon our justice; justice
requires that equal claims or sacrifices should meet with equal
rewards.... Compare the claims of the wounded soldier and
helpless widow; who can deny their equal claim? Who can estimate,
in money, the loss of limbs, or the loss of a bosom friend to the
129
female character?
Years later, in 1848, a new generation of congressmen employed similar
rhetoric in support of a bill to expand the class of pension-eligible
widows. In a lengthy speech on the House floor, Representative
Silvester of New York reminded his colleagues that the Revolutionary
War victory was not only attributable to men on the battlefield:
We all, whenever we speak of the Revolution ... or if we mention its

officers and men, are extravagant in our commendations of them.
We are too forgetful of the past; we are too ready only to speak of the
noble achievements and deeds of patriotic daring which had been
accomplished by our revolutionary army.
Must we let our
admiration go no further? Must it stop here?... Have the sons of
this day forgotten their revolutionary mothers, and ceased to
remember that it was to their smiles and to their cheering counsels
that much of our success in that stormy conflict was indebted[?] 130
Keeping in mind that congressmen's speeches regarding the equal
treatment due soldiers and widows were rhetorically charged advocacy
statements, congressional debates concerning the proper scope of family
pensions nevertheless evidence national legislators' understanding that
128 Id. at 377-78. Representative Harrison continued, invoking the image of "1,800 families
who have contributed more than their proportion; some of them their all for the public service,"
and admonishing his colleagues that "[y]ou cannot, indeed, restore the husband to the widow, the
parent to the child-but you can supply their places to a considerable degree, and, I think that it is
your duty to do it." Id. at 378.
129 31 ANNALS OF CONG. 874 (1818) (statement of Rep. Johnson).
130 CONG. GLOBE (App.), 30th Cong., 1st Sess. 932 (1848) (statement of Rep. Silvester)
(supporting an amendment to a pension bill to give all widows who were married to
Revolutionary War soldiers prior to the year 1812 benefit of the service pension awarded veterans
in 1828).
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principles of republicanism reached the home. In their efforts to reform
the pension system, congressmen recognized equality as a republican
and recognized the
value that applied to the claims of widows,
131
republic.
the
to
service
importance of widows'
Widows' pension petitions are also evidence of women's political
participation at a time when women had very little political or legal
agency. 132 Through the petitioning process, widows brought their
problems-which nearly always concerned their inability to support
themselves and their children-to the attention of Congress with the
expectation that the welfare of their families deserved the attention of
national legislators. And, indeed, in their responses to the petitions,
national legislators became actively engaged in policymaking and
lawmaking that directly involved domestic relations. Congressmen
decided which families would be provided for, which members of
families qualified as dependants and thus were pension-eligible, the
worth of a widow's service in raising the next generation's patriots, and
the impact of a widow's current marital status on her pension eligibility.
Although the national pension statutes did not "nationalize" marriage
laws, they did generate national norms concerning which familial
relations created legal dependency and the extent to which those
dependent relationships would be recognized under a benefits
scheme. While the few historians to have given any consideration to
widows' pensions are correct to assert that the relief offered widows
was limited and was based solely on their status as a widow (rather
than, say, their individual contribution outside of the family), 133 this fact
makes clear that familial relations were integral to early national
pension statutes, and that domestic relations were part of the national
legislative agenda.
The skeptic will argue that although the pension system may have
involved Congress in the creation of a family benefits program and
certain aspects of family policy, this is not evidence that Congress
directly legislated new marriage laws or child custody codes, and hence
131 Of course, we should not be too sanguine about Congress's recognition of the parity of
widows' claims. For example, it took Congress until 1836 to remedy a fundamental source of
class-based family inequality in the Revolutionary War pension statutes by awarding pensions to
widows of soldiers. See Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 362, § 3, 5 Stat. 127, 128 (1836); GLASSON,
supra note 76, at 49.
132 See Mark, supra note 80 at 2185 ("The most important insight we may glean from
considering instances of women petitioning .... [Is that] [t]he fact that the women petitioned at
all meant that they felt they had a right to appeal to public authority for help.").
133 Both Jensen and Kerber have emphasized the relative exclusion of women from the federal
pension system. See JENSEN, supra note 76, at 87; KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC, supra
note 54, at 87-93. I have a slightly more positive view of the pension system's treatment of
widows, in part because I include in my analysis Congress's provision of pensions for war
widows other than Revolutionary War widows (who, until 1836, were particularly poorly treated
under the system).
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the pension system did not qualify as federal family law. It is true that
the creation and administration of the war pension system did not
occasion a redefinition of marital status or of the legal relationship
between parent and child. However, it did involve Congress in the
business of evaluating the operation of domestic relations law in the
context of a benefits program, engaging federal lawmakers in policy
matters that bore directly on family welfare: what constitutes "need,"
what class of individuals is most "deserving," nascent notions of gender
equality, and children's welfare. Moreover, the objection that family
pensions did not constitute a form of family regulation betrays a
misapprehension of the state sovereignty paradigm of domestic
relations, which in its strongest form draws a wide parameter around
regulatory and adjudicative activities that touch on domestic relations
law, and designates them as state-law matters. 134 Application of this
theory during the early national period could have limited the federal
government's authority to provide for the welfare of war widows and
orphans, notwithstanding its explicit authority over spending and the
35
military. 1
Even during fierce debates over the expansion of widows'
pensions, however, opponents of widows' pensions do not appear to
have argued that such expansion was improper because matters relating
to the family fell within the exclusive province of the states, or that
administration of the pensions brought federal actors into a world of
issues that were local in nature.
The theory that congressional
involvement in domestic relations constituted an intervention into a
special sphere reserved to the states simply did not inform the
perception, or exercise, of legislative authority in the context of the
creation and administration of a federal family war pension system.
This historical evidence challenges the grand narrative-relied
upon in modern federalism jurisprudence-that represents federal
involvement in domestic relations, and specifically congressional
involvement in such matters, as a radical departure from past practices.
Undoubtedly, with the general expansion of federal power,
congressional involvement in domestic relations grew substantially and
took new forms during the Reconstruction and New Deal eras. But, as
the history of widows and orphans' pensions demonstrates, the view
that present-day federal involvement in domestic relations is a
categorical departure from the early practices of the federal government
is ill informed. In fact, family welfare and domestic relations policy
134 See sources cited in supra notes 26-42 and accompanying text.
135 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (authorizing Congress "[t]o provide for the.., general
Welfare of the United States"); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (authorizing Congress "[t1o raise
and support Armies"); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 13 (authorizing Congress "[t]o provide and
maintain a Navy").
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constituted part of congressional legislative activities from the very
beginning, and republican values of equality, emanating from Congress,
directly informed how the national legislators crafted the pension
system to ensure just compensation for war widows and their children.
B.

Shanks v. Dupont and Married Women's National Citizenship

In 1830, while Congress was still debating the substantive
dimensions of women's citizenship in the pension debates, the United
States Supreme Court was wrestling with what might be considered a
more technical aspect of women's citizenship rights in Shanks v.
Dupont.136 At issue in Shanks was a dispute over the estate of Thomas
Scott, a South Carolina-born revolutionary who died in 1782 leaving
two daughters, Ann and Sarah. 137 Marriage divided the sisters during
the Revolutionary War. Ann married a British officer in 1781, and in
1782 she went with her husband to England, where she raised a
family. 138 Sarah married an American and stayed in South Carolina,
where she too had a family. 139 The American-born children of Sarah
brought suit in a South Carolina state court, claiming ownership of Ann
Shanks's portion of their grandfather's estate.' 4 0 Because of South
Carolina's restrictions on noncitizens' ownership of real property, the
resolution of this property dispute turned on whether Ann Shanks was a
British citizen when the Treaty of Peace was signed in 1783.141 If she
was, then ownership of the property in question was protected by the
Jay Treaty. 142 Shanks is often understood as a case about the
intersection of citizenship law and coverture.143 As I explain below,
Shanks is also, and perhaps primarily, a case about federalism: the
central debate between the majority and dissenting justices concerned
which sovereign, state or federal, had the power to determine the
citizenship of a married woman. Notwithstanding the direct impact of
the Shanks decision on domestic relations law, the majority insisted that
such power rested in the hands of the federal government.

136 28 U.S. 242 (1830).

137 See id. at 244.
138 See id.
139 See id.
140 See id.

141 See The Definitive Treaty of Peace Between His Britannic Majesty and the United States
of America, Sept. 3, 1783, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. 4 [hereinafter Treaty of Peace].
142 See Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, Nov. 19, 1794, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. 9, 8
Stat. 116 [hereinafter Jay Treaty]; see also infra note 164 and discussion therein.
143 See, e.g., LINDA K. KERBER, No CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADLES: WOMEN AND
THE OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP 35-39 (1998).

1804

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:5

In Part III.B. 1, I briefly examine how domestic relations law came
into play in citizenship determinations of married women during the
early national period. In Part III.B.2, I demonstrate how the centrality
of domestic relations to the resolution of Shanks-and citizenship law
in general-posed no barrier to the Supreme Court's conclusion that
federal government was empowered to determine married women's
citizenship, and that local domestic relations law had no bearing on that
determination.
Shanks and related citizenship law of the early
nineteenth century thus provide another example of how the federal
government played a role in defining the rights, duties, and benefits that
flowed from an individual's familial status.
Modem-day proponents of the state sovereignty paradigm will
likely resist this analysis and argue that the federal government's foray
into domestic relations in the context of citizenship law is a special case,
and does not defeat the general rule that domestic relations is
traditionally reserved to the states. Citizenship law itself is a matter
firmly and exclusively entrusted to the federal government, they will
contend, and therefore the involvement of federal courts and Congress
in domestic relations in the context of citizenship law is an appropriate
exception to the more general rule that family law is state law. This
argument is based on a false premise. As I discuss below, during the
early national period, citizenship was not understood by all to be a
purely federal matter. There was significant disagreement at the time
concerning the role that state law played in individual citizenship
determinations.144 Republicans tended to support a certain degree of
state control over national citizenship, or, at the very least, contended
45
that regulation of citizenship was a joint federal-state endeavor.
Federalists tended to view national citizenship as a creature of federal
law.146 Accordingly, the federal government's involvement in domestic
relations in the context of citizenship during the pre-Civil War period
cannot be dismissed as exceptional on the basis that regulation of
citizenship was an exclusive federal endeavor, as federal control over
citizenship had yet to be fully established. Rather, it is further evidence
that, contrary to modern-day federalists' contention that domestic
relations has traditionally been a sacrosanct domain of the states, federal
power did not historically yield to the states simply because a certain
matter involved federal courts and legislators in domestic relations.
144 See SMITH, supra note 24, at 155-59, 190-94, 228-29.
145 See id. For example, in Collet v. Collet, 6 F. Cas. 105 (C.C.D. Pa. 1792) (No. 3,001), a
federal court understood that "the states, individually, still enjoy a concurrent authority upon this
subject [of naturalization]; but that their individual authority cannot be exercised, so as to
contravene the rule established by the authority of the Union." Id. at 106.
146 See SMITH, supra note 24, at 155-59, 190-94, 228-29. For example, in Chirac v. Chirac,
15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259 (1817), Justice Marshall observed that Congress's power over
naturalizations defeated the states' authority to naturalize citizens. See id. at 269.
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Coverture and Citizenship Prior to Shanks

During and after the Revolutionary War, the common law
operating in many states prevented noncitizens from owning real
property, and many states also passed quasicriminal laws that subjected
British loyalists' property to forfeiture. Thus, the issue of citizenship
was litigated frequently in the early national period in part because the

validity of transfers of real property within families-through
inheritance or assignment-often hinged on the citizenship or political

allegiance of the transferor or transferee.

47

For certain individuals,

notably married women, determinations of citizenship and related

property rights were especially difficult. Under the common law
doctrine of coverture, it was not entirely clear whether a married woman
148
could have citizenship status different from that of her husband.
Thus, courts were repeatedly called upon to consider whether a married
woman's relationship to the government, and hence her citizenship, was

completely derivative in nature (and therefore followed that of her
husband), or whether she had a citizenship of her own. Such questions
required courts to consider the very nature-and limits-of the marital
147 See, e.g., McLearn v. Wallace, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 625 (1836) (considering the right of
noncitizens to inherit real and personal property); Levy v. McCartee, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 102 (1832)
(determining whether descent is possible through an alien mediate ancestor); Inglis v. Trustees of
Sailor's Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99 (1830) (evaluating whether the Jay Treaty protected an
alleged alien's right to inherit real property); Jackson v. Clarke, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 1, 12 n.3
(1818) (reviewing inheritance cases brought pursuant to the Jay Treaty); Campbell v. Gordon, 10
U.S. (6 Cranch) 176 (1810) (analyzing transmission of citizenship to a child through
naturalization of parent for purposes of determining child's right to inherit real property);
M'Ilvaine v. Coxe's Lessee, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 209 (1808) (evaluating effect of alleged
expatriation on citizenship and right to inherit real property).
148 The citizenship status of a married woman was especially important in determining her
dower rights, see discussion in infra note 209, because under the common law noncitizens
generally could not acquire property by operation of law (e.g., descent or dower). See Sutliff v.
Forgey, 1 Cow. 89 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1823) (interpreting a New York statute that permitted aliens to
purchase land to enable an alien widow to claim her dower in contravention of the common law
that barred noncitizens from owning real property); see also Priest v. Cummings, 16 Wend. 617
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837) (holding that an alien wife who was naturalized during marriage was due
her full dower in all properties owned by her husband during marriage); Kelly v. Harrison, 2
Johns. Cas. 29 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1800) (holding that pursuant to a New York statute, an alien widow
could recover dower of those lands her husband acquired prior to the American Revolution).
Some states passed statutes altering the common law rule that aliens could not take land by
operation of law-an amendment that generally resolved disputes concerning noncitizen wives'
dower. For example, in 1791 the State of Maryland enacted a statute which provided that:
[A]ny foreigner may, by deed or will to be hereafter made, take and hold lands within
that part of the said territory which lies within this state, in the same manner as if he
was a citizen of this state; and the same lands may be conveyed by him, and
transmitted to, and be inherited by his heirs or relations, as if he and they were citizens
of this state; provided, that no foreigner shall, in virtue hereof, be entitled to any further
or other privilege of a citizen.
Act of the State of Maryland, Dec. 19, 1791, § 6, An Act Concerning the Territory of Columbia
and the City of Washington.
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bond. Did a woman's civic identity completely merge with that of her
husband, or did she maintain some modicum of independent legal
status?
The quandary posed by married women's citizenship was not novel
by the time Shanks was decided in 1830. Historian Linda Kerber has
examined how "the political implications of coverture"' 14 9 bore on
married women's citizenship status in the early republic, 150 and has
demonstrated the tension between coverture and republican conceptions
of citizenship through an analysis of the 1805 Massachusetts Supreme
Court opinion Martin v. Massachusetts.15 1 Martin concerned James
Martin's right to inherit certain real property from his mother, Anna
Martin.
Anna's real property was escheated by the state of
Massachusetts when, at the outbreak of the Revolutionary War, she fled
from Massachusetts to Nova Scotia with her loyalist husband. 52 Like
many other states, Massachusetts had passed a forfeiture statute that
empowered the government to confiscate the property of any "member"
153
of the state who fled during the war with Britain.
As Kerber explains, the critical issue in Martin was whether, as a
feme covert, Anna could have acted voluntarily (and thus culpably)
when she left the state with her husband, therefore justifying application
of the forfeiture statute. 154 James's attorney claimed that Anna could
not have acted voluntarily because a feme covert had no independent
will and, under the law of coverture, was required to follow her
husband-thus she herself could not be classified as a loyalist whose
property was subject to forfeiture. 15 5 He further argued that because of
a married woman's lack of free will, the common law prevented her
from having a direct political relationship with the state in any event:
"Upon the strict principles of law, afeme covert is not a member; has no
politicalrelation to the state any more than an alien .... ,,1156
149 KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC, supra note 54, at 134.

150 Id. at 132-36; see also KERBER, supra note 143, at 3-46. Several others have considered
the intersection of coverture and citizenship law.
See CANDICE L. BREDBENNER, A
NATIONALITY OF HER OWN: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND THE LAW OF CITIZENSHIP 15-44 (1998);
NANCY ISENBERG, SEX & CITIZENSHIP IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 7, 21-24 (1998); Nancy F.

Cott, Marriage and Women's Citizenship in the United States, 1830-1943, 103 AM. HIST. REV.
1440, 1455-57 (1998); Joan R. Gundersen, Independence, Citizenship, and the American
Revolution, 13 SIGNS 59 (1987); Kristin Collins, Note, When Fathers' Rights Are Mothers'
Duties: The Failureof Equal Protection in Miller v. Albright, 109 YALE L.J. 1669, 1682-93
(2000).
151 See Martin v. Commonwealth, 1 Mass. (1 Will.) 347 (1805).
152 See id. at 348-49.
153 See An Act for Confiscating the Estates of Certain Persons Commonly Called Absentees,
Apr. 30, 1779, in MASS. ACTS AND LAWS: IN THE YEAR OF OUR LORD 1779, at ch. 10, 233-36
(1779).
154 See KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC, supra note 54, at 133-35.

155 See Martin, 1 Mass. (1 Will.) at 364 (reporter's account of counsel's argument).
156 Id. at 362 (reporter's account of counsel's argument) (emphasis in original).
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In an attempt to justify the state's confiscation of a married
woman's property, counsel for the state of Massachusetts proposed a
republicanized vision of domestic relations law and maintained that
married women had the "power of remaining or withdrawing, as they
pleased." 157 Kerber observes that "[t]his element of choice... had
traditionally been absent from the repertory of the married woman; to
introduce it was a challenge to traditional practice. ' 158 And, in fact, the
departure proposed by the state's attorney was too radical for the
Massachusetts Supreme Court, which opted for tradition over revolution
and held that a married woman could not be penalized under the
forfeiture statute: "[W]e are called upon... to say whether a femecovert, for any of these acts, performed with her husband,is within the
intention of the statute; and I think that she is not."'1 59 A married
woman's "duty of obedience" (which unquestionably included moving
with her husband wherever he went) meant that her departure with him
could not be taken as a voluntarily disavowal of her allegiance to the
160
polity, and therefore could not be punished as disloyalty.
Martin was an influential articulation of the relationship between
coverture and women's citizenship with which various state and federal
courts around the United States would engage, directly and indirectly,
for decades to come. Married women's citizenship, like widows'
pensions, raised important questions regarding whether in a republic
women had a direct relationship to the polity. If this were the case, then
taken to its logical extreme, republicanism posed a challenge to the
traditional common law of domestic relations. The Martin Court
resolved, at least with respect to married women's citizenship, that
republicanism did not disturb the traditional gender-status relations of
the household.
But even if the holding and analysis of Martin had binding
authority outside Massachusetts, the case left many questions
unanswered. Some jurists seeking to understand (and extend) the
reasoning of Martin in subsequent cases took Martin's integration of
coverture and citizenship law to its logical, if extreme, conclusion.
Marriage, they argued, not only limited women's relationship with the
government, but also provided a jurisdictional barrier to enforcement of
forfeiture laws against femes covert.16 1 Under this interpretation, the
157 Id. at 370 (reporter's account of counsel's argument).
158 KERBER, supra note 143, at 27.
159 Martin, 1 Mass. (1 Will.) at 390-91 (emphasis in original).
160 Id. at 391.
161 For example, in the 1809 Supreme Court case Kempe's Lessee v. Kennedy, the facts of
which were very similar to Martin, the attorney for Mrs. Kempe's lessee argued that a federal
court was authorized to vacate a state forfeiture action against Mrs. Kempe because the state court
lacked jurisdiction over afeme covert: A husband's "dominion" over the wife under law was so
complete upon marriage that she was simply "not an object of the law, and, consequently, the
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household was literally a little commonwealth: a married woman was
subject to her husband's authority within that domain, and therefore the
laws of forfeiture simply could not be enforced against her. 162 Because
of disagreement over which sovereign-state or federal-controlled
citizenship, 163 the holding of Martin also left open an important
federalism issue: What would happen if the application of state law
resulted in a different citizenship determination for a married woman
than the application of federal law? Would federal or state law govern
the outcome of the case? The United States Supreme Court turned to
this issue in Shanks v. Dupont.
2.

Federal Power and Women's Citizenship in Shanks

Shanks, like Martin, required a court to determine a married
woman's citizenship status in order to resolve a dispute over the descent
of real property. The outcome in Shanks turned on whether Ann
Shanks's marriage to a foreigner, or the subsequent act of moving with
her husband to England, resulted in the termination of her American
citizenship. If Shanks became a British subject (through marriage or
relocation), her property rights-and those of her heirs-were protected
by the Jay Treaty, which insulated the property claims of "British
subjects" from the force of state laws. 164 If Ann Shanks retained her
American citizenship when she moved to England, then her
grandchildren, as noncitizens, would have no protection under the Jay
Treaty and no right to inherit real property in South Carolina.165
At the time Shanks was being decided, American jurists were
debating whether one could "elect" citizenship--either by affirmative
oaths or conduct.166 Thus, one of the questions presented in Shanks was
justice who took the inquisition had not jurisdictionas it regardedher." 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 173,
177 (1809) (reporter's account of counsel's argument) (emphasis added). Though Chief Justice
Marshall agreed with the view that married women lacked the volition to act independently of
their husbands, he rejected the notion that their legal disability removed them altogether from the
jurisdiction of a state forfeiture proceeding. See id.at 186.
162 See id.
at 177 (reporter's account of counsel's argument).
163 See sources cited in supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text; sources cited in infra notes
175-83.
164 Under the Jay Treaty of 1794, the national government allowed noncitizens to retain title to
property in America that they had owned prior to 1794:
It is agreed that British subjects who now hold lands in the territories of the United
States... shall continue to hold them according to the nature and tenure of their
respective estates and titles therein ...and that neither they, nor their heirs or assigns
shall, so far as may respect the said lands.., be regarded as aliens.
Jay Treaty, supra note 142.
165 See Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. 242, 251 (1830) (Johnson, J., dissenting).
166 For a discussion of the debates over election of citizenship, also referred to as the "right of
expatriation," see SMITH, supra note 24, at 153-59 (discussing debates over the right of
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whether, assuming that election of citizenship was possible in a
republic, afeme covert had the requisite legal capacity to make such an
election. Before resolving that issue, however, the Supreme Court was
required to decide which sovereign, state or federal, had the authority to
determine a married woman's citizenship. The South Carolina Supreme
Court had found that South Carolina law governed Shanks's citizenship,
that under that law "Mrs. Shanks was an American citizen" in 1783, that
she did not have the protection of the Jay Treaty, and that, consequently,
the American cousins took all. 167 Overruling the state court, the
Supreme Court found that South Carolina law did not control Shanks's
citizenship, and that under federal law Shanks was a British citizen in
1783. In so doing, the Supreme Court opted for federal supremacy in
the determination of a married woman's citizenship, notwithstanding
direct implications for domestic relations law.
The federalist Justice Story showed little patience for the
proposition that South Carolina bore at all on the determination of
national citizenship-even for married women. Though Story agreed
with the conclusion that a woman is "sub potestate viri," and has "no
' 68
right to make an election [of citizenship],"' he insisted that federal law
trumped state law in citizenship determinations. Articulating the strong
federalist view on this point, he reasoned that national citizenship was a
matter of the "law of nations," and was not subject to the "mere
doctrines of municipal law" that limited women's "civil rights" in
marriage:
It does not appear to us that her situation as a feme covert disabled
her from a change of allegiance .... The incapacities of femes
covert, provided by the common law, apply to their civil rights, and
are for their protection and interest. But they do not reach their
political rights, nor prevent their acquiring or losing a national
character. Those political rights do not stand upon the mere
but
doctrines of municipal law, applicable to ordinary transactions,
169
stand upon the more general principles of the law of nations.
In announcing the "federal" nature of married women's
citizenship, Story sub silentio unraveled a major aspect of Martin's
logic: that local domestic relations law and citizenship law were
integrally connected. 170 By disaggregating Martin'sconnection of local
expatriation during the 1790s and early 1800s); id. at 228-30 (discussing debates over
expatriation during the 1850s). On the same day that the Court decided Shanks, it also decided
Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor's Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99 (1830), which recognized a period
of election between the Declaration of Independence and the Treaty of Peace during which those
on either side of the conflict could elect British or American nationality. See id. at 121.
167 See Shanks, 28 U.S. at 244.
168 Id. at 248. For the same reason, he concluded that a married woman should not "be bound
by an act of removal under [her husband's] authority or persuasion." Id.
169 Id.

170 Justice Story distinguished Martin on factual grounds, reasoning that in Martin "the
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law and citizenship, Story was able to explain why, notwithstanding her
inability to make legally binding choices, Shanks's move to England
resulted in a change in her citizenship: coverture prevented a feme
covert from choosing her domicile and her citizenship, but coverture did
not prevent the national polity from determining a feme covert's
citizenship.
Thus, in part because of Shanks's incapacity under
coverture, "[t]he governments [of America and England], and not
herself, finally settled her national character... they did not treat her as
capable by herself of changing or absolving her allegiance." 17' Story
did not challenge coverture, but he reasoned that coverture did not
create a barrier between married women and national government or the
law of nations.
In a lengthy dissenting opinion, Justice William Johnson presented
a very different view of the national government's authority to
determine married women's citizenship. Justice Johnson was a native
of South Carolina and had been appointed to the Supreme Court in 1804
as part of Jefferson's attempt to de-Federalize the Court. 172 In Shanks,
Johnson concurred with Story's view that married women lacked free
will, and that therefore it was impossible to construe Shanks's departure
to England with her British husband as a voluntary election of
citizenship.1 73 Johnson reasoned that "[i]t never entered into the minds
of [the South Carolina court] that the very innocent act of marrying a
British officer, was to be tortured into 'taking a part in the present war;'
nor that following that officer to England and residing there under
coverture, was to be imputed to her a cause of forfeiture."' 74
question was, whether afeme covert should be deemed to have forfeited her estate for an offence
committed with her husband, by withdrawing from the state, &c. under the confiscation action of
1779; and it was held that she was not within the purview of the act." Id. Nancy Cott argues that,
in fact, the Martin opinion "diverged" from the then-reigning norm of "separation of marital
status from citizenship status," and that Shanks later articulated that norm "at the Supreme Court
level." Cott, supra note 150, at 1456 n.44.
171 Shanks, 28 U.S. at 248; see also id.at 247 ("[Bly her removal with her husband, [she] was
deemed by the British government to retain her allegiance, and to be, to all intents and purposes, a
British subject.") (emphasis added).
172 See 1 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969: THEIR LIVES

AND MAJOR OPINIONS 358, 362-65 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1969). It should be
noted that Johnson did not vote as a rank-and-file Republican during his years on the bench, and
sided with Chief Justice Marshall in many important opinions regarding congressional power, to
the disappointment of Jefferson. See id.at 366-70.
173 As Justice Johnson noted in his, dissent:
If the facts be resorted to, and the court is called upon to fix the period of her transit, it
would be obliged to confine itself to the act of her marrying against her allegiance. It
is the only free act of her life stated upon the record, for from thence she continued sub
potestate viri;
and if she or her descendents were now interested in maintaining her
original allegiance, we should hear it contended, and be compelled to admit, that no
subsequent act of her life could be imputed to her because of her coverture; and even
her marriage was probably during her infancy.
Shanks, 28 U.S. at 258 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
174 Id. at 253.
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But the junior justice did not agree that the national government
had authority to assign legal significance to a married woman's
habitation outside the United States. According to Johnson, citizenship
determinations of this sort were governed fully and completely by state
law, not federal law.1 75 South Carolina had a "superior claim" with
respect to the resolution of Ann Shanks's citizenship, "[f]or although
before the revolution a subordinate state, yet it possessed every attribute
of a distinct state; and upon principles of national law, the members of a
state or political entity continue members of the state notwithstanding a
change of government."' 176 In short, the critical legal and ideological
schism between Story and Johnson in Shanks was whether the federal
government had the power to determine the impact of marriage on a
woman's citizenship status, not whether a married woman had the legal
capacity to make choices or act in a manner that would bear on her
citizenship status.
Johnson's reasoning about the division of authority between
federal and state governments is instructive because, even in the context
of deciding whether the federal government had the authority to
determine a legal implication of marriage, Johnson did not object that
domestic relations were a subject of special state sovereignty. This is
especially striking because Johnson reasoned about federalism in a
formalistic fashion, and insisted that any proper understanding of states'
rights was derived from pre-Constitutional understandings of federalstate authority. For example, Johnson argued that "[u]ntil the adoption
of the federal constitution, titles to land, and the laws of allegiance,
' 77
were exclusively subjects of state cognizance,"' and that thus in 1782,
when Shanks's father died, "the state of South Carolina was supreme
1 78
Although Johnson
and uncontrollable on the subject now before us."'
conceded that the adoption of the United States Constitution somewhat
"restrained" the states' power to determine "who cannot inherit," he
was adamant that South Carolina's "power [was] still supreme in
determining who can inherit."' 179 In his defense of South Carolina's

175 On this point, Justice Johnson reasoned as follows:
If we were called upon to settle the claims of the two governments [United States and
South Carolina] to her allegiance,.., we should be obliged to decide that the superior
claim was in South Carolina .... [Tihe constitution and legislative acts of South
Carolina, when asserting her independence, must be looked into to determine whether
she may not then have modified the rigour of the common law, and substituted
principles of greater liberality.
Id. at 259-60.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 251.
178 Id.

179 Id. at 252 (emphasis added); see also id. ("On this subject her own laws and her own courts
furnish the only rule for governing this or any other tribunal.").
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right to determine Shanks's citizenship and inheritance rights, Johnson
defended his home state's authority against the federal government:
I consider it as altogether set at rest by the [South Carolina Supreme
Court's] decision itself; it is established by paramount authority; and
this court can no more say that it is not the law of South Carolina,
than they could deny the validity of a statute of the state passed in
1780, declaring that to be her character, and those her privileges.18 0
Johnson also explicitly recognized the significance of domestic
relations law for the determination of married women's citizenship.
With respect to citizenship, Johnson noted that South Carolina followed
the well-established common law rule that individuals (both male and
female) had no right of election regarding their citizenship,' 81 and hence
nothing Shanks could have done would have altered her citizenship
status.
Furthermore, Johnson reasoned that if South Carolina
maintained the common law rule against elective expatriation for all of
its citizens, such a rule was especially applicable to married women,
who lacked the legal volition to choose a sovereign. To support this
proposition, Johnson noted that even if one endorsed a contractual type
of relationship between citizen and state in which one could disavow
American citizenship by an act of affirmative assent-which South
Carolina did not-"[w]omen ... are necessarily excluded from the right
of assent, and yet arbitrarily subjected." 82 In sum, South Carolina
possessed exclusive authority over Shanks's citizenship, and under that
state's law individuals, and especially married women, did not have the
ability to "elect" their allegiance. In this instance, South Carolina had
chosen not to recognize Shanks's marriage or her removal to England as
an indication of a change in her citizenship status.183
In his Shanks dissent, Johnson argued that certain areas of lawsuch as citizenship law, real property law, and aspects of the law of
descent-fell under the exclusive authority of the individual states.
180 Id. at 253.
181 On this point, Johnson explained:

It is the doctrine of the American court... that the American states were free and
independent on the 4th of July 1776. On that day, Mrs. Shanks was found under
allegiance to the state of South Carolina, as a natural born citizen to a community, one
of whose fundamental principles was that natural allegiance was unalienable; and this
principle was at no time relaxed by that state, by any express provision, while it
retained the undivided control over the rights and liabilities of its citizens.
Id. at 263.
182 Id. at 262.
183 Johnson emphasized this point rhetorically:
But when did South Carolina renounce the allegiance of Mrs. Shanks? We have the
evidence of the states having acquired it; when did she relinquish it? Or, if it be placed
on the footing of an ordinary contract, when did South Carolina agree to the dissolution
of this contract? Or when did she withdraw her protection, and thus dissolve the right
to claim obedience or subjection?
Id. at 257.
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Notably, although Johnson claimed that aspects of the law of descent
derived from state law, he also recognized that, in contrast to the laws of
citizenship and real property, descent was an area of law over which the
federal government legitimately exercised some regulatory authority.
But despite the significance of domestic relations law to the outcome of
Shanks-and of Shanks to the legal significance of marriage-Johnson
registered no special complaint that the majority erred because it
allowed the federal government to determine the legal significance of
marriage, or that Justice Story's opinion allowed the federal government
to trammel local law governing the rights and duties of marriage. Had
those been cognizable arguments at the time, one might expect that
Johnson would have articulated them in his lengthy dissent.
Of course, Shanks is most significant for the central principle of
Story's majority opinion: the federal government has the authority to
make determinations regarding married women's citizenship, and state
law does not bear on that determination. Although Justice Story's
vision of women's citizenship as controlled by the national powers-thatbe did not register a progressive understanding of women's legal
personhood, the assertion that women's citizenship fell within the
purview of federal power was not insubstantial, in terms of either
outcome or legal principle. Even as Story's opinion explicitly affirmed
married women's disability under coverture, it also established that at
least certain aspects of married women's legal status and rights were
governed by the national polity. 184 This aspect of the Shanks opinion
was not lost on contemporary jurists, and courts later extrapolated from
Shanks a challenge to the basic principles of coverture. In 1838, for
example, the New York Court of Appeals cited Shanks as evidence that
"[i]t will not be denied, that congress possess[es] the power to
naturalize femes covert, even against the consent of their
husbands ....-185 In 1852, an Alabama state court extended the logic
of Shanks to determinations of domicile within the United States, citing
the case in support of its then-progressive holding that "[a] married
woman abused and maltreated by her husband may have her residence
(or domicil) in one State, . . . whilst her husband's residence or domicil
186
is in another."
Shanks's holding is also significant because it was part of a larger
trend of disaggregating citizenship law and local domestic relations law.
184 Kerber maintains that "Story's decision in Shanks v. Dupont opened the door toward a
broader conceptualization of the political capacity of married women. The woman with political
capacity was a woman who could choose not only her husband but also her political allegiance."
KERBER, supra note 143, at 35-39.
185 Priest v. Cummings, 16 Wend. 617, 627 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837); see also Comitis v.
Parkerson, 56 F. 556, 562 (C.C.E.D. La. 1893) (citing Shanks to support the proposition that
marriage of a female citizen with an alien does not affect her citizenship status).
186 Harrison & Saunders v. Harrison, 20 Ala. 629, 639 (1852).
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However, as the national legislature and federal judges began to shape
women's marital rights through citizenship laws, Shanks did not
guarantee that women's citizenship would be consistently subject to
what we might now consider to be enlightened adjudication and
policymaking. In 1855, for example, Congress passed a law that
encoded in statute the link between coverture and citizenship by
establishing that an alien woman's citizenship would follow that of her
American husband upon marriage, with no further procedure
required.1 87 Congressmen debating the merits of the 1855 Act explicitly
understood the relationship between the proposed statute and domestic
relations law. "[B]y the act of marriage itself the political character of
the wife shall at once conform to the political character of the husband,"
urged one congressman in support of the 1855 Act. 188 "There can be no
objection to it," he added, "because women possess no political
rights."' 189 As historian Nancy Cott has observed, the Act was
remarkable because it "in effect rais[ed] the doctrine of coverture to the
level of national identity," even though by that time many states had
begun the process of unwinding coverture through changes to laws
governing marital property. 190 In other words, Congress developed its
own principles of domestic relations law within the context of
citizenship, and those principles sometimes ran contrary to the general
trend within state domestic relations laws.
Federal judges played a part in this process as well. For example,
in 1883, in Pequignot v. Detroit, a Federal Circuit Court found that the
principle of coverture animating the 1855 Act also applied (in reverse)
to American women: upon marriage to a foreigner, an American woman
immediately lost her American citizenship. 19 1 In 1907, Congress
ratified Pequignot'sholding in the Expatriation Act, which resolved that
"any American woman who marries a foreigner shall take the
nationality of her husband."' 192 It was not until 1922, after woman
suffrage was constitutionally secured, that feminist organizations were
able to successfully advocate for the repeal of the Expatriation Act. 193
In short, despite the fact that the Shanks decision protected Ann
Shanks's individual property rights, it did not portend the consistent

187 SeeAct of Feb. 10, 1855, ch. 71, § 2, 10 Stat. 604, 604 (1855).
188 CONG. GLOBE, 33d Cong., Ist Sess. 170 (statement of Rep. Cutting).
189 Id.

190 Cott, supra note 150, at 1457; see also BREDBENNER, supra note 150, at 15-22; Collins,
supra note 150, at 1687-88.
191 16 F. 211, 217 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1883). Not all federal courts gave the 1855 Act such an
expansive reading. See Comitis v. Parkerson, 56 F. 556, 562 (C.C.E.D. La. 1893).
192 Expatriation Act of 1907, ch. 2534, § 3, 34 Stat. 1228, 1228 (1907).
193 See An Act Relative to the Naturalization and Citizenship of Married Women (The Cable
Act), ch. 411, §§ 3, 6-7, 42 Stat. 1021, 1021-22 (1922), repealingExpatriation Act of 1907, ch.
2534, § 3, 34 Stat. 1228, 1228 (1907).
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enactment of federal citizenship laws that challenged the gender status
hierarchy produced and perpetuated by coverture.
What the Shanks opinion did establish was that federal actors
would not shy from asserting, or even creating, federal citizenship laws
and regulations that directly impacted the scope and effect of domestic
relations law and policy. Accordingly, the Shanks opinion, like the
family pension debates, challenges the modem-day belief that early
understandings of federalism resulted in categorical deference to the
states in matters touching on domestic relations. Shanks required the
Court to upend the South Carolina Supreme Court's determination that
Ann Shanks remained an American citizen-a determination that, if not
mandated by local domestic relations laws, was certainly consistent
with the principles of coverture enshrined in those laws. In trumping
the state supreme court's determination of a married woman's
citizenship, the Shanks majority offered no apology for intervening in
domestic relations law, and the dissenting Justice Johnson raised no
objection on that basis. This is likely because in 1830, the notion that
domestic relations were exclusively a state law matter, or that federal
involvement in such issues constituted improper intervention, had not
taken hold as a generally applicable principle of American federalism.
C.

Domestic Relations in the FederalCourts: Common Law and
Equity

It is [a case] that has attracted a larger share of public attention, and
inspired a stronger feeling of interest, than any other ...in ...the
and this interest is one of a sort permanently to
American courts;
94
1
society.
affect
So claimed an anonymous commentator in 1854 regarding the
Gaines Case, a legal battle of epic proportions involving the allegedly
suppressed will of Daniel Clark (the first representative of the Louisiana
Territory in the United States Congress), Clark's various sexual liaisons,
his secret and potentially bigamous marriage, and, most important, the
legitimacy of his daughter Myra Clark Whitney (later Myra Clark
Gaines). The Gaines Case was a cause c~lkbre that occupied the
attention of the nation from the 1830s to the 1890s and generated tidy
revenue for what Justice David Davis called "the ablest talent of the

194 The Gaines Case, 9 So. Q. REV. 274 (1854) (commenting on the 1852 decision of the
Supreme Court in the Gaines Case); see also NOLAN B. HARMON, JR., THE FAMOUS CASE OF
MYRA CLARK GAINES (1946); ANNA CLYDE PLUNKETT, CORRIDORS BY CANDLELIGHT (1949);

Perry Scott Rader, The Romance ofAmerican Courts: Gaines vs. New Orleans, 27 LA. HIST. Q. 5
(1944); John S. Kendall, The Strange Case of Myra Clark Gaines, 20 LA. HIST. Q. 5 (1937).
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American bar."' 195 The Supreme Court heard the Gaines Case at least
seventeen times' 96 and, practically speaking, reviewed the most
significant lower court decisions under a de novo standard, mining
"nearly eight thousand closely printed pages" of evidence relating to
bastardy, marriage, bigamy, and divorce. 197 In short, the Gaines Case
put the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit Court of Louisiana in the
middle of a protracted dispute that involved nearly every aspect of
domestic relations law. Although Justice James Wayne anticipated that,
at some point in the future, when an "American lawyer [retires] to write
the history of his country's jurisprudence [this case] will be registered

195 Gaines v. New Orleans, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 642, 699 (1867).
196 See Ex Parte Whitney, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 404 (1839); Gaines v. Relf, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 9
(1841); Gaines v. Chew, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 619 (1844); Patterson v. Gaines, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 550
(1848); Gaines v. Relf, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 472 (1851); New Orleans v. Gaines, 63 U.S. (22 How.)
141 (1859); Gaines v. Hennen, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 553 (1860); Gaines v. New Orleans, 73 U.S. (6
Wall.) 642 (1867); Gaines v. De La Croix, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 719 (1867); New Orleans v. Gaines,
82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 624 (1872); Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U.S. 10 (1875); Smith v. Gaines, 93 U.S.
341 (1876); Davis v. Gaines, 104 U.S. 386 (1881); Louisiana Nat'l Bank v. Whitney, 121 U.S.
284 (1887); New Orleans v. Christmas, 131 U.S. 191 (1889); New Orleans v. United States ex rel
Christmas, 131 U.S. 220 (1889); New Orleans v. Whitney, 138 U.S. 595 (1891). In 1867, the
Supreme Court Reporter expressed his self-consciousness about the extraordinary efforts the
Court expended on the Gaines Case:
For more than one-third of a century, in one form and another, [the Gaines Case] had
been the subject of judicial decision in this court, and the records now-complicated in
the extreme-reached nearly eight thousand closely printed pages. If this court, when
the case was last heard before it, spoke of it as 'one which, when hereafter some
distinguished American lawyer shall retire from his practice to write the history of his
country's jurisprudence, will be registered by him as the most remarkable in the
records of its courts,' the present reporter will surely be excused, if, in that haste which
a speedy publication of current decisions requires, he shall, from such records as he has
described,-and in a matter where as to facts, simply, this high tribunal has been
always largely divided on the evidence,-have attained much less than perfect
accuracy of detail or even than the truest form of presentation generally. As far as he
has himself conceived the case from the huge volumes in which it was imbedded-but
deprecating reliance upon his statement in any matter affecting property involved in
these issues if, contrary to the hope expressed by this court, further question about
property is anywhere to be made-the subject, in its outlines and general effect,
seemed thus to present itself.
Gaines v. New Orleans, 73 U.S. at 645-46 (reporter's commentary). In the same opinion, the
Court expressed its own view of the protracted nature of the litigation:
We shall not attempt to give the history of the litigation, which, it is to be hoped, will
be closed by this decision; for the profession is familiar with it by the repeated
adjudications of this court. It is enough to say it has been pursued by the complainant
through a third of a century, with a vigor and energy hardly ever surpassed, in defiance
of obstacles which would have deterred persons of ordinary mind and character, and
has enlisted, on both sides, at different periods, the ablest talent of the American bar.
Id.at 699.
197 Id. at 645 (reporter's commentary). For examples of the Court's exhaustive evaluation of
the evidence presented, see Patterson v. Gaines, 47 U.S. at 552-75 (reporter's account of the
evidence), and id.at 582-602 (analysis of evidence in text of opinion); Gaines v. New Orleans, 73
U.S. at 646-97 (reporter's account of the evidence), and id.at 698-719 (evaluation of the evidence
in the text of opinion).
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198 until very
by him as the most remarkable in the records of its courts,"
recently little attention has been given to the Gaines Case in modem
scholarship. 199
The Gaines Case will seem extraordinary to modem-day students
of what is known as the domestic relations exception to federal diversity
jurisdiction, perhaps the most thoroughly enshrined incarnation of the
state sovereignty paradigm of domestic relations. As articulated by the
Supreme Court in the 1992 opinion Ankenbrandt v. Richards, the
domestic relations exception should be narrowly construed to preclude a
federal court from issuing "divorce, alimony, and child custody
2 00 But the
decrees" when resolving a case filed in diversity jurisdiction.
application of the domestic relations exception has been anything but
narrow. It is applied as a limit on federal question jurisdiction, and as a
20 1 Most recently,
modem-day canon of federal statutory interpretation.
it has been invoked by the Supreme Court as a "prudent" limitation on
20 2
Article III standing in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow.
In applying the domestic relations exception and expanding it beyond
the narrow boundaries set forth in Ankenbrandt, federal courts routinely
rely on the tradition and history of state sovereignty over domestic
relations as a basis for deference to state law and state courts in any case
that touches on family matters. 20 3 The Gaines Case and the hundreds (if
not thousands) of federal cases involving domestic relations during the
pre-Civil War era demonstrate that such deference in cases involving
rather than an
domestic relations is premised on an invented tradition
20 4
federalism.
of
essential or transhistorical principle
Even more surprising than the fact that pre-Civil War federal
courts routinely handled domestic relations matters is that prior to
1938-the year of the Erie v. Tompkins decision and of the merger of
2 5
law and equity in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure -federal

198 Gaines v. Hennen, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 553, 515 (1860).
199 See ELIZABETH URBAN ALEXANDER, NOTORIOUS WOMAN: THE CELEBRATED CASE OF

MYRA CLARK GAINES (2001). Alexander provides a wonderfully rich study of Myra Clark
Gaines's life and family, the protracted litigation that occupied her during her entire adult life,
and the hosts of attorneys and other public figures involved in the lawsuit.
200 Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992).
201 See, e.g., sources cited in supra note 3 1.
202 542 U.S. 1, 26-29 (2004). As Naomi Calm notes, "[h]istorically, the Court's statements
concerning the source and scope of the Domestic Relations Exception have provided little
guidance for the lower federal courts." Naomi R. Calm, Family Law, Federalism, and the
FederalCourts, 79 IOWA L. REv. 1073, 1080 (1994).
203 See, e.g., sources cited in supranote 15.
204 See, e.g., cases listed in infra notes 207-17, 223-30 and accompanying text.
205 See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); FED. R. Civ. P. 2 (1938) ("There shall be
one form of action to be known as 'civil action."'). The application of state law in equity cases
may have occurred definitively a few years later, when the Supreme Court explicitly applied the
Erie rule to federal equity in Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 105 (1945),
and contended that "[iun giving federal courts 'cognizance' of equity suits in cases of diversity
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equity principles, not state law, governed the outcomes of the many
domestic relations cases brought in federal court. Prior to 1938, the
federal court docket officially had two "sides": law and equity. Under
the interpretation given to the Judiciary Act of 1789 during much of the
pre-Civil War period, state law generally governed disputes brought on
the legal side of the federal docket. 206 Thus, federal judges generally
applied state law when resolving the various legal issues that arose in
domestic relations cases before them: the construction and validity of
wills, 20 7 intestate inheritance,2 08 dower 209 and curtesy,21 0 validity of
jurisdiction, Congress never gave, nor did the federal courts ever claim, the power to deny
substantive rights created by State law or to create substantive rights denied by State law." The
accuracy of Guaranty Trust's portrayal of the federal court's historic equity powers has been
questioned. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 710-11 (4th ed. 1996); Laura Fitzgerald, Is Jurisdiction
Jurisdictional?,95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1207, 1273 n.306 (2001). In 1948, Congress amended the
Rules of Decision Act to specify that state substantive law was to be applied as the rule of
decision in all "civil actions," thus requiring that state law be applied in actions seeking equitable
relief. See An Act to Revise, Codify, and Enact into Law Title 28 of the United States Code,
Entitled "Judicial Code and Judiciary," ch. 646, § 1652, 62 Stat. 869, 944 (1948). See generally
Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered the Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedurein HistoricalPerspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987).
206 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 81, 81 (1789) ("[T]he laws of the several
states ... shall be regarded as rules of decisions in trials at common law in the courts of the
United States in cases where they apply."). For discussions ofpre-1842 application of state law
in federal court, see FALLON, JR., ET AL., supra note 205, at 79-81; William A. Fletcher, The
General Common Law and Section 34 of the JudiciaryAct of 1789: The Example of Marine
Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1515 (1984) (arguing that the "general common law," rather
than state law, was often applied in federal courts in the early national period).
207 Federal courts routinely construed wills after they had been proved in probate court. See,
e.g., Beard v. Rowan, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 301 (1835) (construing the will of John Campbell); Smith
v. Bell, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 68 (1832) (construing the will of Britain B. Goodwin); Inglis v. Trustees
of Sailor's Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99, 127-29 (1830) (applying New York law to construe
the will of Catherine Brewerton); Wright v. Denn, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 204 (1825) (construing
the devise of James Page to his wife); Taylor v. Mason, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 325 (1824)
(construing the will of R.B.); Waldron v. Chasteney, 28 F. Cas. 1364, 1365 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1847)
(No. 17,058) (interpreting effect of a will to resolve dispute regarding real property); Parkman v.
Bowdoin, 18 F. Cas. 1213 (C.C.D. Mass. 1833) (No. 10,763) (construing the will of Sarah
Bowdoin); West v. Pine, 29 F. Cas. 714 (C.C.D.N.J. 1827) (No. 17,423) (interpreting the will of
Deborah West devising real property to her children); cf McCormick v. Sullivant, 23 U.S. (10
Wheat.) 192, 202-03 (1825) (finding that a will executed in Pennsylvania devising real property
in Ohio was invalid as to real property in Ohio unless and until the will was proved in an Ohio
state court).
208 See, e.g., Gardner v. Collins, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 58 (1829) (determining the descent of the
property of Mary Gardener pursuant to state statute); Cook v. Hammond, 6 F. Cas. 399 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1827) (No. 3,159) (applying state law in resolution of intestacy dispute).
209 Dower was a marital property rule recognized in common law and equity that gave the
widow the right to one-third of the real property that her husband owned, either at death or at any
time during the marriage (or one-half of such real property if the marriage was childless). See
Herbert v. Wren, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 370, 376-77 (1813) (noting that both courts of law and
courts of equity have jurisdiction over claims for dower, and resolving that a widow may not take
both her dower and a devise of real property from her husband, but must choose between the
two). For additional federal cases involving widows' dower rights, see Johnson v. Vandyke, 13 F.
Cas. 888, 893 (C.C.D. Mich. 1855) (No. 7,426) (rejecting the argument by widow that the

2005]

FEDERALISM'S FALLACY

1819

2 13
marriage, 211 illegitimacy, 2 12 conveyance of property byfemes covert,
214 child custody, 2 15 and
husbands' marital property rights and duties,
retroactive application of an 1846 Michigan statute limiting the dower rights of out-of-state
widows violated the federal Constitution, but limiting the retroactive effect of the dower statute,
thus allowing the out-of-state widow to collect dower); Robison v. Codman, 20 F. Cas. 1056,
1059 (C.C.D. Me. 1831) (No. 11,970) (rejecting wife's claim to dower in lands held by the
husband in trust); Hall v. Savage, 11 F. Cas. 252, 253 (C.C.D. Mass. 1826) (No. 5,944) (finding
that a wife's dower is not defeated unless the deed contains "words to express such intention" to
release dower); Stegall v. Stegall, 22 F. Cas. 1226, 1227 (C.C. Va. 1825) (No. 13,351) (holding
that an adulterous wife had no claim to dower in deceased husband's estate, but recognizing her
right to a distributive share under Virginia law); Powell v. Monson & Brimfield Manufg Co., 19
F. Cas. 1228, 1230 (C.C.D. Mass. 1824) (No. 11,357) (noting that a widow's right to dower
includes improvements made to property); Powell v. Monson & Brimfield Manuf'g Co., 19 F.
Cas. 1218, 1222 (C.C.D. Mass. 1824) (No. 11,356) (finding that a conveyance of married
woman's dower rights must conform to the formalities of the state statute, lest married women,
who "are not often sufficiently well acquainted with the practical business of life," be taken
advantage of). See also sources cited in infra note 223 and accompanying text.
210 Where the wife predeceased the husband, but first bore a child with him, the doctrine of
curtesy gave the husband a life estate in all real property to which his wife had title during
coverture. See REEVE, supra note 56, at 89. In other words, while marriage itself gave a husband
an absolute claim to his wife's chattel, the husband's property rights in the wife's real property
were perfected with the birth of a child. See, e.g., Barr v. Galloway, 2 F. Cas. 903 (C.C. Ohio
1839) (No. 1,037) (finding that entry on wild land is not necessary for husband to claim as tenant
by the curtesy); Stoddard v. Gibbs, 23 F. Cas. 126 (C.C.D.R.I. 1832) (No. 13,468) (determining
whether a husband is entitled to a life estate, as tenant by the curtesy, of land of which his wife
held a fee in reversion pursuant to Rhode Island statute); Cook v. Hammond, 6 F. Cas. 399, 409
(C.C.D. Mass. 1827) (No. 3,159) (Story, J.) (holding that a Massachusetts statute providing for
the equal distribution of property among children rather than primogeniture or double share for
eldest son applies to remainders, such as dower and curtesy).
211 See, e.g., Jewell v. Jewell, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 219 (1843) (Taney, C.J.) (evaluating the
legitimacy of husband's alleged undisclosed first marriage to another woman in order to resolve
an action for ejectment brought by the second wife against the children of the husband's alleged
first wife); Rose v. Niles, 20 F. Cas. 1188, 1191 (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1849) (No. 12,050) (finding that a
woman purported to be the wife of the defendant must first overcome the presumption of a legal
marital relationship before testifying on behalf of the defendant); see also infra Part III.C.2
(discussing the Gaines Case).
212 See McCool v. Smith, 66 U.S. (I Black) 459 (1861) (rejecting application of statute
securing inheritance rights of nonmarital children in light of the relevant common law
prohibitions); Gregg v. Tesson, 66 U.S. (I Black) 150 (1861) (analyzing application of the laws
governing the rights of nonmarital children in civil law and common law jurisdictions); Jewell, 42
U.S. (1 How.) at 219; Brewer's Lessee v. Blougher, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 178, 200 (1840)
(determining that, pursuant to state statute, illegitimate children of incestuous relationship are
able to inherit from their mother, in contravention of the common law); see also infra Part III.C.2
(discussing the Gaines Case).
213 As explained by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the strict rules regarding a married
woman's conveyance of her property rights were intended to protect the wife against the
husband's coercions:
The subordinate and dependent condition of the wife, opens to the husband such an
unbounded field to practice on her natural timidity, or to abuse a confidence, never
sparingly reposed in return for even occasional and insidious kindness, that there is
nothing, however unreasonable or unjust, to which he cannot procure her consent.
[Hence,] [t]he policy of the law should be, as far as possible, to narrow, rather than to
widen, the field of this controlling influence.
Watson v. Mercer, 6 Serg. & Rawle 49, 50 (Pa. 1820); see also Hepburn v. Dubois, 37 U.S. (12
Pet.) 345, 375 (1838) (refusing to enforce conveyance of real property by feme covert where
woman not subject to privy examination by judicial officer, out of husband's presence); Lane v.
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numerous procedural issues directly affected by domestic relations law
(such as statute of limitations 21 6 and evidence 217). Thus, domestic
relations issues that were "legal" in nature were subject to the same
treatment as all other disputes in law under the 1789 Judiciary Act. 21 8

During the same period, equitable claims filed in federal courtsincluding claims involving domestic relations-were generally decided

Dolick, 14 F. Cas. 1077 (C.C.D. Ill. 1854) (No. 8,049) (finding that an affirmation byfeme covert
that she was conveying dower in husband's real property is insufficient to convey her interest in
her own estate under Illinois law); Raverty v. Fridge, 20 F. Cas. 319 (C.C.D. Ohio 1843) (No.
11,587) (stating that the failure of deed to conform to exact statutory requirements for conveyance
by feme covert is insufficient to invalidate deed); Manchester v. Hough, 16 F. Cas. 572, 572
(C.C.D.R.I. 1828) (No. 9,005) (noting that the common law of New England gives afeme covert
the right to convey her real estate by deed with the assent of her husband); Durant v. Ritchie, 8 F.
Cas. 118, 122 (C.C.D. Mass. 1825) (No. 4,190) (recognizing that by the law of Massachusetts, a
feme covert may convey her estate by deed executed by herself and her husband); Talbot v.
Simpson, 23 F. Cas. 644, 646 (C.C.D. Pa. 1815) (No. 13,730) (finding that the conveyance of the
wife's property by the husband to a third party conformed with the statutory requirements of
privy examination of the wife by a magistrate).
214 See, e.g., Avery v. Doane, 2 F. Cas. 243, 244-45 (D.C.D. Wis. 1854) (No. 673) (narrowly
construing Wisconsin's married women's property act, and finding that "[t]he common law has
wisely ordered that property acquired by the wife by purchase, with the consent of her husband, is
in his possession and under his control, and the act under consideration does not disturb this
provision, so essential to the peace and happiness of families"); Callan v. Kennedy, 4 F. Cas.
1073 (C.C.D.C. 1829) (No. 2,319) (recognizing the common law rule that a husband is bound to
pay all of wife's debts accrued during coverture).
215 See Bennett v. Bennett, 3 F. Cas. 212 (D.C.D Or. 1867) (No. 1,318) (using writ of habeas
corpus to secure custody of child pursuant to state court child custody decree); United States v.
Green, 26 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D.R.I. 1824) (No. 15,256) (approving of use of federal habeas corpus
to remove daughter from custody of grandfather); cf Exparte Des Rocers, 7 F. Cas. 537, 537-38
(C.C.D. Cal. 1856) (No. 3,824) (observing that the writ of habeas corpus has been used to restore
a bastard child to his mother and "to bring up an infant who had absconded from its father"). But
see Ex parte Everts, 8 F. Cas. 909 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1858) (No. 4,581) (finding that under federal
habeas corpus statute, a federal court has no jurisdiction over an application for habeas corpus by
the father of a child for the purpose of enforcing his right to custody); In re Barry, 42 F. 113
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1844) (denying writ of habeas corpus for return of child to father).
216 See, e.g., Mercer's Lessee v. Selden, 42 U.S. (I How.) 37, 52-53 (1843) (explaining that if
a wife marries while an infant, then the statute of limitations on a claim begins running after she
achieves majority, even while married).
217 See, e.g., Rose v. Niles, 20 F. Cas. 1188, 1191 (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1849) (No. 12,050) (finding
that a woman purported to be the wife of the defendant must first overcome the presumption of a
legal marital relationship before testifying on behalf of the defendant); Gilleland v. Martin, 10 F.
Cas. 384, 384 (C.C.D. Ohio 1844) (No. 5,433) ("[A]s the wife of the plaintiff, [Mrs. Gilleland] is
inadmissible as a witness, and her statement [as to his lunacy] is therefore rejected."); Bank of
Alexandria v. Mandeville, 2 F. Cas. 614, 615 (C.C.D.C. 1809) (No. 851) (observing that the wife
of one partner may not testify against the other partner, as she "has all of [her husband's legal]
disabilities").
218 They were also subject to the same inconsistencies in the application of the rule of
decision. For example, Stevenson's Heirs v. Sullivant, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 207 (1820), is a
notable instance of the disregard federal judges sometimes displayed for state substantive law,
even in the context of domestic relations. In that case, which involved the inheritance rights of
nonmarital children under Virginia statutory law, the Supreme Court rejected the claim that
Virginia statutory law, as interpreted by the highest court of that state, governed its determination
of the legitimacy status of a would-be heir to a sizable estate.
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2 19 The Process
pursuant to a national uniform body of equity principles.
Act provided that cases filed in equity were to be resolved "according to
the principles, rules and usages which belong to courts of equity ...as
'220 This rule was
contradistinguished from courts of common law.
219 Recent analyses of federal equity jurisprudence of the early nineteenth century support this
conclusion. See Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, The Article III Jury, 87 VA. L. REV.
587, 619 (2001) ("[T]he substantive law that applied in federal equity proceedings was frequently
either federal or general law rather than state law."); Fitzgerald, supra note 206, at 1263-70
("Moreover, the 1789 Act authorized the federal judiciary to develop for itself a uniquely federal
law of equity. Although Congress required federal courts to follow state rules of decision in
common-law cases, absent controlling federal constitutional or statutory authority, they were not
so confined when deciding cases in equity."). This conclusion departs from William Fletcher's
contention that during the early national period, "as a routine matter, the federal courts sitting in
equity followed local state law." Fletcher, supra note 206, at 1529. I agree with Fletcher's
observation that in federal court, in suits brought in law or equity, remedies were derived from
federal rather than state practice. See id at 1529 n.72. However, my research does not support
the conclusion that, as a general matter, "questions of rights, both at law and equity, [were]
determined according to local state law." Id. First, federal judges of the period recognized that
federal equity jurisprudence, as opposed to state equity or state common law or statute, provided a
"rule of decision" as to equitable claims. In United States v. Howland, 17 U.S. 108, 115 (1819),
Justice Marshall clarified that where
the remedy in Chancery ...is more complete and adequate ...in such cases,
ascertained with more certainty and facility; and as the Courts of the Union have a
Chancery jurisdiction in every state, and the judiciary act confers the same Chancery
powers on all, and gives the same rule of decision, its jurisdiction in Massachusetts
must be the same as in other States.
Perhaps as importantly, then, as now, the strict division between rights and remedies upon which
Fletcher appears to rely in his analysis of historic federal equity powers may not adequately
capture the function of federal remedies in the context of federal equity. As Holmes would
explain at the end of the nineteenth century, "a legal duty so called is nothing but a prediction that
if a man does or omits certain things he will be made to suffer this way or that way by judgment
of the court;-and so of a legal right." Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L.
REV. 457, 458 (1897). This was especially true in the context of equity jurisprudence, which
applied only when the common law failed to supply an adequate remedy. See Judiciary Act of
1789, ch. 20, § 16, 1 Stat. 73, 82 (1789) (noting that equity is not available "in any case where a
plain, adequate and complete remedy may be had at law"). In A Summary of Equity Pleading,
published in 1877, Christopher Columbus Langdell warned against interpreting equity as a
system of special remedies only, admonishing that "it must not be supposed that equity in modem
times is simply a different system of remedies from those administered in courts of law; for there
are many extensive doctrines in equity and some whole branches of law, which are unknown to
the common-law courts," such as trusts and equity of redemption. C.C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY
OF EQUITY PLEADING at xxv-xxvi (Cambridge, Mass., C.W. Sever 1877). Thus, equity was, in
many respects, a separate body of jurisprudential principles that, when applicable, determined the
rights and liabilities of the parties before the court. When application of equity was required in a
federal court, federal uniform principles governed.
220 An Act for Regulating the Processes of the Courts of the United States, and Providing
Compensation for the Officers of Said Courts, and for Jurors and Witnesses (The Process Act of
1792), ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276 (1792). The Process Act replaced what has been referred to as
the Temporary Process Act of 1789, ch. 21, 1 Stat. 93, 93-94 (1789), which provided that "the
forms and modes of proceedings in causes of equity ... shall be according to the civil law." The
Process Act of 1792 also gave the Supreme Court authority to promulgate rules governing equity
practice. See The Process Act of 1792, § 2, 1 Stat. at 276. In 1818, the Court explicitly
recognized the distinctive authority of federal equity courts in Robinson v. Campbell, 16 U.S. (3
Wheat.) 212, 221-22 (1818), and in 1822 exercised its rule-making authority by promulgating a
uniform body of equity rules for all federal courts, see Rules of Practicefor the Courts of Equity
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interpreted to require that federal courts apply a uniform body of equity
procedure and remedies in all cases filed in equity. And the application
of equitable procedures and remedies required application of a
considerable body of equity jurisprudence that had developed to
ameliorate the harsh consequences of the common law and that was
often outcome determinative. Thus, federal courts applied equity
principles even-or especially-when application of those principles
resulted in a different outcome than would have been reached by a
forum state court. 221 Accordingly, because many cases involving
domestic relations could be (and were) filed on the equity side of the
federal courts' docket, federal courts frequently decided those cases
pursuant to federal equity principles rather than state law. 222
of the United States, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) at v (1822). The Court adopted a second edition of the
Federal Rules of Equity in 1842. See Rules of Practicefor the Courts of Equity of the United
States, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at xli (1842). For recent analyses of the significance of the Process Act,
see Fitzgerald, supra note 206, at 1264-70, Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 219, at 615-20,
and Ann Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of ConstitutionallyCompelled Remedies, 107
YALE L.J. 77, 104-05 (1997). John T. Cross traces the evolution of the Process Act and the
federal courts' equity powers in The Erie Doctrine in Equity, 60 LA. L. REv. 173, 178-81 (1999).
The Process Act also received some attention by an earlier generation of scholars, such as Robert
von Moschzisker:
[I]n the national courts, there is a chancery jurisdiction which stands quite free of other
juridical powers, and.., is accompanied by a body of uniform rules and remedies, not
only separate and distinct from those of the various states but entirely independent of,
and uncontrolled by, the equity systems there prevailing.
Equity Jurisdictionin the FederalCourts, 75 U. PA. L. REv. 287, 287 (1927); Howard Newcomb
Morse, The Substantive Equity Historically Applied by the U.S. Courts, 54 DICK. L. REV. 10
(1949) (reviewing the case law interpreting federal courts' distinctive equity powers); see also
ERWIN C. SURRENCY, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 156 (1987) ("The procedure in equity
was entirely different from that followed in the common law side of the federal courts. Because
the federal courts were free to completely regulate practice [in equity], it was uniform throughout
the United States.").
221 Application of equity was often outcome determinative because, as section 16 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 required, actions at equity were not available in federal courts "in any case
where a plain, adequate and complete remedy may be had at law," Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20,
§ 16, 1 Stat. 73, 82 (1789), a provision that memorialized in federal statute the standard limitation
on equity courts' powers, see 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS
ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 32 (Boston, Hillard, Gray & Co. 1836). However,
equity was not always outcome determinative because, for example, just as an action filed in law
could be dismissed, so too a bill filed in equity could be dismissed for failure to properly plead an
equitable claim. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 56, at *445-46.
222 This is not to suggest that all issues that arose in a case filed in equity were decided
pursuant to federal principles. Many cases filed in equity required the courts to resolve both
equitable and legal issues. See, e.g., Walker v. Parker, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 166 (1839) (in action at
equity, applying Maryland law to interpret will to resolve claims of decedent's widow and infant
son); Rinehart v. Harrison, 20 F. Cas. 806 (C.C.D.N.J. 1830) (No. 11,840) (in action in equity,
interpreting will of wife who predeceased her husband, and applying the common law rule that
the husband is the administrator of his wife's estate); Talbot v. Simpson, 23 F. Cas. 644, 646
(C.C.D. Pa. 1815) (No. 13,730) (in action at equity, finding that the conveyance of the wife's
property by the husband to a third party conformed with the statutory requirements of privy
examination of the wife by a magistrate, and refusing argument that principles of equity mandated
different result). And federal courts sitting in equity would retain jurisdiction over a case even
when it became clear that equitable relief was not available. See Cathcart v. Robinson, 30 U.S. (5
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In any given domestic relations case filed in equity, the role of
As a source of
federal principles equity could be profound.
"exceptional" remedies, equity was instrumental in domestic relations
disputes where the court needed to "undo" a conveyance of property
when common law rights had been violated, such as wrongful denial of
224 or undue influence of an
dower, 223 fraudulent suppression of a will,
225 Most notoriously, using their equity powers, federal judges
heir.
enforced married women's separate estates--establishing trusts for
femes covert that enabled women to maintain possession and control of
their property during marriage in contravention of the common law's
226 Although there is much
rules regarding married women's property.
disagreement among historians over the precise impact of equity on
Pet.) 264, 278 (1831) ("It is equally well settled that if the [equity] jurisdiction attaches, the court
will go on to do complete justice, although in its progress it may decree on a matter which was
cognizable at law."). In cases filed in equity where both legal and equitable issues were at stake,
federal courts appear to have applied state legal principles to resolve legal claims-unless
principles of equity required departure or modification-and applied federal equity to resolve
equitable claims. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 16, 1 Stat. 73, 82 (1789); see infra Part
1II.C.2 (discussing the application of equity in the Gaines Case); infra Part III.C.3 (discussing the
application of federal equity in the enforcement of a marriage settlement).
223 See, e.g., United States v. Duncan, 25 F. Cas. 926, 927 (C.C.D. IlI. 1846) (No. 15,002)
(finding a widow indowable, even though she accepted certain property bequeathed to her in her
husband's will); Flagg v. Mann, 9 F. Cas. 202 (C.C.D. Mass. 1837) (No. 4,847) (noting that
absence of wife's signature on deed releasing her dower does not necessarily invalidate a
conveyance of real property by the husband); see also cases cited in supra note 209.
224 See, for example, Gaines v. Chew, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 619 (1844), which is examined at
length in Part III.C.2.
225 See, e.g., Taylor v. Taylor, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 183, 209 (1850) (finding undue influence by
father and intended husband to defraud the daughter of her inheritance from an uncle); Jenkins v.
Pye, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 241, 253-54 (1838) (reversing lower court's finding of undue influence,
and rejecting the contention that a parent is "disqualified to take a voluntary deed from his
child... on account of their relationship," a proposition that the Court found to be "at war with
all filial as well as parental duty and affection"); Pye v. Jenkins, 20 F. Cas. 95, 97 (C.C.D.C.
1835) (No. 11,487) ("Among the relations which a court of equity looks upon with a suspicious
eye are those of guardian and ward, parent and child, trustee and cestui que trust, tutor and pupil,
attorney and client, master and servant ... ").
226 A trust enabled a donor, often the woman's father, to provide a separate gift to afeme sole
that, upon marriage, would not be available to the husband under the common law rules
governing marital property. See 2 STORY, supra note 221, at 606-11; see, e.g., Pierce v. Turner, 9
U.S. (5 Cranch) 154, 167 (1809) (where husband was a party to marriage settlement conveying
wife's land and slaves to trustees, conveyance protects the property from husband's creditors
even though the settlement instrument was not recorded); Neves v. Scott, 18 F. Cas. 22, 24
(C.C.D. Ga. 1846) (No. 10,134) (finding that a bilateral marriage settlement is not enforceable
against third parties); Picquet v. Swan, 19 F. Cas. 600, 603 (C.C.D. Mass. 1827) (No. 11,133)
(upholding wife's separate estate as valid against attempted attachment by husband's creditors);
Robinson v. Cathcart, 20 F. Cas. 985 (C.C.D.C. 1825) (No. 11,946), rev'd in part, 30 U.S. (5
Pet.) 264 (1831) (observing that a postnuptial conveyance "executed by a husband in favor of
wife, or children, after marriage, which rests wholly on the moral duty of a husband and parent to
provide for his wife and issue, is voluntary and void against purchasers"). For a thorough account
of the development of married women's separate estates in nineteenth-century England, see
ALBERT V. DICEY, LECTURES ON THE RELATION BETWEEN LAW & PUBLIC OPINION IN
ENGLAND DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 375-98 (1914).
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married women's wealth and status, 227 it is uncontroverted that by
enforcing the establishment of separate trusts-marriage settlements (or
prenuptial agreements) 228-equity enabled at least some married women
to achieve a level of financial independence that was otherwise
unattainable under the common law. 229 Use of such equitable devices
was, in essence, a private law response to coverture.
This Section analyzes two pre-Civil War Supreme Court cases
involving domestic relations: the Gaines Case and Neves v. Scott.2 30
The outcomes of both of these cases turned on whether federal equity
jurisprudence or state law would apply in an equity suit filed in federal
court. The first important feature of these cases is that, using federal
equity principles, the Supreme Court upheld the privately negotiated
resolutions to injustice created by local law or local bias. In the Gaines
Case, the Court enforced an alleged nonmarital child's right to her
father's estate as purportedly promised in a missing will. In Neves, the
Court enforced the terms of a marriage settlement that had allowed the
couple to share their property equally, and gave the surviving spouse a
survivorship interest in the deceased spouse's estate. Private law
offered ways around some of the inegalitarian aspects of the default
rules of domestic relations law, and by enforcing these arrangements in
equity, the federal courts helped to disestablish the status-based
hierarchies of traditional family law on a case-by-case basis.
The second notable aspect of both cases is that, despite the fierce
dispute concerning the use of federal equity principles in place of state
227 See, e.g., SALMON, supra note 64, at xvi (suggesting that the steady improvements of
wives' control over property through the separate estate was the initial step toward the married
women's property acts); ELIZABETH BOWLES WARBASSE, THE CHANGING LEGAL RIGHTS OF
MARRIED WOMEN, 1800-1861, at 36 (1987) (suggesting that equity's various devices for
ameliorating the harshness of the common law's marital property rules created a different law of
marital property for rich and poor women); Richard H. Chused, Married Women's Property Law:
1800-1850, 71 GEO. L.J. 1359, 1409-12 (1983) (arguing that women's equitable trusts had a
liberalizing effect on the common law's treatment of married women's property).
228 A marriage settlement made prior to marriage was essentially a prenuptial agreement.
Such agreements would have been unenforceable against third parties under the common law, but
were enforceable in equity. See 2 KENT, supra note 56, at 173; WARBASSE, supra note 227, at
32-34. For federal cases interpreting marriage settlements, see Ladd v. Ladd, 49 U.S. (8 How.)
10, 27 (1850) (observing that conveyance byfeme covert of part of her separate estate will be
presumed to have been executed absent marital duress); Marshallv. Beall, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 70,
80 (1848) (finding that upon the wife's death, certain trust assets were subject to the laws of
distribution and were therefore the property of the husband); Cranev. Morris'sLessee, 31 U.S. (6
Pet.) 598, 614 (1832) (interpreting rights of husband under separate estate established by wife
before marriage); Tilghman v. Tilghman, 23 F. Cas. 1243 (C.C.D. Pa. 1832) (No. 14,045)
(interpreting marriage settlement provided by the respective fathers of a husband and wife prior to
the couple's marriage); Gallego v. Chevallie, 9 F. Cas. 1102, 1105 (C.C.D. Va. 1826) (No. 5,200)
(finding that husband's decision not to claim a portion of wife's legacy defeats claim of the
husband's creditors). See also infra Part III.C.3.
229 See WARBASSE, supra note 227, at 36.
230 See Neves v. Scott, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 268 (1851); Neves v. Scott, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 196
(1850).
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law, neither the parties nor the judges involved argued that state law
should govern because the suits involved domestic relations. Even at
the end of the pre-Civil War period, when, as I discuss below, the
notion that states had special authority over domestic relations had
become part of the flourishing states' rights rhetoric of the time, the
state sovereignty paradigm had not developed as a generally applicable
principle of American federalism that bore231 on contemporary
understandings of the powers of the federal courts.
The Gaines Case and Neves, and the hundreds of other pre-Civil
War federal cases involving domestic relations, call into question the
historical foundation of the state sovereignty paradigm and, more
specifically, the modern domestic relations exception.
1.

A Short History of Equity in America

To understand the Gaines Case and Neves, and the dispute over
federal equity jurisprudence during the pre-Civil War era, one must
understand a bit about America's historical ambivalence toward equity.
Defined narrowly, "equity" referred to a set of extraordinary remedies
and procedures that were available to ameliorate defects in the
application of positive law, such as in the case of fraud, mistake, and
forgery, 232 and to equitable instruments that required the ongoing
supervision of a court, such as trusts and guardianships. 2 33 The term
"equity," or "equity of the statute," was also used more broadly to
describe a form of statutory interpretation that authorized judges to
interpretation of a statute in order to
follow a restrictive or expansive
"prevent a failure of justice. '' 234
Equity was a standard feature of English jurisprudence and was
enforced in a separate chancery court. But the reception of equity in
many parts of America was tepid at best, and sometimes even hostile.
In regions settled by those colonists who inherited a distrust of the
231 See infra Part IV.
232 See Stanley N. Katz, The Politics of Law in Colonial America: Controversies over
Chancery Courts and Equity Law in the Eighteenth Century, in 5 PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN
HISTORY: LAW INAMERICAN HISTORY 259 (Donald Fleming & Bernard Bailyn eds., 1971).
233 See id
234 GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 457

(1969). Many scholars have examined the role of equity principles as interpretive tools. See,
e.g., PETER C. HOFFER, THE LAW'S CONSCIENCE: EQUITABLE CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA
(1990); GARY L. MCDOWELL, EQUITY AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME COURT,
EQUITABLE RELIEF, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1982); William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words:

Early Understandings of the "JudicialPower" in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 990, 1040-55 (2001) (discussing the framers' and early jurists' attitudes toward
and use of equitable interpretive techniques); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the
Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 79-85 (2001)(same).
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Crown, such as New England, chancery courts were suspicious because
of their associations with the monarch's (and his colonial governors')
unfettered use of equity to vitiate the common law, and with it the
common law rights of Englishmen. 235 This attitude was part of the
intellectual inheritance of the founders: opponents of equity maintained
that the "roguish" body of jurisprudence allowed the judiciary to reign
supreme over positive laws that bore the stamp of the elected
representatives of the people ("[i]n republics, the very nature of the
constitution requires the judges to follow the letter of the law" 236) and
over the time-honored common law rights that protected property. As a
consequence of this history, the reception of equity within the legal
systems of the individual states varied regionally. Southern and midAtlantic states, founded as royal colonies, tended to embrace equity
jurisprudence. 237 In New England, where the highest concentration of
dissenters had settled, several states lacked developed equity
jurisprudence or chancery courts into the nineteenth century.2 38 As a
civil law state, Louisiana never adopted equity jurisprudence. 239
In the area of domestic relations, the role of equity was especially
offensive to some because it provided exceptions to the enforcement of
the common law's merger doctrine. Critics of equity contended that
equitable instruments such as marriage settlements resulted in the
235 See Calvin Woodard, Joseph Story and American Equity, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 623,
641 (1988) ("Many colonists in America who favored Parliament instead of the Stuart kings
became, if not champions of the common law, detesters of the Crown and everything associated
with it, including the chancellor and chancery. For purely political reasons, therefore, equity
started off in this country with a black eye."). The history of the Parliamentarian-and, later,
republican-distrust of equity jurisprudence and courts of equity is well documented. See
SHAMMAS, supra note 64, at 34-35 ("Equity law and chancery courts were viewed with
suspicion, for they were associated in many people's minds with the machinations of the Tudor
and, especially, the Stuart monarchs to destroy certain common law liberties. The dissenter
colonies refused to set up these courts."); Amalia D. Kessler, Our InquisitorialTradition:Equity,
Procedure,Due Process, and the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L.
REV. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 16-19, on file with Cardozo Law Review); cf Katz,
supra note 232, at 265 (arguing that "[iun the colonial period, at least, Americans objected to
chancery courts rather than to equity law"); Chused, supra note 227, at 1369 (arguing that
colonial resistance to equity is better understood as a resistance to the chancery courts than equity
jurisprudence per se).
236 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 75 (Thomas Nugent trans., 1949)

(1748).
237 See SALMON, supra note 64, at 11.
238 See id.at 11-12, 82-84. On this point, Woodard explains:
[I]n those colonies, and later states, that had a powerful class of leaders who identified
closely with the mother country-such as Virginia, South Carolina, and to a lesser
degree New York-the home system was replicated: a separate court of chancery with
traditional English chancery jurisdiction ... was established. In colonies in which the
dominant classes were strongly hostile to England and things English-such as those in
New England-the English chancery model was rejected altogether... and
equity... was sought in other, perhaps more appropriate ways.
Woodard, supra note 235, at 641.
239 See WARBASSE, supra note 227, at 48; see also infra notes 261-68 and accompanying text.
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dislocation of the husband's common law property rights (his "private
rights"). Consequently, they maintained, equity jurisprudence disrupted
the domestic harmony secured by the merger doctrine and the attendant
marital property laws. 240 For example, in 1804 a Connecticut lawyer
opposing the expansion of married women's equitable trusts maintained
that the unity of a married couple's property interests was a crucial
factor in ensuring marital stability:
And are we ... to take, at once, the last step, which corruption has
there introduced, and bury in oblivion the principle, that a feme
covert has no separate existence? . .. We happily have never heard
of forming certain exceptions to the marriage contract, when framed,
that the wife need not lose her independence; nor of relations giving
property to married women, to their separate use. But the idea has
here been, that lines of separation were not to be drawn between
husband and wife; and the generosity of our females has not allowed
them to wish to keep their property from those, to whom they have
not refused their persons. Our customs, therefore, do not require the
introduction of these new principles.... Upon principles of policy,
what good consequences can result from pin-money, and separate
establishments? While husband and wife have but one interest, you
create separate
may calculate upon the most perfect harmony; but
24 1
....
tranquility
domestic
destroy
you
and
interests,
While naysayers understood equitable trusts as an abrogation of the
common law's marital regime, others argued that trusts were a
necessary corrective to the abuses that stemmed from married women's
inability to control property, a view adopted by Chancellor Kent:
These marriage settlements are benignly intended to secure to the
wife a certain support in every event, and to guard her against being
overwhelmed by the misfortunes, or unkindness, or vices of her
husband. They usually proceed from the prudence and foresight of
friends, or the warm and anxious affection of parents; and, if fairly
made, they ought to be supported according to the true intent and
meaning of the instrument by which they are created. A court of
settlements into effect, and
equity will carry the intention of these
242
not permit the intention to be defeated.
240 See SALMON, supra note 64, at 8-9 (noting that, in order to ensure marital unity, the
puritanical element of New England ideology led regional law makers to limit the use of marriage
settlements). By the 181Os, married women's trusts and property rights still lacked full protection
under at least four states' legal systems (Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and Maine).
See WARBASSE, supra note 227, at 43-45.
241 Dibble v. Hutton, 1 Day 221, 223 (Conn. 1804) (reporter's account of counsel's argument)
(emphasis in original).
242 2 KENT, supra note 56, at 165-66. Justice John Bannister Gibson of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court warned that because his state lacked the full protections of equity, "the interests
and estates of married women [are] so entirely at the mercy of their husbands ... in
Pennsylvania. This... is extenuated by no motive of policy, and is by no means creditable to our
jurisprudence." Watson v. Mercer, 6 Serg. & Rawle 49, 50 (Pa. 1820).
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Thus, equitable trusts enabled families, usually through a thirdparty trustee, to effectively negotiate around the default rules of marital
property distribution (and the values those laws protected), just as wills
enabled individuals to circumnavigate the default rules of intestacy
distribution. As historian Carole Shammas has demonstrated, the most
common use of the trust was by fathers seeking to protect their
daughters from spendthrift or tyrannical husbands. 243 As the trust
became more common in America-and the restrictions on its
formalities loosened-it also became an instrument used by couples
themselves to redistribute authority within the relationship.
For
example, couples entered prenuptial marriage settlements stipulating
that once married, the couple would exercise equal authority over all
property, 244 or the wife would maintain control over her property. 245
Thus, despite the prohibition on contracts executed between husband
and wife (a direct consequence of their legal "merger"), within certain
families, marriage settlements enabled couples to re-negotiate authority
before and even after they married. 246
In Lewis v. Baird, for example, a federal court in Ohio evaluated a
trust between a former Continental Line officer, his wife, and a group of
third-party trustees, "[t]he principal object of [which] was, to procure a
reconciliation between Lawson and his wife, and preserve harmony in
the family. '247 Lawson was an abusive husband, and the trust was
designed to incentivize his reform through a covenant with the trustees
that he would not "offer any personal violence or injury to his wife, and
that he would abstain from the intemperate use of every kind of
spirituous liquors. '248 If he violated these restrictions, the trust required
that the trustees provide his wife with 150 acres of land. 249 Depending
on one's perspective, then, the use of equitable trusts to distribute
property according to private negotiations could be understood either as
a victory for the republican values of freedom of property and some
degree of gender equality, or as a most unrepublican, tyrannical form of
judicial overreaching into the laws that secured the harmony of marital
relations and the "private rights" secured for husbands by the common
law of domestic relations.
Outside the context of married women's separate estates, equitable
instruments and remedies also embroiled the courts in domestic
243 See SHAMMAS, supra note 64, at 57.
244 See, e.g., Neves v. Scott, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 196 (1850).
245 See, e.g., Ladd v. Ladd, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 10, 27 (1850) (observing that conveyance by
feme covert of part of her separate estate will be presumed to have been executed absent marital
duress).
246 See WARBASSE, supra note 227, at 32-33.
247 Lewis v. Baird, 15 F. Cas. 457, 460 (C.C.D. Ohio 1842) (No. 8,316).
248 Id. at 458.
249 See id.
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relations cases where a private arrangement for allocation of property
within a family-such as by will or trust-was thwarted by the
fraudulent conduct of another, such as the exploitation of a child-heir by
his parents, or embezzlement by the executors of an estate. Equitable
principles and remedies enabled courts to ensure that the intended
Because these private law
arrangements were not sabotaged.
instruments allowed individuals to trump certain default rules of
intestacy established under the common law, such instruments
frequently involved the courts in the case-by-case re-definition of the
priorities established by the rules of descent.
If equity jurisprudence was controversial, it should come as no
surprise that defenders of state sovereignty especially resented federal
equity jurisprudence. At the Constitutional Convention, Article III's
mandate that "Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity" 250 prompted resistance by Anti-Federalists who believed that
federal equity powers would effectively license federal judges to
abrogate state positive law. 25 1 The Anti-Federalists' campaign to take
"equity" out of the Constitution was unsuccessful, and in 1789 Congress
accommodated the federal court's equity powers by passing a temporary
Process Act, which provided that "the forms and modes of proceedings
in causes of equity ...shall be according to the course of the civil
law. '252 Three years later, the Second Congress replaced this provision
with the Process Act, which required federal courts to apply federal
equity principles in all suits arising "in equity," and granted the
Supreme Court power to prescribe procedural rules for cases brought in
253
equity.
Resistance to federal equity jurisprudence continued, and the issue
of whether a uniform body of federal equity jurisprudence applied in
federal courts was litigated on numerous occasions from the 1810s
through the 1830s. 254 To some proponents of state sovereignty, federal
' 255 Much to their
equity jurisprudence was considered "foreign law.
250 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
251 See, e.g., Brutus XI, N.Y.J., Jan. 31, 1788, reprinted in XV THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 512 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspere J. Saladino eds.,
1984) (giving federal courts equity jurisdiction would empower the courts to "explain the
constitution according to the reasoning spirit of it, without being confined to the words or letter,"
and would eventually lead to the expansion of the jurisdiction of federal courts). For a discussion
of the constitutional debates concerning equity jurisdiction and the development of equity
jurisprudence during the early republican period, see MCDOWELL, supra note 234, at 33-47.
252 See Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93-94 (1789).
253 See The Process Act of 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276 (1792); see also supra notes 21922 and accompanying text.
254 See sources cited in infra note 256.
255 See infra note 264 and accompanying text. The perception of national equity as "foreign
law" took hold even in those states where equity jurisprudence formed part of local law. Thus,
even though the southern states had fully adopted equity jurisprudence, a southern reviewer of the
second edition of Story's Commentaries on Equity-a tome that did at least as much to
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dismay, however, throughout the pre-Civil War period the Supreme
Court repeatedly interpreted Article III's "law and equity" provision and
the Process Act to require that federal courts apply a distinct, uniform
body of federal equity principles and procedures when deciding
256
equitable claims.
The Supreme Court remained adamant on that point, regardless of
the subject matter of the lawsuit. In both the Gaines Case and Neves,
the Supreme Court interpreted federal equity jurisprudence to enforce
certain distributions of property within families, even though those
distributions arguably infringed the private rights of family members or
third parties: the designation of a putative bastard child as the heir of a
large fortune in the Gaines Case, and the equal distribution of property
between spouses in Neves. The Gaines Case and Neves were a victory
for federal courts, and for the use of privately negotiated
arrangements-enforced through equity-as a tool for disestablishing
certain inegalitarian norms of domestic relations law.
2.

The Gaines Case

Despite the unambiguous Supreme Court precedent requiring the
application of federal equity jurisprudence in federal court, when Myra
Clark Whitney (through her first husband) filed suit in federal district
court of the Eastern District of Louisiana charging that her father's last
will and testament of 1813 had been fraudulently suppressed, the federal
judges of Louisiana dismissed the suit, refusing to apply federal equity
principles that would have allowed them to take a closer look at the
executors' conduct. 257 It is not entirely surprising that the federal judges
nationalize and standardize equity jurisprudence as the federal courts-urged "the South to
sustain her own law writers, and her own law schools":
The permanence and prosperity of the South; her domestic rights; her wealth, her
religion, her morals and her education, rest on the construction and enforcement of her
laws. What will these be? [H]ow construed and how enforced, if taught in foreign
schools, and applied by foreign jurists?
E.H. Britton, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence, as Administered in England and America,
by Joseph Story, 2 So. Q. REV. 416,419-20 (1842) (book review).
256 For the Court's early insistence that federal courts apply a distinctive, uniform body of
federal equity jurisprudence, see, for example, Poultney v. City ofLa Fayette, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.)
472 (1838); Livingston v. Story, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 632 (1835); Robinson v. Campbell, 16 U.S. (3
Wheat.) 212 (1818); United States v. Howland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 108 (1819).
257 See Ex Parte Whitney, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 404 (1839) (holding that, although the Circuit
Court's refusal to apply the Supreme Court's rules of equity was clearly error, the proper remedy
is reversal, not mandamus); Gaines v. Relf, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 9, 11, 16 (1841) (reversing the
Circuit Court's holding that "the mode of proceeding in all civil cases.., shall be conformable to
the code of practice of Louisiana"). In Gaines v. Relf the Court expressed the view that
[it is a matter of extreme regret, that it appears to be the settled determination of the
district judge, not to suffer chancery practice to prevail in the circuit court in Louisiana,
in equity causes; in total disregard of the repeated decisions of this court, and the rules
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sitting in Louisiana were hesitant to dig into the facts underlying the
Gaines Case. The allegedly suppressed will of 1813 reputedly
contained Daniel Clark's declaration of Myra's legitimacy and named
her as the heir of his vast fortune. If Myra's legitimacy was to be
evaluated, the lower court would have to permit a full investigation of
Clark's personal affairs and those of some of the most prominent
citizens of New Orleans. 258 Clark and his alleged wife, Zulime (who,
the Supreme Court reporter informs us, was "proved to have been
remarkable for beauty" 259), stood at the epicenter of the dispute. Zulime
allegedly became Clark's paramour in 1801, while her husband, a
in
Frenchman named Geronimo Des Grange, was on an extended trip 260
Myra.
including
Clark,
by
children
two
or
one
bore
Zulime
Europe.
Myra's status-and, hence, her right to inherit under Louisiana law26 1
was the primary substantive legal issue in the Gaines Case. If federal
equity applied and the federal judge found that Myra was Clark's

of practice established by the supreme court to be observed in chancery cases.
Id. at 17.
258 According to the Supreme Court reporter:
[Clark] became early an actor in the events of his day and region, a leader of party
there, and connected either by concert or by opposition with many public men of the
time. To him more than to almost any one, as it seemed, was to be attributed the
acquisition by our country of the State of Louisiana. He had been consul of the United
States there before the acquisition, and in 1806-8, represented the Territory in
Congress; its first representative in that body. Everywhere his associations were of a
marked kind, and with people of social importance.
Gaines v. New Orleans, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 642, 647 (1867) (reporter's account).
259 Id. at 648 (reporter's account of the evidence).
260 See id. at 649-53 (reporter's account of circumstances surrounding the births of two
children to Zulime: Caroline and Myra). There was considerable disagreement as to whether
Zulime's first child, Caroline, was actually Clark's child. See, e.g., id. at 703-05 (analyzing
contradictory evidence relating to Caroline's status). Clark nevertheless purportedly provided for
Caroline in the suppressed will of 1813. See id. at 662 (reporter's account of testimony that
Clark's will of 1813 provided "an annuity of $500 to a young female at the north of the United
States, named Caroline Des Granges, till her majority, then it was to cease, and $5000 were to be
paid her as a legacy").
261 Over the course of the protracted litigation, Myra offered three separate theories under
which she was due an inheritance from Clark's estate: (1) If the 1813 will were proven, that
document would constitute a recognition of Myra's legitimacy and would, by its terms, entitle
Myra to nearly the entire estate of Daniel Clark, see Gaines v. Hennen, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 553,
556 (1860); (2) Even if the will were not proven, if Myra were declared Clark's legitimate child,
under Louisiana law she would be entitled to four-fifths of Clark's estate, see Patterson v. Gaines,
47 U.S. (6 How.) 550, 556 (1848) (reporter's account of counsel's argument); LA. CIV. CODE, art.
22, at 212 (1808); (3) Even if Myra were declared illegitimate, she could claim a portion of her
mother's inheritance from Clark, assigned to her by her mother, see Gaines v. Relf, 53 US. (12
However, if Myra was found to be an "adulterine bastard"-an
How.) 472, 506 (1851).
an adulterous relationship-she could not inherit under any theory.
from
bom
child
illegitimate
See Gaines v. Hennen, 65 U.S. at 619 (Catron, J., dissenting) ("By the laws of Louisiana, as they
stood in 1813, the complainant was an adulterous bastard, and could not inherit from her
father,... which declare[], that 'bastard, adulterous, or incestuous children, even duly
acknowledged, shall not enjoy the right of inheriting their natural father or mother."') (quoting
LA. CIV. CODE, art. 46, at 156 (1808)).
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legitimate heir, then the court could rescind many of the property

transfers that had subsequently occurred using the equitable remedy of
the implied trust.262 If federal equity did not apply, then pursuant to
Louisiana law, under which trusts did not exist, arguably the federal
judge had no means of remedying the fraud against Myra, and she

would remain forever a notorious bastard with no claim to her father's

estate. The legal drama being played out as the case bounced back and

forth from state to federal courts, and within the federal court system,
was as much about federal power as it was about the intimate affairs of
Myra's parents.

As a case about federal power, the Gaines Case required the Court

to determine whether Louisiana had the sovereign power to reserve
exclusive jurisdiction over some portion of its positive laws,
notwithstanding the grant of equity power to the federal judiciary in

Article III and the Process Act. 263 In one appearance before the Court,
counsel for the executors of Clark's estate were quick to point out that
the state of Louisiana did not recognize trusts because, as a civil law

jurisdiction, equity had never taken hold there. Thus, they maintained,

the issue on appeal in the Supreme Court was whether the "foreign law"

of federal equity jurisprudence was applicable in a state that had no
equity jurisprudence of its own. 264 The executors reasoned that federal
equity jurisprudence ran roughshod over the substantive probate law of
Louisiana ("Can this court fasten upon the people of Louisiana all the
doctrine of uses and trusts, against their positive law?"), enabling
federal courts to usurp the authority of Louisiana courts, 265 and giving

out-of-state litigants such as Myra special rights. 266 They further
contended that, regardless of whether others viewed Louisiana law as a
"mongrel system," the federal courts simply lacked authority to
dictate
in-state policy. 267 And despite unequivocal Supreme Court case law to
262 See Gaines v. Chew, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 619, 649-50 (1844) (discussing the availability of
the equitable remedy of the implied trust in federal court).
263 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; The Process Act of 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276 (1792).
264 See Gaines v. Chew, 43 U.S. at 650 ("Complaint is made that the federal government has
imposed a foreign law upon Louisiana. There is no ground for this complaint."); id.("It is
insisted that trusts are abolished by the Louisiana code, and that, consequently, that great branch
of equity jurisdiction cannot be exercised in that state."); id. at 630-39 (reporter's summary of
counsel's argument concerning the application of federal equity jurisprudence in Louisiana
federal courts).
265 Id.at 639 (reporter's account of counsel's argument).
266 See id. (reporter's account of counsel's argument: "How can a citizen of another state claim
more rights than a citizen of the state itselfl?] The Constitution requires all to be placed upon
equal footing, but nothing more").
267 See id.at 637 (reporter's account of counsel's argument: "Our system has been called a
mongrel system, but it is good enough for us. It does not follow that laws are unjust because they
emanate from a despotic government"). In defense of the Louisiana court system, the executors'
attorneys noted that "[t]he district-attomey of the United States has preferred resorting to the state
tribunals in a controversy between the government and Bank of the United States, rather than go
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the contrary, the executors maintained that the "law and equity" clause
of Article III, while providing for federal court jurisdiction over equity
cases, did not allow for the development of a distinctive federal equity
Under this theory, if a state lacked equity
jurisprudence. 268
jurisprudence altogether (as in Louisiana), then equity was not available
to litigants in federal court. The executors further insisted that there
were certain areas of law over which states have special authority: "The
sovereignty of a state over its domestic policy [i.e., internal affairs] is
269
complete, and especially over its land laws.
Myra's various counsel presented a more capacious view of federal
equity power, one that was derived from the then-standard interpretation
of the "law and equity" clause of Article 111.270 Myra's attorney
Johnson proposed that Article III effectively gave federal courts power
to use equity jurisprudence to reach any case where local prejudice
would otherwise operate an injustice:
It is asked how we are to reach the Court of Probate. The answer is
found in the Constitution of the United States. If it is a case [in
equity] all state power falls. It was intended to protect the people
from state prejudice; the framers of the instrument knew that local
27 1
prejudices would exist, and saved the people from their operation.
Countering the argument that federal equity allowed federal courts
to "destroy[] all state regulations," Johnson maintained, first, that the
federal courts were simply enforcing the rights secured by Louisiana
law ('Louisiana has recognized the right to transfer property by will,
and this right was exercised in the present case" 272) and that, in any
event, "state power cannot limit the Constitution of the United States
and the jurisdiction of this court under it. ' ' 273 The "equity" provision in
Article III was a grant of jurisdiction to federal courts that required
them to apply federal law regardless of the underlying legal subject
On this point, Myra's counsel dismissed the executors'
matter.
categorical understanding of the federal courts' equity jurisdiction:

into the federal court." Id. (reporter's account of counsel's argument). The subject of the relative
sophistication of Louisiana's civil law code was also the topic of popular commentary. See B.F.
Porter, The Mission ofAmerica, 4 DEBOW'S REv. 108, 119-21 (1847).

268 Counsel for the executors argued:
The position that a state cannot enlarge or restrain the equity power of the Circuit
Court of the United States, is laid down too broadly.... The clause in the Constitution
was inserted, undoubtedly, for the security of impartial justice, but justice administered
with uniformity by state and federal tribunals.
Gaines v. Chew, 43 U.S. at 638 (reporter's account of counsel's argument).
269 Id.

270
271
272
273

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
Gaines v. Chew, 43 U.S. at 633 (reporter's account of counsel's argument).
Id.(reporter's account of counsel's argument).
Id.(reporter's account of counsel's argument).
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It is said that a state court here claims exclusive jurisdiction. If a
state can say that its courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction, it can,
by extending the range of subjects, shut out the courts of the United
States from all jurisdiction whatever. The only question is, is it a
case of equity? If so, no matter how far the claim of exclusiveness of
jurisdiction in the state courts may be pressed, the Constitution of the
274
United States comes in with paramount authority.

For the various justices who wrote opinions, the Gaines Case was
an easy case in terms of the rule governing application of federal equity.
Myra's attorneys were correct that Article III and the Process Act
required that the federal courts sitting in Louisiana apply uniform
federal procedure and principles in cases filed in equity. On this point,
the Gaines Case was made difficult only by the lower court's
recalcitrant refusal to apply the Supreme Court's clear precedent. On
the first appeal to the Supreme Court in 1839, the justices simply issued
a summary reversal. 275 By the second appeal, in 1841, the justices were
exasperated: "These questions having been so repeatedly decided by
this court," wrote Justice Thompson, "and the ground upon which they
rest so fully stated and published in the reports, that it is unnecessary, if
not unfit, now to treat this as an open question.

' 276

With this

justification, the Court's pronouncement was unbending. Federal equity
jurisprudence provided a uniform corpus of principles and procedures to
be applied in every state of the union: "[T]he Circuit Court of the United
States, exercising jurisdiction in Louisiana, as in every other state,
preserves distinct the common law and chancery powers.

' 277

Thus, although the Court doubted its authority to give force to the
unprobated will of 1813,278 it authorized the use of equitable discovery
tools to acquire evidence to be used in any proceeding (federal or state),
274 Id. at 634 (reporter's account of counsel's argument).
275 See Ex Parte Whitney, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 404, 408 (1839) ("That it is the duty of the Circuit
Court to proceed in this suit according to the rules prescribed by the Supreme Court for
proceedings in equity causes at the February term thereof, A. D. 1822, can admit of no doubt.")
276 Gaines v. Relf, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 9, 17 (1841). Even Justice McLean, who had been critical
of the Court's stand on federal equity jurisprudence early in his career, insisted that Louisiana
federal courts come into line:
Complaint is made that the federal government has imposed a foreign law upon
Louisiana. There is no ground for this complaint. The courts of the United States have
involved no new or foreign principle in Louisiana.... Believing that the mode of
proceeding there in the state courts, was adequate to all the purposes of justice; and
knowing with what pertinacity even forms are adhered to, I was averse to any change
of the practice in the federal courts. But I was overruled; and I see in the change only a
change of mode, which produces uniformity in the federal courts, throughout the
Union.
Gaines v. Chew, 43 U.S. at 650-5 1.
277 Gaines v. Chew, 43 U.S. at 650.
278 See id. at 646-47 (noting that although probate courts have jurisdiction over the probate and
revocation of wills, "it will be a matter for grave consideration, whether the inherent powers of a
court of chancery may not afford a remedy where the right [under an unprobated will] is clear").
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and recognized the power of a federal court sitting in equity to evaluate
Myra's legitimacy and, if appropriate, deem her to be Clark's legal heir,
notwithstanding the terms of the 1811 will.279 Largely due to the lower
federal court's recalcitrance, the Supreme Court itself assumed the task
of evaluating Myra's legitimacy. Using its equitable powers-including
the various evidentiary presumptions equity provided-the Supreme
transfers,
Court reviewed the entire mass of evidence concerning land
280
bigamists.
and
liaisons,
illicit
weddings,
stolen wills, secret
The justices examined reams of testimony, including that
submitted by Clark's trusted friend Mrs. Harper (whose testimony it
deemed to be especially trustworthy because she "suckled" Myra along
with her own infant son). 281 Harper testified that in Clark's final will,
written in 1813, Clark acknowledged Myra "as his legitimate daughter,"
designated her as his heir, and provided what he characterized as a
personal "charter of her rights."
About four weeks before his death, Mr. Clark brought this will to my
house; as he came in, he said, 'Now my will is finished,' my estate is
secured to Myra beyond human contingency, 'now if I die tomorrow, she will go forth to society, to my relations, to my mother,
acknowledged by me, in my last will, as my legitimate daughter, and
will be educated according to my minutest wishes,... here is the
charter of her rights, it is now completely finished, and I have
'282
brought it to you to read .
This, along with the testimonies of Zulime's sister and numerous others
privy to Clark's private affairs, was sufficient in 1848 to convince the
justices that Clark had, in fact, married Zulime in a secret ceremony in
Philadelphia in 1803, that Zulime's own marriage to Des Granges was
bigamous and thus void, and therefore that Myra was Clark's legitimate
283
daughter.
The evidence was hotly contested, however, and in the end the case
turned in part on the federal equitable evidentiary presumptions
employed by the justices. Despite a wealth of evidence suggesting that
the Zulime-Clark wedding ceremony was pure fabrication, 284 and
279 See discussion in supra note 261.
280 The Court conducted a full review of all of the evidence regarding Myra's status in four
separate appeals-revisiting and recounting extensive testimony in each opinion. See Patterson v.
Gaines, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 550 (1848); Gaines v. Relf, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 472 (1851); Gaines v.
Hennen, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 553 (1860); Gaines v. New Orleans, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 642 (1867).
281 See Pattersonv. Gaines, 47 U.S. at 589-90; Gaines v. New Orleans,73 U.S. at 702-03.
282 Gaines v. Chew, 43 U.S. at 625-26 (reporter's account of testimony).
283 See Pattersonv. Gaines, 47 U.S. at 559-60 (reporter's account of testimony); id. at 588-59
(assessment of evidence in text of the opinion).
284 See id. at 577-82 (reporter's account of counsel's argument regarding the alleged marriage
of Clark and Zulime). Counsel for the executors made a similar argument in Gaines v. Chew, 43
U.S. (2 How.) 619 (1844):
The will of 1811 gave the whole estate to his mother. Where was his wife, if he had
one? So the will of 1813 is said to have given his wife nothing, in violation of all
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competing evidence suggesting that Clark sought to do away with the
"stain of her birth" with the 1813 will (an aspiration that, if believed,
betrayed her illicit status), 285 the rules of equity led the Supreme Court
to honor one man's purported private declarations of filiation:
[W]e cannot permit it to prevail over the legitimacy of his child,
established, as we think ourselves obliged to say it has been, in
conformity with those rules of evidence which long experience and
the wisdom of those who have gone before us in courts of equity
have deemed the best to ascertain, in cases of doubt, the affinity and
286
blood-relationship of social life.

This finding (entered in 1848 against one purchaser of a portion of
Clark's estate) should have provided the basis for Myra's claim, as
Clark's legal heir, to four-fifths of Clark's entire estate. 287 But the other
defendants in the Gaines Case continued to defend against Myra's
claims on the basis that she could not inherit as an illegitimate child.
And their efforts were almost successful. In 1851 the Supreme Court
was once again faced with the monumental task of determining Myra's
legitimacy.
With new evidence presented by a different set of
defendants, the justices reached a different conclusion regarding Myra's
status (and her claim), lamenting that "[t]he harshness of judicial duty
requires that we should deal with witnesses and evidences, and with
men's rights, as we find them; and it is done so here. '288
Undeterred, and ever resourceful, Myra successfully had the
missing will of 1813 probated in a Louisiana court in 1856.289 The
defendants continued to contest Myra's right to inherit in federal court,
and the issue of Myra's legitimacy once again came before the Supreme
Court. 290 Over the defendants' continued objection that Myra was an

duties. The bill itself, therefore, attacks his character. It says also that the complainant
was kept in ignorance of her true name until she was nineteen years of age. Her own
mother is alleged not to have told her, and yet this mother is said to have been the wife
of Clark.
Id.at 636 (reporter's account of counsel's argument).
285 Patterson v. Gaines, 47 U.S. at 578 (reporter's account of testimony).
286 Id.at 597. In Patterson v. Gaines, the Court further explained:

When, in the progress of a suit in equity, a question of pedigree arises, and there is
proof enough, in the opinion of the court, to establish the marriage of the ancestor, the
presumption of law is, that the child of the marriage is legitimate, and it will be
incumbent upon him who denies it to disprove it, though in doing so he may have to
prove a negative.
Id.at 598.
287 See id.at 602.

288 Gaines v. Relf, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 472, 539 (1851).
289 Gaines v. New Orleans, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 642, 668-69 (1873) (reporter's account of the
probating of the 1813 will in 1856). For a detailed discussion of Myra's extraordinary efforts to
have the 1813 will probated, see ALEXANDER, supra note 199, at 214-21.
290 See Gaines v. Hennen, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 553 (1860); Gaines v. New Orleans, 73 U.S. at
669.
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"adulterine bastard" 29 1 who could not inherit (even under a will), the
Court in 1860, and again 1867, revisited all of the evidence and once
again declared Myra to be "the legitimate and only child of the said
'292
Daniel Clark:
[A]s she was declared legitimate by her father in his last will and
testament, common justice, not to speak of legal rules, would require
that such a declaration should only be overbome by the strongest
proof; and yet detached portions of evidence, scattered through the
record here and there, are invoked to destroy the dying declarations
of an intelligent man, that a beloved child was capable of inheriting
293
his property.
The outcome in the Gaines Case was not a result of the channeled
discretion purportedly allowed by equitable remedies, but of a much
broader and substantive understanding of federal equity as protector of
the individual against the injustice of local bias. Despite claims by
defense counsel throughout the litigation that the states had special
sovereignty over matters involving land and probate, the Gaines Court
understood its powers in equity to be wide-ranging. The fact that the
case required the federal courts to evaluate and determine Myra's
legitimacy did not give rise to the objection that the federal courts
should defer to state law or state courts because the case involved the
parent-child relationship or, more generally, domestic relations-a
significant omission given the insistence in modem-day jurisprudence
that the domestic relations exception has deep historical roots.
3.

Prenuptial Agreements in Federal Court

Lest any doubts remain that the Supreme Court understood that
federal equity powers extend to what we now label "domestic
relations," including marriage law, a brief examination of Neves v. Scott
will dispel such misconceptions. 294 At issue in Neves was the degree to
which a federal court would enforce a prenuptial agreement, or marriage
settlement, that abrogated common law marital property rules and
effectively created a community property arrangement between John
Neves and Catharine Jewell. The marriage settlement executed by the
couple in 1810 provided that the property of both John and Catharine
291 Gaines v. New Orleans, 73 U.S. at 699; Gaines v. Hennen, 65 U.S. at 590 (noting
defendant's arguments "that [Myra's] status of adulterine illegitimacy incapacitates her from
taking as legatee under the olographic will of her father, though admitted to probate, as it has
been, by the Supreme Court of Louisiana").
292 Gaines v. Hennen, 65 U.S. at 616-17.
293 Gaines v. New Orleans, 73 U.S. at 699.
294 For a discussion of Neves as an example of the Supreme Court's application of federal
equity principles to enforce substantive rights, see Fitzgerald, supra note 206, at 1264-66.
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"shall remain in common between them" during their natural lives, "and
should the said Catharine become the longest liver, the property to
continue hers so long as she shall live,... [and] should the said John
become the longest liver, the property to remain in the manner and form
as above. '295 In other words, upon the death of one spouse, the other
would retain all of the couple's property as a life estate. When the
"longest liver" in the couple died, the property would be divided equally
296
between their heirs.
Although under more traditional equity rules a marriage settlement
of this sort was binding only if executed through a third-party trustee, in
the early nineteenth century bilateral marriage settlements-those
executed between the couple without the use of a trustee-were
gradually gaining recognition and enforcement. 29 7 The degree to which
courts enforced bilateral settlements varied. Courts generally enforced
such trusts as to the rights of the parties and their consanguineous
relations under contract theory, but some courts refused to enforce
bilateral trusts as to the rights of third parties such as creditors. 298 In
practical terms, this meant that bilateral trusts would not always protect
the widow's assets from claims against her husband's creditors who had
a claim on property that the common law designated as "his." When
John and Catharine's marriage settlement was contested soon after
John's death in 1828, challengers raised exactly this issue.
The strength of Catharine's legal position was severely
undermined by John's execution of a will that arguably disregarded the
survivorship rule of the marriage settlement. In that will, John ordered
299
his entire estate to be divided between Catharine and George Rowell.
Catharine successfully procured an injunction in a Georgia court barring
the execution of the will as against their entire estate (although the
30 0
Court required her to post a bond for the payment of John's debts).
Catharine then married a second husband, William Scott, who used part
of Catharine's (and arguably John's heirs') estate to pay his own
30 1
debts.
When Catharine died in 1844, John's heirs (his brother and
nephew) sued Scott for their portion of the couple's original marital
estate. John's heirs argued that the original Neves-Jewell agreement
was a trust that could determine the rights of third parties (such as
themselves), so that when Catharine died they were due to inherit their
295 Neves v. Scott, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 196, 207 (1850).
296 See id.at 210.
297 See SALMON, supra note 64, at 112-15 (discussing the evolution of the enforcement of
bilateral or "simple" marriage settlements).
298 See id.at 89-90.
299 See Neves v. Scott, 50 U.S. at 198 (reporter's account of the evidence).
300 See id.(reporter's account of the evidence).
301 See id.(reporter's account of the evidence).
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portion of the estate under the terms of the marriage settlement, and
Scott was answerable to them for waste. 30 2 Scott argued that the
original marriage settlement was simply a covenant between the parties
that could not benefit non-consanguineous relations (such as John's
30 3
heirs) or otherwise impact the rights of third parties.
With hindsight, the distinction between covenants given for
consideration and settlements executed as trusts seems a fairly pedantic
point of equity jurisprudence. But Neves is significant because it
required the Supreme Court to evaluate the extent to which the law
would allow private ordering of domestic relations, even at the expense
of a state's common law doctrine of marital property distribution, the
principles of coverture, and the rights of third parties. The position
taken by John's heirs represented a more progressive view of marriage
settlements: the Court should honor fully the couple's ability to
negotiate around the rules of coverture, thus allowing women to claim
larger (and more legally significant) portions of the couple's collective
property. In contrast, Scott's position counseled a narrower more
traditional, view of couples' ability to contract around the entrenched
common law of marital property, which did not contemplate joint
ownership of the couple's real property, nor women's ability to control
their husband's property after his death. 30 4 As in the Gaines Case, the
Neves Court insisted that it was within the power and jurisdiction of the
federal courts to determine the scope of federal equity. The fact that the
case involved domestic relations law, and (if equity's critics were to be
believed) therefore required a federal court to make a determination that
drove at the heart of marital harmony, did not even emerge as an issue
in the case, much less a decisive one.
Initially, the lower federal court in Georgia had resorted to a
restrictive view of marriage settlements, finding that John and Catharine
"were the only parties to [the marriage settlement], . . . [that] it was
founded exclusively on the consideration of marriage," and that "[t]he
consideration of such an agreement extends only to the husband and
wife and their issue. ' 30 5 On the first appeal to the Supreme Court, the
justices reversed the lower court's order, holding that federal equity
principles gave greater scope to individuals to alter the distribution of
property within their marriage (and to affect the rights of third parties
by such an agreement). The Court maintained that the primary factor
when interpreting a marriage settlement was the "manifest intent [and]
302 See id.(reporter's account of the evidence).
303 See id. at 208.

304 There is some irony in the position taken by Scott's counsel, given that Scott himself had
apparently benefited financially from the original Neves-Jewell agreement: Catharine had
substantial survivorship rights in the Neves-Jewell estate upon John's death, which she apparently
then shared with (or lost to) Scott when she remarried.
305 Neves v. Scott, 18 F. Cas. 22, 24 (C.C.D. Ga. 1846) (No. 10,134).
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the leading design, of the parties entering into it,"306 and that in this
agreement the couple clearly intended to determine the rights of the
couple's heirs.
The tension between the Supreme Court's ruling and the Circuit
Court's ruling became palpable when, on reargument, the parties alerted
the justices that the highest court in Georgia had issued a decision in a
case involving "other persons claiming a separate interest" in the
Neves-Jewell marriage settlement. ' 307 The Georgia court had provided
a very narrow interpretation' of bilateral marriage settlements,
proclaiming that "no persons are within the marriage consideration but
the husband and wife and their issues; .... all others are volunteers"
who may not enforce their claimed rights in equity 3 8-thus showing
limited regard for couples' ability to privately negotiate around the
common law's marital property rules. Scott's counsel argued that,
under binding Georgia law, John's heirs could not seek enforcement of
the marriage settlement in equity.309 In the second appeal of Neves, the
Supreme Court was required to choose between the broader federal
equity rule and the explicitly narrower rule required under Georgia's
equity jurisprudence. As in the Gaines Case (which had been heard by
the Supreme Court on five different occasions by the second time Neves
was heard by the Court), the decision turned on the justices'
understanding of federal power:
[W]e do not consider this court bound by the decision of the
Supreme Court of Georgia. The Constitution provides, that the
judicial power of the United States shall extend to all cases in equity
arising between citizens of different States. Congress has duly
conferred this power upon all Circuit Courts, and among others upon
that of the District of Georgia, in which this bill was filed, and the
same power is granted by the Constitution to this court as an
3 10
appellate tribunal.
As in the Gaines Case, the Supreme Court was unbending in its
insistence that federal equity jurisprudence trumped state positive law
and state equity principles in those states that had their own equity
jurisprudence (such as Georgia):
Wherever a case in equity may arise and be determined, under the
judicial power of the United States, the same principles of equity
must be applied to it, and it is for the courts of the United States, and
for this court in the last resort, to decide what those principles are,
and to apply such of them, to each particular case, as they may find
justly applicable thereto. These principles may make part of the law
306
307
308
309
310

Neves v. Scott, 50 U.S. at 211.
Neves v. Scott, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 268, 271 (1851).
Id. at 270 (reporter's account of counsel's argument).
See id. at 268 (reporter's account of counsel's argument).
Id. at 272.
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of a State, or they may have been modified by its legislation, or
usages, or they may never have existed in its jurisprudence.
Instances of each kind may now be found in the several States. But
in all the States, the equity law, recognized by the Constitution and
by
by acts of Congress, and modified by the latter, is administered
3 11

the courts of the United States, and upon appeal by this court.
In short, the supremacy of federal principles in equity cases filed in
federal courts was unyielding, even when the case departed from thensettled domestic relations law of an individual state. Even in 1852, only
six years before the Court's dictum in a case called Barber v. Barber
suggested that it would shy away from disputes concerning domestic
relations, the Neves Court did not question whether applying federal
equity jurisprudence in a dispute over a marriage settlement was
proper.

3 12

Richard Chused has argued that marriage settlements of the sort
John Neves and Catharine Jewell executed paved the way for married
women's property acts passed by state legislatures in the mid-nineteenth
century. 313 If that is the case, federal courts may have played a
significant role in propagating liberalized understandings of married
women's property throughout the Union. Thus, in that instance, federal
equity would have provided a model for state domestic relations lawmuch as today federal constitutional jurisprudence and federal statutes
provide models for state constitutional interpretation and state
legislation.
But regardless of the degree to which the federal courts' embrace
of equity principles shaped the states' application of equity in domestic
relations cases, it is undoubted that equity gave individuals a means to
circumnavigate the common law's strict regulation of family and
marital property transmission, and federal courts gave those who
satisfied the requirements of diversity jurisdiction the ability to have
those arrangements enforced even when state courts would not do so.
And while proponents of state sovereignty viewed the federal courts'
equity powers as an abrogation of state sovereignty, even during the
most vitriolic debates over the propriety of federal equity jurisprudence,
critics of federal equity failed to articulate the argument that cases
involving domestic relations occupied a special area of state authority.
311 Id.

312 See Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 584 (1858) (noting in dictum that the federal
courts "disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of the United States upon the subject of
divorce, or for the allowance of alimony"). This is likely because, as I explain infra,
notwithstanding the fact that Barber is frequently cited today as an early iteration of the domestic
relations exception, at the time it was issued the case was not understood to stand for a blanket
prohibition on federal court resolution of cases involving domestic relations. See infra note 332
and accompanying text.
313 See Chused, supra note 227, at 1409-12.
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The ideas that federal courts were ill-suited to consider such cases, or
that state courts enjoyed special sovereignty over domestic relations
disputes, or that federal involvement in domestic relations was
somehow destructive of marital privacy or of the republic itself, had yet
to take hold as authoritative, general principles of American federalism.
D.

Early TraditionsSummarized

The historical sources reveal that the most common of
commonplaces
about federalism-that
domestic relations
is
traditionally a special enclave of state power--does not reflect the
actual practice of federalism in the United States during the pre-Civil
War period. Rather, during the early decades, the federal government
was actively involved in regulating and adjudicating various matters
involving domestic relations. *
The national legislature crafted and enforced a war pension system
for widows and orphans, involving Congressmen in the details and
administration of a national family benefits program, and a sustained
consideration of the place of the family in the republic. 31 4 In Shanks,
the Court established that the federal government possessed authority to
determine married women's citizenship status, even when exercise of
that authority limited a state's power to determine the full legal
consequences of marriage for an individual's legal status .315
Throughout the nineteenth century, Congress used that authority to
create a body of citizenship laws that had immediate and striking
consequences for the familial rights and responsibilities of certain
individuals, including citizens who married noncitizens, noncitizens
who married citizens, and anyone born abroad to U.S. parents. 3 16
Perhaps most surprisingly from a modem vantage point, federal courts
of the pre-Civil War era routinely adjudicated cases involving domestic
relations and frequently applied federal, rather than state, adjudicative
principles and procedures in the process of doing so. 3 17
In contemporary debates over, and adjudication of, these issuesfamily pensions, citizenship, and domestic relations matters-no one
involved appears to have argued that Congress or the federal courts
lacked authority because the matter at hand involved family law. In
other words, domestic relations matters were not generally cordoned off
as a special enclave of state law during the pre-Civil War era, and were
instead governed by a complex constellation of state and federal
314 See supra Part III.A.2.

315 See supra Part III.B.2.
316 See id.

317 See supra Part III.C.
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statutes, common law, and equity principles, interpreted and applied and
modified by state and federal actors.
In reaching this conclusion, I do not suggest that the federal
government was a pervasive force in the regulation of family law issues
during the pre-Civil War period. As with almost all areas of substantive
law, the states were undoubtedly responsible for creating and enforcing
most of the law that governed familial relations. Federal adjudicative
and regulatory involvement in domestic relations often functioned in
tandem with, or as a complement to, state practices and laws. Nor am I
suggesting that the federal government's early regulatory involvement
in domestic relations was similar in range or scope to the type of
regulation that is permissible under our modern constitutional regime,
or that is possible with the help of a modern federal administrative
My point is, rather, that even under a constitutional
apparatus.
interpretative regime that generally assumed a more limited conception
of federal power, the early federal government was not precluded from
exercising its legitimate regulatory powers in ways that bore directly on
domestic relations--even in ways that conflicted with the laws of the
states.

IV.

INVENTING STATES' RIGHTS

If the state sovereignty paradigm of domestic relations is not a
transhistoric principle of American federalism, the question remains:
How did the theory that domestic relations are uniquely excluded from
federal jurisdiction come into being? Although it is beyond the scope of
this article to give full consideration to this question, even a preliminary
review of the historical sources suggests that the state sovereignty
paradigm of domestic relations developed in response to several
discrete, inflammatory issues, and was only gradually understood as a
transcontextual, generally applicable theory of federalism that restricted
the exercise of the federal government's otherwise legitimate powers.
In this Part, I provide a general overview of the genealogy of the
state sovereignty paradigm, which began to take shape during the preCivil War era in the context of efforts to block federal regulation of
slavery and polygamy. It developed into an influential, generally
applicable theory of federalism at the end of the nineteenth century
when the apparent threat of divorce, interracial marriage, polygamy, and
woman suffrage occasioned an explosion of interest in the regulation of
domestic relations. Within these debates, the role of the proper
allocation of power between federal and state authorities was a primary
concern, and the state sovereignty paradigm of domestic relations
emerged as one competing (and influential) theory. Even as it gained
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influence as a model of federalism, however, the state sovereignty
paradigm always existed alongside-and in tension with-the actual
practices of federal actors, who continued to legislate and adjudicate
matters directly and indirectly bearing on domestic relations. The
genealogy of the state sovereignty paradigm shows that the notion that
domestic relations occupied a special regulatory sphere beyond the
reach of federal power was born out of specific historical events, and
the social mores, human predilections, ideological commitments, and
political strategies that developed in response to those events. It was
not, and has never become, a universally accepted, inherent principle of
federalism.
A.

Early Articulationsof the State Sovereignty Paradigm

As a matter of practice, we know that national legislators, federal
judges, and federal officials in the executive branch were involved in
the creation, administration, and adjudication of domestic relations law
and policy during the pre-Civil War period. As shown above, federal
regulation and adjudication of domestic relations often went unnoted as
such, but certain federal efforts to regulate domestic relations-or what
were understood at the time to be domestic relations-drew heavy
criticism from defenders of states' rights and slavery.
Attempts by the federal government to determine the rights
associated with an individual's status within a family (such as husband
or wife) carried an ominous threat for slave owners: if the federal
government could regulate domestic relations of any sort, then by
implication it had authority to regulate the relation of master and slave.
As Jill Hasday has explained, "slave owners contended... that the
master-slave relationship was best understood as a familial connection
operating along the same tenets of hierarchy, dependency, and intimacy
that governed ties amongst white relatives. '31 8 From that proposition,
states' rights advocates reasoned that because the master-slave
relationship was a "domestic relation," the federal government had no
authority to regulate that peculiar institution. 3 19 Thus, Southern
318 Hasday, supra note 14, at 1325; see also COTT,supra note 18, at 62-63.
319 Representative McLane of Delaware embraced this type of reasoning, distinguishing
between "municipal" and "federal" powers. In his view, domestic relations clearly fell into the
former category:
Could we say that property should not descend to all the children equally, or not
devisable by will? Could we define the marital rights, or establish certain relations
between parent and child, guardian and ward, or master and servant? No one can
pretend that we could, and for the plain reason that they are objects of municipal
power, of which we are entirely destitute. The relation of master and slave is but a
domestic relation ....
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congressmen drew a connection between the master-slave relationship

and other forms of domestic relations-such as the relationship between
husband and wife-warning their anti-slavery colleagues that federal
"intervention" in slavery would inevitably lead to disruption of the
marital relationship, and even to claims for women's
32 0
enfranchisement.
Slave owners' trepidation regarding federal regulation of slavery
informed the response of Southern congressmen and their constituents
to other attempts by the federal government to regulate domestic
relations, including anti-polygamy legislation proposed on the eve of

the Civil War. During debates over the proposal of Representative
Justin Morrill to criminalize polygamy, many Southern congressmen
articulated their belief that passage of the bill would open the doors to

federal regulation or abolition of slavery, and urged that the federal
government lacked authority to pass such legislation because polygamy

involved domestic relations. 321 Typical of such arguments, in 1860,
Representative Emerson Etheridge of Tennessee urged that enactment
of federal anti-polygamy legislation would "concede[] the power of
Congress to legislate against a domestic regulation," including
slavery. 322 Notwithstanding sustained criticism on these grounds (and
with the help of Southerners' departure from Congress), in 1862
Congress passed the Morrill Act, the first federal statute criminalizing
35 ANNALS OF CONG. 1152 (1820) (statement of Rep. McLane), quoted in Hasday, supra note
14, at 1327 n.I10.
320 For example, during an impassioned speech on the Senate floor, Senator William Pinkney
alerted his fellow senators to the parallel between federal anti-slavery efforts and the specter of
federal intervention in the legal relations between husband and wife. Pinkney conjured up the
image of "[s]ome romantic reformer, treading in the footsteps of Mrs. Wolstonecraft," who would
"claim for our wives and daughters a full participation in political power, and add to it that
domestic power which, in some families ... is as absolute and unrepublican as any power can
be." 35 ANNALS OF CONG. 413 (1820) (statement of Sen. Pinkney), quoted in Hasday, supra
note 14, at 1328.
321 As Sarah Gordon has explained:
Controversy over federal power to legislate the structure of "domestic relations" in the
territories tore into Congress in the 1850s. Domestic relations was a legal category that
in the nineteenth century included the law of master and servant as well as the law of
husband and wife; it described slavery as well as polygamy.
SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 57 (2002); see also COTr, supra note 18, at 73
("When Mormon polygamy was discussed, slavery was never far from politicians' minds, and the
reverse was also true.").
322 CONG. GLOBE (App.), 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 199 (1860) (statement of Rep. Etheridge, as
quoted in the testimony of Rep. Simms). Representative Etheridge continued:
Now, sir, what are domestic institutions? They consist simply of husband and wife,
parent and child, guardian and ward, master and slave.... And I ask, if Congress can
take jurisdiction of the relation of husband and wife, may it not also exercise
jurisdiction in regard to another domestic relation? Now, "forewarned is forearmed."
Id. Representative Simms dismissed this argument, urging that because the proposed antipolygamy legislation acted to "protect" a domestic relation (marriage), and was not legislation
"against" a domestic relation, it fell within the purview of federal power. Id.
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polygamy. 323 As I discuss below, debates over the propriety of federal
anti-polygamy efforts continued and intensified during the later half of
the nineteenth century, as did Congress's legislative efforts to end
324
polygamy.
Unsurprisingly, modem-day jurists do not generally reference
slave debates or opposition to federal anti-polygamy efforts as evidence
of the historical pedigree of the state sovereignty paradigm of domestic
relations. Instead, the most frequently cited evidence of early support
for the notion that the states have special sovereignty over domestic
relations is Barber v. Barber, a case decided by the Supreme Court in
1858, during the tense period between the Dred Scott decision and the
outbreak of the Civil War. 325 In Barber, a divorced woman sought to
have a New York state court alimony decree enforced in a Wisconsin
federal court. A majority of the Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court's holding that federal courts were authorized to enforce alimony
decrees entered in other states, but in dictum gave a nod to the basic
323 See An Act to Punish and Prevent the Practice of Polygamy in the Territories of the United
States and Other Places, and Disapproving and Annulling Certain Acts of the Legislative
Assembly of the Territory of Utah (Morrill Act), ch. 126, § 1, 12 Stat. 501, 501 (1862).
324 See infra Part IV.B.2.
325 See 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1858).
Though apparently unnoticed by modem
commentators, the first reported opinion suggesting that the federal courts would not entertain
certain types of domestic relations cases appearsto be In re Barry, 42 F. 113 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1844), in which a federal district court judge held that the federal habeas corpus statute did not
apply in a child custody dispute. Certain antebellum interpretations of the federal habeas statute
had supported the notion that, like state habeas corpus procedures, federal habeas could be used to
mandate the release of a child from wrongful custody. See United States v. Green, 26 F. Cas. 30
(C.C.D.R.I. 1824) (No. 15,256) (approving of use of federal habeas corpus to remove daughter
from custody of grandfather). And several state courts had recognized the use of a court's habeas
powers as a means of resolving custodial disputes. See GROSSBERG, supra note 53, at 240, 255.
But in Barry, Judge Betts of the federal court in Manhattan rebuffed an estranged father's attempt
to use the federal statute to claim custody of his child from the maternal grandparents. See In re
Barry, 42 F. at 114. In an opinion written in 1844, but which went unpublished for several
decades, Betts reasoned that federal courts have no authority under the habeas corpus statute to
"assume and exercise this function of parens patriae in relation to infant children held in
detention by private individuals, not acting under color of authority from the laws of the United
States." See id. at 125. Writing for the Supreme Court, Justice Taney affirmed Betts's decision
on the basis that the Supreme Court lacked appellate jurisdiction because the amount in
controversy did not satisfy the jurisdictional statute then in effect. Taney mentioned nothing of
the district court's theory that federal habeas does not reach child custody disputes. See Barry v.
Mercein, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 103, 119-21 (1847). Even after Barry other federal courts expressed
different views on the applicability of federal habeas corpus in child custody disputes. Compare
Exparte Des Rochers, 7 F. Cas. 537, 537 (C.C.D. Cal. 1856) (No. 3,824) (observing that the writ
of habeas corpus has been used to restore a nonmarital child to his mother and "to bring up an
infant who had absconded from its father"), and Bennett v. Bennett, 3 F. Cas. 212 (D.C.D. Or.
1867) (No. 1,3 18) (using writ of habeas corpus to secure custody of child pursuant to state court
child custody decree), with Ex parte Everts, 8 F. Cas. 909 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1858) (No. 4,581)
(holding that a federal court has no jurisdiction over an application for habeas corpus by the
father of a child for the purpose of enforcing his right to its custody). For an edifying analysis of
the Barry litigation, which was then referred to as the Mercein case, see HARTOG, supra note 18,
at 193-217.
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theory of a domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction by
"disclaim[ing] altogether any jurisdiction in the Courts of the United
326
States upon the subject of divorce, or for the allowance of alimony.
In a lengthy dissenting opinion, states' rights defender Justice
Daniels (joined by Justice Taney) ignored the principles announced in
Shanks, and opined that the lower court lacked jurisdiction altogether
because the federal government could not recognize a married woman's
independent state citizenship for purposes of satisfying the requirements
Invoking the then-declining doctrine of
of diversity jurisdiction.
coverture, Daniels reasoned that "husband and wife can[not] be
regarded as citizens of different States. '327 The Barber dissenters
sought to bring the logic of coverture to bear on jurisdictional
considerations, just as coverture had long informed procedural rules
Justice Daniels also urged that federal
regarding joinder.328
involvement in domestic relations would violate the common
understanding of family as a private sphere, and announced that the
federal government lacked the power to "regulate the domestic relations
of society," and should not "with a kind of inquisitorial authority, enter
the habitations and even into the chambers and nurseries of private
and
families, and inquire into and pronounce upon the morals and habits
32 9
affections and antipathies of the members of every household.
Today Barber is considered to be the origin of the domestic
relations exception to federal jurisdiction, even though, as Judith Resnik
and Libby Adler have observed, the Barber Court actually affirmed the
use of federal power in certain domestic relations cases. 330 Because of
Barber's affirmative holding-and despite modern-day federalists'
reliance on Barber as one of the early foundations of the state
sovereignty paradigm--during the decades immediately following the
Barberdecision, the opinion had the net effect of facilitating rather than
limiting federal involvement in divorce disputes. To be certain, Barber
was cited by some lower federal courts as a basis for rejecting bills of
divorce filed in federal court. 33 1 But Barber was more frequently cited
326 Barber, 62 U.S. at 584.
327 Id.at 600 (Daniels, J., dissenting).
328 See sources cited in supra note 60.
329 Barber,62 U.S. at 602 (Daniels, J., dissenting).
330 See Resnik, Naturally, supra note 16, at 1741-42 (observing the dissonance between the
holding of Barber and the proposition for which its dictum is often cited); Libby S. Adler,
Federalism and Family, 8 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197, 232, 237-39 (1999) (same). For
examples of modem references to Barber as support for the early origins of federal deference to
states in domestic relations matters, see Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 693 (1992);
Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018, 1022 (3d Cir. 1975); Morris v. Morris, 273 F.2d 678, 682
(7th Cir 1960); Tilley v. Anixter Inc., 283 F. Supp. 2d 729, 733 (D. Conn. 2003); Coll v. Coll, 690
F. Supp. 1085, 1086 (D.D.C. 1988). See also Sylvia A. Law, Families andFederalism,4 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL'Y 175, 179 (2000) (noting that Barber's famous dictum "gave birth to the hoary
'domestic relations exception' to federal diversity jurisdiction").
331 See, e.g., Bowman v. Bowman, 30 F. 849, 849 (C.C.N.D. Il1. 1887) (refusing to permit
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by federal courts for the force of its actual holding: federal courts are
authorized to consider and rule upon the enforcement of divorce,

alimony, and child custody decrees entered in states other than the
forum state. 332 For example, in Cheever v. Wilson, decided eleven years
after Barber, the Supreme Court entertained an appeal from a challenge
to a divorce and alimony decree awarded by an Indiana court. The
Court rejected the challenge, noting that in Barber, it had "recognized
removal of a divorce action from state to federal court, citing Barber); Johnson v. Johnson, 13 F.
193, 194 (C.C.S.D.N.Y..1882) (remanding suit for divorce to state court pursuant to Barber). A
little over a decade after it was decided, Barber was also cited by at least one federal district court
in Georgia in an opinion rejecting a federal constitutional challenge to criminal sanctions for
interracial marriage and fornication. See In re Hobbs, 12 F. Cas. 262 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1871) (No.
6,550) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment does not render criminal sanctions for interracial
marriage and fornication unconstitutional, and citing Barber for the proposition that domestic
relations law is free from federal interference).
332 For example, in 1867, a district court showed little patience for the theory that it lacked
jurisdiction over an application for child custody under the federal habeas statute:
If it was thought proper and right by the framers of the constitution and congress to
give the national courts jurisdiction of a controversy between citizens of different
states, where the matter in dispute is mere rights of property-to be measured by mere
dollars and cents-why should their jurisdiction not extend to the more important
controversy like this, where the matter in dispute is the custody and control of an infant
child of the parties. The objection, that the control of the domestic relation belongs
properly to the state courts, and that therefore the United States courts ought not to take
cognizance of questions concerning them, is merely begging the question.
Bennett v. Bennett, 3 F. Cas. 212 (D.C. Or. 1867) (No. 1,318) (issuing writ of habeas corpus to
secure custody of child pursuant to state court child custody decree, citing Barber for authority).
For other federal court decisions relying on Barber's affirmative holding, see Barret v. Failing,
Ill U.S. 523 (1884) (resolving dispute over ex-wife's right to dower following entrance of
divorce decree by state court, citing Barber); Droop v. Ridenour, 11 App. D.C. 224 (C.C.D.C.
1897) (noting that if parties to an alimony decree reside in different states, the decree is
enforceable by the federal courts, citing Barber);Hekking v. Pfaff,82 F. 403 (C.C.D. Mass. 1897)
(recognizing federal jurisdiction to consider suit for enforcement of alimony pursuant to Barber,
but refusing to award alimony to former wife against husband where wife procured ex parte
divorce in South Dakota); Slack v. Perrine, 9 App. D.C. 128 (C.C.D.C. 1896) (citing Barberfor
analogous support for the holding that a state writ of habeas corpus securing the mother's
custodial rights over her children is given full faith and credit in federal court). For post-Barber
federal domestic relations cases that do not cite Barber but that effectively disregard the
majority's dictum, see Cheely v. Clayton, 110 U.S. 701 (1884) (awarding a wife's claim of dower
rights in the marital property, notwithstanding that husband had obtained an ex parte divorce in a
territorial court); Sims v. Everhardt, 102 U.S. 300 (1880) (finding that a conveyance by an underaged feme covert could be disavowed after she reached maturity and following divorce from
abusive spouse); Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457 (1876) (holding that
divorce does not automatically dissolve a wife's claim to her ex-husband's life insurance policy);
Jackson v. Jackson, 91 U.S. 122 (1875) (finding that husband has no claim to wife's separate real
property in action for divorce); Walker v. Walker's Executor, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 743 (1869)
(considering the enforceability of a private separation agreement between husband and wife on
appeal from the District of Massachusetts); Tolman v. Tolman, I App. D.C. 299 (C.C.D.C. 1893)
(appeal in action for alimony and divorce); Sharon v. Hill, 26 F. 337 (C.C. Cal. 1885) (awarding
bill in equity to pronounce declarations of marriage false and fraudulent); Walker v. Beal, 29 F.
Cas. 7 (No. 17,065) (C.C.D. Mass. 1868) (considering wife's claim on husband's estate in light of
marriage settlement). See also McNeil v. McNeil, 78 F. 834 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1897) (recognizing
that federal courts have jurisdiction to entertain bill in equity to declare judgment of divorce void,
and distinguishing Barber).
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the validity of the original [alimony] decree, sustained the jurisdiction
333
[of the federal court], and affirmed the decree of the court below.
Furthermore, Barber certainly did not arise as a barrier to federal
courts' routine consideration of cases filed in law and equity involving
important domestic relations matters, such as dower, marriage
settlements, and inheritance. 334 The dictum in Barber, and certainly
Justice Daniel's dissent, seem to have received remarkably little
attention in the courts at the time the opinion was issued. And, taken
were in tension with contemporary
literally, both dictum and dissent
335
courts.
federal
the
of
practices
In short, the notion that domestic relations were a special enclave
of state regulatory authority attracted selective attention during the preCivil War era, but did not gain broad purchase in the legislature or in
the federal courts. As shown in Part III, the notion that domestic
relations was a special arena of state power did not arise as an objection
to many instances of federal regulatory and adjudicatory involvement in
domestic relations. And even when that objection was raised by
Southern congressmen and states' rights justices in the context of
polygamy and divorce, by enacting anti-polygamy legislation and
affirming the role of federal courts in the enforcement of divorce and
alimony decrees, Congress and the Supreme Court took steps that were
viewed by critics as interfering with state authority over domestic
relations. Thus, although some jurists of the pre-Civil War period
certainly articulated the view that domestic relations were to be
regulated by the states, that view does not appear to have been

333 Cheever v. Wilson, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 108, 124 (1869) (considering challenge to divorce
decree, and citing Barber for the proposition that a divorce decree entered in Indiana is
enforceable in the District of Columbia).
334 See, e.g., Moore v. Page, 111 U.S. 117 (1884) (evaluating propriety of marriage
settlement); Carite v. Trotot, 105 U.S. 751 (1881) (resolving dispute over impact of separation of
marital property under Louisiana community property law); Prewitt v. Wilson, 103 U.S. 22
(1880) (evaluating propriety of marriage settlement); Gaines v. New Orleans, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.)
642 (1867) (evaluating the marital status of the deceased in order to determine the legitimacy, and
inheritance rights, of a child); Blackburn v. Crawford's Lessee, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 175 (1865)
(determining the marital status of parents in order to determine the inheritance rights of the
children); Rogers v. Weller, 20 F. Cas. 1130 (C.C.N.D. 111.1870) (No. 12,022) (same); Sellon v.
Reed, 21 F. Cas 1044 (C.C.N.D. 111.1870) (No. 12,646) (noting that ex-wife cannot be divested
of her right in the family homestead, even when she gave up possession of home as part of private
separation agreement).
335 On a related issue, there was certainly support for the proposition that, with respect to
choice of law in domestic relations disputes, the law of a married couple's domiciliary state
governed their rights and responsibilities in marriage and in any divorce proceeding. See JOEL
PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AND EVIDENCE IN

MATRIMONIAL SuITs 580-632 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1852). That, however, was a
different issue from the one presented in Barber, which concerned a federal court's jurisdiction to
enforce an alimony decree entered by a sister state court, or the larger issue of whether federal
courts--even when applying state law and following state choice of law rules-could entertain
suits for alimony or divorce.
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enforced-as, a generally applicable principle of

federalism that precluded the federal government from exercising its
otherwise legitimate regulatory and adjudicatory powers.
B.

The State Sovereignty Paradigmof Domestic Relations Emerges

Following the Civil War, the federal courts continued to adjudicate

domestic relations cases, including, famously, the Gaines Case.336

Congress had a new set of war widows and orphans to provide for,
triggering extensive pension legislation 'and an expanded federal
administrative apparatus to process and review pension claims. 337 By

1893 the war pension system had expanded such that pension payments

represented forty percent of the federal budget. 338 As historian Nancy

Cott has observed, the federal pension system of the post-war period
"reach[ed] far into the ranks of the very poor, Indians, African

Americans, and recent immigrants[,] . . . reinforced the standard that the
husband and the father was the provider and family members his

dependents," and-much like today's welfare laws--encouraged
monogamy of pensioners through its various restrictions and
requirements. 339 Similarly, through the Freeman's Bureau and the
Indian Bureau, the Reconstruction Congress and federal regulators

began to implement policies that would encourage (or coerce) African

Americans and Native Americans to conform to national standards of
domestic relations: monogamy, legally condoned and conducted
marriage ceremonies, and family compositions that conformed to the
traditional household. 340 During this period, national legislators also
actively regulated the family through citizenship law, establishing
336 See sources cited in supra note 196.
337 Theda Skocpol's Protecting Soldiers provides the seminal account of the development of
Civil War pensions. See SKOCPOL, supra note 18, at 102-51; see also Megan J.McClintock,
Civil War Pensions and the Reconstruction of Union Families, 83 J. AM. HIST. 456, 461-64
(1996); Amy E. Holmes, "Such Is the Price We Pay": American Widows and the Civil War
Pension System, in TOWARD A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 171 (Marls A.
Vinovskis ed., 1990).
338 See Holmes, supra note 337, at 171-73.
339 COTT, supra note 18, at 103-04.
340 See id.at 120-23 (discussing federal policies and congressional acts designed to encourage
Native American conformity with western norms of monogamy); Franke, supra note 18, at 27993 (describing the Freedmen Bureau's aggressive campaign to enforce marriage laws among
recently emancipated slaves). It is notable that the extension of family civil rights to freedmen
was secured in Reconstruction legislation over objections that such rights would effectively
disestablish certain aspects of coverture.
See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 158 (1988) (recounting
arguments by opponents of the Civil Rights Bill of 1866 that the legislation would improperly
extend the right to make and enforce contracts to married women, and would legalize interracial
marriage); Amy Dru Stanley, ConjugalBonds and Wage Labor: Rights of Contract in the Age of
Emancipation,75 J. AM. HIST. 471,479-81 (1988) (same).
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dramatic consequences through the Expatriation Act for brides who
34
chose to marry across national boundaries, ' and imposing important
citizenship of offspring born to American
regulations governing the
342
citizens living overseas.
What appears to have changed most after the Civil War was not the
fact of the federal government's involvement in domestic relations, but
the explosion of interest and debate over the proper place of the family
in the federal system. Several social and legal transformations in the
late nineteenth century were viewed as threats to the (white) American
family: the persistence of legalized polygamy in Utah, the rising rates of
divorce throughout the country, the perceived increase in the incident of
interracial marriage, and the organized campaign for woman suffrage.
In the context of debates concerning proposals for national
legislation and constitutional amendments intended to address these
issues, the federal government's power to regulate domestic relations
emerged as a significant point of contention. Some urged that federal
regulation of domestic relations violated state sovereignty-even when
the proposed "regulation" was an amendment to the Constitution itself.
For example, opponents of woman suffrage routinely invoked the
notion that domestic relations law is a state-level concern-beyond the
reach of federal authority-as a firm principle of federalism. At the
same time, however, this purported principle was routinely ignored by
those pressing national measures to restrict divorce, ban interracial
marriage, or outlaw polygamy.
In the context of the heightened attention to the place of the family
in the federal system at the end of the nineteenth century, the state
sovereignty paradigm took shape and gathered authority as a
generalized, transcontextual theory of American federalism. It did so,
however, as a contested theory, and one that failed to accurately
describe the allocation of power between federal and state governments
with respect to domestic relations.
1.

Women's Disenfranchisement as a Domestic Relations Matter

Although woman suffrage is not viewed today as concerning
family law or familial relationships, when the suffragists began
advocating for a federal suffrage amendment in 1869, it was certainly
perceived by advocates and opponents alike as a challenge to the legal,
social, and cultural ordering of the traditional household. As Reva
Siegel has demonstrated, opponents of woman suffrage were adamant
341 See sources cited in supranotes 187-92 and accompanying text.
342 For a discussion of Congress's regulation of the citizenship of children born to American
parents abroad, see Collins, supranote 150, at 1689-98.
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that "enfranchising women threatened the unity of the marriage relation,
in which there could be only one will-that of the male head of
household. ' 343 Anti-suffragists portrayed women's enfranchisement as
an intervention into the household and a radical disruption of the
gendered order that the common law of domestic relations protected. 344
According to its opponents, woman suffrage would introduce "the
bedlam of political debate" into the home, causing marital discord and,
ultimately, divorce. 345 Moreover, they argued, women were unfit to
vote because of their "delicate" nature and because participation in
public life would distract them from their duties at home:
While the man is contending with the sterner duties of life [such as
military service, jury service, and participation in commerce], the
whole of time of the noble, affectionate, and true woman is required
in the discharge of the delicate and difficult duties assigned to her in
the family circle, in her church relations, and in the society where her
346
lot is cast ....
From the premise that one could not disaggregate the ordering of
the household from the ordering of political authority, anti-suffragists
analogized the disruptive effect of woman suffrage on the household
with the anticipated disruption that a federal woman suffrage
amendment would visit on the allocation of power between federal and
state government. 347
In 1882, a minority report of the Senate
Committee on Woman Suffrage conveyed objections to the proposed
amendment, and in so doing provided a sustained articulation of the
state sovereignty paradigm of domestic relations:
[The question of woman suffrage] involves considerations...
intimately pertaining to all the relations of social and private lifethe family circle-the status of women as wives, mothers, daughters,
and companions to the functions in private and public life which they
ought to perform, and their ability and willingness to perform
343 See Siegel, supra note 18, at 993.
344 See id at 977-87.
345 H. REP. No. 48-1330, at 3 (1884); see also S. REP. No. 48-399, pt. 2, at 7 (1884) ("[O]ne of
the gravest objections to placing the ballot in the hands of the female sex is that it would promote
unhappiness and dissensions in the family circle.").
346 S.REP. No. 48-399, pt. 2, at 2 (1884). Interestingly, pro-suffrage congressmen countered
this type of reasoning with arguments that echoed those made in favor of expanded widows'
pensions: that women were the educators of the next generation of citizens. See sources cited in

supra note 119 and accompanying text. For example, in 1887, Senator Kenneth McKellar of
Tennesee reasoned:
Ordinarily in our home life in the United States the mother is the principal teacher. It
is absolutely necessary that she should be well informed and well educated. If she
takes an interest in politics and is allowed to take part in public affairs, it will but
increase her knowledge and education. It will but better fit her to rear and educate her
boys, as well as her girls-knowing that the future of the State depends upon her
efforts in a larger degree than ever before.
56 CONG. REC. 10785 (1887) (statement of Sen. McKellar).
347 See Siegel, supra note 18, at 998-1004.
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them-the harmony and stability of marriage, and the division of
labors and cares of that union.... Among the powers which have
hitherto been esteemed as most essential to the public welfare is the
power of the States to regulate, each for itself, their domestic
institutions in their own way; and among those institutions none have
absolute
been preserved by the States with greater jealousy than their
348
control over marriage and the relation between the sexes.
This understanding of state sovereignty haunted suffragists for the
entire half century during which they advocated ratification of the
woman suffrage amendment. Determined to thwart constitutional
change, the anti-suffragists argued that state sovereignty over the family
prevented anti-suffragists even from amending the Constitution to
In 1918 opponents of woman suffrage
enfranchise women. 349
contended that by calling for federal action, the "militant suffragettes"
threatened "a direct and lawless invasion by the Congress of the United
States of the rights of those States which have refused to confer upon
'350 And upon the enactment of the
their women the privilege of voting.
Nineteenth Amendment in 1919, Senator Underwood explained that:
[W]hen it comes to those powers of government which invade the
family home and the fireside, that welcome the infant into life and
carry old age to the cemetery, those laws of our intimate life and
living, if we want just government, must be determined by the local
That is the only way we can
people who live under them.
351
result.
desired
accomplish the
Recognizing that his view had not prevailed, and that women were
to be guaranteed the right to vote under the federal constitution, he
lamented that "the disintegration of this great Republic has begun and
35 2
the hour of downfall is only a question of time.
2.

Polygamy, Divorce, and Interracial Marriage

At the end of the nineteenth century, woman suffrage was only one
of several issues to give rise to political organization and advocacy for
reform of laws relating to domestic relations and, concomitantly, to
sustained consideration of the proper role of the federal government in
such matters. The liberalization of divorce laws, the continued struggle
348 S. REP. No. 47-686, pt. 2, at 2 (1882), quoted in Siegel, supra note 18, at 1000.
349 Reva Siegel provides a searching analysis of anti-suffragists' contention that states' rights
limited federal authority to amend the constitution, including an analysis of the anti-suffragists'
post-ratification challenge to the Nineteenth Amendment in federal court in Leser v. Garnett, 258
U.S. 130 (1922). See Siegel, supra note 18, at 1003-07.
350 56 CONG. REC. 775 (1918) (statement of Sen. Gordon).
351 58 CONG. REc. 570 (1919) (statement of Sen. Underwood).
352 Id.
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to eradicate polygamy in Utah, and the apparent increase in interracial
marriages captivated the nation. Congress was called on to remedy
these perceived evils, leading some national legislators to reason about
the federal government's role in domestic relations in a very different
fashion from their anti-suffragist colleagues.
For example, as a number of states began to liberalize divorce
laws, divorce rates rose rapidly, and other areas of domestic relations
law, such as alimony, marriage settlements, and child custody, were
proven inadequate. "Family savers" decried the decay of the American
family due to the increase in divorce, and some turned to federal
legislators for help. 353 Similarly, enemies of the "female slavery"
known as polygamy successfully lobbied Congress to pass several more
statutes punishing polygamy and continued to seek congressional
assistance in putting an end to the practice. 354 Finally, though
interracial marriage was rare even in the states where it was permitted,
proponents of "racial purity" petitioned Congress for a federal
constitutional amendment that would prohibit interracial marriage
throughout the country. 355 The frenzy of congressional activity in
response to these purported threats to the traditional family is itself

remarkable. As Edward Stein has recently demonstrated, not including
the proposed woman suffrage amendments, 120 constitutional
amendments concerning domestic relations law were proposed between

1880 and 1929.356 (Since 1929, only eighteen amendments concerning
marriage or family law have been proposed, and seven of those were
introduced within the last four years in an effort to ban same-sex
marriage.) 357

353 See GROSSBERG, supra note 53, at 250-51. For accounts of reformers' turn to the
federal
government for divorce legislation and constitutional amendments, see MAX RHEINSTEIN,

MARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE, AND THE LAW 45-46 (1972); WILLIAM L.
O'NEILL, DIVORCE
IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 238-53 (1967); NELSON MANFRED BLAKE, THE ROAD
TO RENO: A
HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN THE UNITED STATES 133-137 (1962).

354 See, e.g., An Act to Amend Section Fifty-Three Hundred and Fifty-Two of the Revised
Statutes of the United States, in Reference to Bigamy, and for Other Purposes (Edmunds Act),
ch.
47, § 1, 22 Stat. 30, 30-31 (1882); An Act to Amend an Act Entitled "An Act to Amend
Section
Fifty-Three Hundred and Fifty-Two of the Revised Statutes of the United States, in Reference
to
Bigamy, and for Other Purposes," Approved March Twenty-Second, Eighteen Hundred
and
Eighty-Two (Edmunds-Tucker Act), ch. 397, § 24, 24 Stat. 635, 639-40 (1887).
For a
comprehensive discussion of the federal response to Mormon polygamy, see GORDON, supra
note
3
21,passim.
355 See Edward Stein, Past and Present Proposed Amendments to the United States
ConstitutionRegardingMarriage, 82 WASH. L. REV. Q. 611, 627-31 (2004).
356 See id at 627, tbl. 1 (table calculating the federal constitutional amendments concerning
marriage proposed since the 1870s).
357 See id. The proposed amendments concerning same-sex marriage include the following:
H.J. Res. 93, 107th Cong. (May 15, 2002); H.J. Res. 56, 108th Cong. (May 21, 2003);
S.J. Res.
26, 108th Cong. (Nov. 25, 2003); S.J. Res. 30, 108th Cong. (Mar. 22, 2004); S.J. Res. 40,
108th
Cong. (July 8, 2004); H.J. Res. 106, 108th Cong. (Sept. 23, 2004); S.J. Res. 1, 109th Cong.
(Jan.
24, 2005). The wording of the various proposed amendments varies somewhat, but S.J. Res.
1 is
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While recognizing the apparent limits on federal power described
by the anti-suffragists, various reformers and social conservatives
rallied behind federal efforts to restrict the availability of divorce, and to
ban polygamy and interracial marriage. Flipping the anti-suffragists'
logic on its head, those who supported federal legislative action with
respect to divorce, polygamy, and interracial marriage argued that
precisely because of the importance of family to the stability of the
polity, the federal government should assume control of marriage laws
in order to protect the republic from inevitable decay and dissolution.
In a 1905 message to Congress, President Roosevelt endorsed national
action with respect to divorce on the basis that:
The institution of marriage is, of course, at the very foundation of
our social organization, and all influences that affect that institution
are of vital concern to the people of the whole country. There is a
widespread conviction that the divorce laws are dangerously lax and
in a
indifferently administered in some of the States, resulting
358
relation.
marriage
the
of
sanctity
the
for
regard
diminishing
As Stein has shown, this sentiment was articulated in debates
concerning polygamy legislation and proposed marriage amendments as
well. Thus, a strong federal remedy to polygamy was purportedly
necessary because "the family is the foundation of human
governments," 359 and "republican institutions cannot rest on polygamist
Similarly, a constitutional amendment banning
aristocracy." 360
typical: "Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman.
Neither this Constitution, nor the constitution of any State, shall be construed to require that
marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any union other than the union of a man
and a woman." Given that one of the primary bases for objection to the Equal Rights
Amendment (ERA) was that it would permit the federal government to "control" family law, see
sources cited in supra note 29, it is also plausible to consider the ERA as an amendment
concerning domestic relations and marriage. Were we to add to Stein's calculation all of the post1929 resolutions proposing the ERA (or a version thereof), the numbers of proposed
constitutional amendments that concerned domestic relations would increase considerably.
358 Letter from President Roosevelt to the Congress (Jan. 30, 1905), reprinted in BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, 1867-1906, at 4 (1909). Similarly, in 1887, Senator
Dolph of Oregon argued:
If it be objected that the adoption of this amendment would tend to the centralization of
power in the National Government, I answer that many of the powers already
possessed by the Federal Government are less important than that under consideration,
and that the propriety or necessity of the exercise of the General Government can not
be maintained by stronger arguments than can be adduced in favor of conferring upon
it the power in question. The number of subjects concerning which the power of
legislation is conferred upon Congress is not as important as the character of the
subjects.
19 CONG. REC. 166 (1887) (statement of Sen. Dolph).
359 Id. at 503-04, quoted in Stein, supra note 355, at 645.
360 Proposed Amendment to the Constitution of the U.S. ProhibitingPolygamy: Hearing on
H.J. Res. 203 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 56th Cong. 26 (1900) (statement of Rev.
William R. Campbell), quoted in Stein, supra note 355, at 644. Similarly, when faced with the
objection that a constitutional amendment outlawing polygamy would "be a departure from the
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interracial marriage was necessary to declare such unions "prohibited by

the fundamental law of the Republic, ' 361 and to protect the "social body
of this Republic" from interracial marriage. 362
At the turn of the twentieth century, the issue of whether the
federal government should preempt the states in the regulation of
divorce and other domestic relations matters remained an "open
question," according to one New York newspaper. 363 But it is fair to
say that public debates over polygamy, woman suffrage, interracial

marriage, and divorce gave rise to heightened and unprecedented
awareness of, and disagreement concerning, the proper role of the
federal government in the regulation of the family and, concomitantly,
the place of the family in the national republic. Opponents of woman
suffrage portrayed domestic relations as too important to be entrusted to

the "imperial power" of the federal government, thus advocating

insulation of the family against the corrupting influences of federal
364
power.

Meanwhile, many social conservatives, and others frustrated

by the difficulties inherent in a polyglot system of marriage and divorce
laws, viewed federal involvement as necessary precisely because of the
importance of family in a republic. 365
With respect to the federalism question, no one side could claim

victory in this dispute-polygamy regulation and woman suffrage
prevailed, while Congress did very little to address divorce and
interracial marriage. 366 But it was in the context of the debates over
these issues that the theory that domestic relations were a special
enclave of state sovereignty was formulated as a generally applicable

principle of federalism.

genius of our Union, which leaves the control of domestic relations to each State and denies it to
the central Government," a House committee report relied on the constitutional guaranty of
a
"republican form of government" to explain why an anti-polygamy amendment
did not itself
violate the Constitution: "[C]an there be any departure from the principles of the Constitution in
declaring... that [the states'] Government shall not only be republican in form, but that their
civilization shall not be based on a polygamous family." H. REP. No. 49-2568, at 7-8 (1886).
361 49 CONG. REC. 504 (1912) (statement of Rep. Roddenberry).
362 Id. at 503-04, quoted in Stein, supra note 355, at 646.
363 N.Y. TRIBUNE, Apr. 17, 1901, at 3.
364 56 CONG. REC. 10779 (1918) (statement of Sen. Hardwick).
365 See BLAKE, supra note 353, at 133-37; O'NEILL, supra note 353, at 238-49.
366 For a discussion of the fate of proposed divorce legislation in Congress, see BLAKE, supra
note 353, at 145-50. For a discussion of Congress's treatment of proposals to amend the
Constitution to prohibit interracial marriage, see PETER WALLENSTEIN, TELL THE COURT I LOVE
MY WIFE: RACE, MARRIAGE, AND LAW: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 133-36 (2002).
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The State Sovereignty Paradigm in the Federal Courts

It comes as little surprise that as reformers and congressmen were
debating the propriety of federal regulation of domestic relations at the
end of the nineteenth century, the topic also arose in the adjudicative
context. In 1890, the Supreme Court weighed in on the role of the
367
federal government in domestic relations in the case Ex parteBurrus.
Perhaps because of different institutional concerns of the federal courts,
the Supreme Court took a position on federal involvement in domestic
relations that varied from the view embraced by those who urged
Congress to assume complete control of the regulation of domestic
relations.
In Burrus the Court addressed a father's attempt to secure his
child's release from his custodial grandparents using the federal habeas
corpus statute. 368 The Supreme Court used its opinion in Burrus to
announce the principle that "[t]he whole subject of domestic relations of
to the laws of the states,
husband and wife, parent and child, belongs
369
and not to the laws of the United States.
As to the right to the control and possession of this child, as it is
contested by its father and its grandfather, it is one in regard to which
neither the Congress of the United States nor any authority of the
United States has any special jurisdiction. Whether the one or the
other is entitled to the possession does not depend upon any370act of
congress, or any treaty of the United States or its constitution.
Burrus introduced into judicial discourse an expansive rendition of
the state sovereignty paradigm of domestic relations. And, in contrast
to the limited impact of Barber, it cannot be gainsaid that Burrus had a
profound impact on the federal courts' role in domestic relations
matters. Although Burrus did not involve divorce per se, it was soon
divorce
interpreted by the Court to bar federal courts from entertaining
371
suits.
custody
child
as
such
suits and related matters,
367 136 U.S. 586 (1890).
368 For a discussion of federal courts' differing views on the applicability of federal habeas
corpus in child custody disputes prior to Burrus, see supra note 215.
369 Burrus, 136 U.S. at 593-94. The case itself involved a plea by the father for his own
release from custody, after having been held in contempt for kidnapping the child from the

grandparents.
370 Id.at 594.

371 For example, in Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 167 (1899) (citing Burrus, 136 U.S. at 59394), the Court explained:
It may therefore be assumed as indubitable that the circuit courts of the United States
have no jurisdiction, either of suits for divorce, or of claims for alimony, whether made
in a suit for divorce, or by an original proceeding in equity, before a decree for such
alimony in a state court.
See also State of Ohio ex rel Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379 (1930); Clifford v. Williams, 131 F.
100 (C.C.D.N.D. Wash. 1904); Hastings v. Douglass, 249 F. 378 (D.C.N.D. W. Va. 1918);
Popovici v. Popovici, 30 F.2d 185 (D.C.N.D. Ohio 1927).
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Notably, however, even in the face of Burrus's broad proscription
of federal power, the federal judiciary continued to adjudicate various
domestic relations disputes, 372 and influenced the development of
divorce law by determining the extent to which state courts would be
permitted, and required, to give full faith and credit to divorce and
alimony decrees entered by sister state courts. 373 Thus, while Burrus
powerfully limited the federal courts' involvement in domestic relations
cases, it did not put an end to the federal judiciary's role in domestic
relations matters altogether, and certainly did little to explain what kind
of domestic relations disputes fell outside federal court jurisdiction. But
like the anti-suffragists' insistence that the woman suffrage amendment
was an invasion into a sphere of state sovereignty, Burrus presented a
sustained and authoritative vision of domestic relations law as a special
creature of state law, one that-perhaps even more so than Barber-is
cited today as the origin of a limitation on federal courts' authority in
cases that touch on domestic relations. 374
372 See, e.g., Spreckles v. Wakefield, 286 F. 465 (9th Cir. 1923) (deciding whether a contract
between a husband and wife for alimony and child support, in contemplation of dissolution of
marriage, was void for public policy); Whitney v. Whitney Elevator & Warehouse Co., 183 F.
678 (2d Cir. 1910) (enforcing a separation agreement giving ex-wife right to alimony even after
death of husband); Moore v. Moore, 255 F. 497 (3d Cir. 1919) (deciding whether a contract
between a husband and wife for alimony and child support, in contemplation of dissolution of
marriage, was void for public policy); Smith v. Smith, 247 F. 461 (8th Cir. 1917) (evaluating
whether alimony decree entered by a county court was enforceable as a final judgment); Carter v.
Rinker, 174 F. 882 (C.C.D. Kan. 1909) (considering action for breach of promise to marry);
Davis v. Pryor, 112 F. 274 (8th Cir. 1901) (reviewing jury award granted in action for breach of
promise to marry); Daniels v. Benedict, 97 F. 367 (8th Cir. 1899) (enforcing separation
agreement containing release by wife of all claims to husband's estate); Holmes v. Holmes, 283
F. 453 (D.C.E.D. Mich. 1922) (considering ex-wife's challenge to a deed fraudulently entered by
then-husband in an effort to deprive her of alimony); Hogg v. Maxwell, 233 F. 290 (S.D.N.Y
1916) (enforcing separation agreement and alimony as final resolution of ex-wife's financial
rights). Bankruptcy suits also required federal courts to interpret and apply divorce and alimony
decrees. See, e.g., Westmoreland v. Dodd, 2 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1924); Turner v. Turner, 108 F.
785, (D.C.D. Ind. 1901); Hawk v. Hawk, 102 F. 679 (D.C.W.D. Ark. 1900).
373 The federal courts were regularly confronted with claims that a particular divorce or
alimony decree should not receive full faith and credit because of due process concerns. See, e.g.,
Bates v. Bodie, 245 U.S. 520 (1918); Pennington v. Fourth Nat'l Bank of Cincinnati, 243 U.S.
269 (1917); Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906); Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155
(1901); Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175 (1901); Hekking v. Pfaff, 91 F. 60 (1st Cir. 1898). For a
discussion of the development of full faith and credit jurisprudence in the context of divorce and
alimony, see HARTOG, supra note 18, at 258-77. Hartog concludes that following the Supreme
Court's decision in Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906), "[e]ach state no longer had the right to be as
strict or as loose as it chose with regard to the recognition of foreign divorces ....
[T]he federal
Constitution now served to discipline apparent state sovereignty." HARTOG, supra note 18, at
276. See generally BLAKE, supra note 353, at 173-88; Neal R. Feigenson, Extraterritorial
Recognition ofDivorce Decrees in the Nineteenth Century, 34 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 119 (1990).
374 See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004); Ankenbrandt v.
Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 702-03 (1992); Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 629 (1987); Lehman v.
Lycoming County Children's Serv. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 511 (1982); Bennett v. Bennett, 682
F.2d 1039, 1042 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018, 1022-25 (3d Cir. 1975);
Hernstadt v. Hernstadt, 373 F.2d 316, 317 (2d Cir. 1967); 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
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There is a tendency within modern federalism jurisprudence to
present specific allocations of authority between state and federal
governments as stable, fixed principles that are divorced from the
375 But
historical contingencies of ideology and political expediency.
even this broad overview of the genealogy of the state sovereignty
paradigm shows that state sovereignty over domestic relations is notas is often claimed-a transhistoric feature of American federalism. For
the first decades of the nation's history, most federal involvement in
domestic relations went completely unnoted as such, and the notion that
family law was a special enclave of state authority was articulated in
specific contexts only, as in the debates over federal authority to
regulate slavery and polygamy.
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, as domestic relations
law and attendant regulation of women's political participation went
through a period of rapid transition, the state sovereignty paradigm was
embraced by some in order to stymie federal "intervention" into the
home. Opponents of the woman suffrage amendment marshaled the
state sovereignty paradigm in an effort to protect the traditional gender
order of the household. Around the same time, the Supreme Court
employed similar logic-albeit without endorsing a preference for
tradition or transition-when it announced a strict limitation on federal
authority over "[t]he whole subject of domestic relations of husband and
wife, parent and child. '376 By the turn of the century, the state
sovereignty paradigm of domestic relations had taken shape in political
and legal discourse as a general theory of federalism, applicable as a
restraint on federal judicial and legislative action across multiple
regulatory contexts.
That the state sovereignty paradigm evolved as a generally
applicable theory of federalism does not mean that it was a universally
accepted theory, or even a particularly cogent theory. Even as some
congressmen argued that a woman suffrage amendment would abrogate
state sovereignty over domestic relations, others urged that federal
regulation of the family could provide the only solution to the perceived
destruction of the traditional household caused by divorce, polygamy,
This selective invocation of the state
and interracial marriage.

ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3609 (1984).

375 See Susan Bandes, Erie and the History of the One True Federalism, 110 YALE L.J. 829,
830 (2001) (reviewing EDWARD A. PURCELL, BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION:
ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-

CENTURY AMERICA (2000)) ("When federalism is portrayed as an abstract notion, unaffected by
changing political conditions or the changing nature of the institutions themselves, that portrayal
gives the seductive appearance of advancing the goals of consistency, predictability and reason");
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. REV. 953
(1994) (enumerating the Process School assumptions that typify federal courts scholarship).
376 Exparte Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890).
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sovereignty paradigm should come as little surprise, given the federal
government's continued involvement in all manner of domestic
relations matters in the late nineteenth century. The federal courts
continued to resolve domestic relations cases of various sorts, even as
Burrus circumscribed their authority in such matters. 377 Through
citizenship laws, Civil War pension statutes, and a variety of other
programs, Congress continued to regulate certain aspects of domestic
relations. 378 And by 1920, whatever influence the state sovereignty
paradigm exerted in the debates over woman suffrage had given way to
the Nineteenth Amendment. 379 In short, even as the state sovereignty
paradigm took shape as a generally applicable theory of federalism, it
was selectively invoked, inconsistently applied, and always contested.

CONCLUSION: INDETERMINACY, FEDERALISM, AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS

In today's jurisprudence, domestic relations law is identified as an
"area of traditional state regulation, ' 380 and many jurists have attempted
to neatly package matters involving, or even related to, family as falling
under the exclusive control of the individual states. 38' The state
sovereignty paradigm of domestic relations-the result of this process
of categorizing and packaging-has been presented as having hallowed
roots in the founding era, and as being part of the inherent design of our
constitutional order. It ends up, however, that the state sovereignty
paradigm is neither historically predetermined, nor an essential feature
of our federalism.
The historical sources tell us that even during the era of dual
federalism, contemporaries did not translate the general principle of
enumerated federal powers into an exclusion of the federal government
from matters relating to domestic relations. National legislators of the
pre-Civil War period spent considerable effort tending to widows'
pension petitions and related legislation.
Individual citizenship
determinations involved a host of considerations that turned on
domestic relations law, and those issues were addressed by Congress
and the federal courts, even sometimes at the expense of the states'
power to determine the rights, benefits, and consequences of marriage.
The federal courts resolved a wide range of domestic relations issues
that arose in federal cases, such as disputes concerning dower,
illegitimacy, and marriage settlements. And when such issues arose as
377
378
379
380
381

See sources cited in supranotes 373-74 and accompanying text.
See sources cited in supra notes 337-40 and accompanying text.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIX; see sources cited in supranotes 343-52 and accompanying text.
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615-16 (2000).
See sources cited in supra notes 26-36 and accompanying text.
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equitable claims, federal judges followed federal equity principles rather
than state law. When viewed together with mounting evidence of the
federal government's late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century
382
promulgation of laws and policies relating to the family, evidence of
federal involvement in domestic relations during the pre-Civil War era
shows that there has never been a point in American history when the
states exercised exclusive authority over family law and policy.
The historical sources also tell us that the notion that domestic
relations are a special enclave of state regulation did not begin as an
uncontested, inherent principle of American federalism. With few
exceptions, during the pre-Civil War era, federal involvement in
domestic relations generally did not meet with the kinds of federalism
objections that it does today. It was later, as debates over polygamy,
divorce, interracial marriage, and woman suffrage escalated, that the
state sovereignty paradigm developed as a generally applicable
federalism theory, and was selectively invoked and ignored to achieve
Understood in light of this historical
specific regulatory goals.
evidence, the state sovereignty paradigm appears to have always
functioned as a prescription for federalism, rather than as a description
of the actual allocation of federal and state authority.
How might current dialogue concerning federalism and family law
be altered by recognition of this revised understanding of the history
and basis of the state sovereignty paradigm? Does it matter, and should
it matter, that federal lawmakers and judges have always played a
role-however varied-in the regulation and adjudication of domestic
relations matters? Does the history of federal involvement in domestic
relations provide any insight into the values that should inform modern
federal family regulation? And does the fact that the state sovereignty
paradigm has always been a contested and inconsistently applied theory
of federalism shed light on the wisdom of relying on it to resolve
current debates regarding the proper allocation of power between state
and federal governments?
The most obvious implication of the evidence of an early tradition
of federal regulation of domestic relations is that it liberates us from the
bold claims to historical precedent that are common in current advocacy
discourse and federalism jurisprudence--especially those claims that
marshal the legitimacy and importance of the founding and early
national periods as their reference point. Some will contend that a
revised historical understanding is of minimal significance because, in
general, history should have little weight in the project of discerning or
creating a modern federalism doctrine. The fact is, however, that for
better or worse, the historical pedigree of the state sovereignty paradigm
382 See sources cited in supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
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has become a mantra repeated in all manner of discussions, debates,
hearings, and judicial opinions concerning federal involvement in
domestic relations. Thus, assuming-as I believe it is safe to do-that a
substantial number of jurists, legislators, and commentators will
continue to look to history for answers to questions regarding the proper
allocation of authority between state and federal actors, historical
inquiry remains a relevant endeavor. Of course, recognizing that the
state sovereignty paradigm finds little support in the historical sources
does not help us with the much more difficult task of determining how
federal and state powers may be best marshaled-independently or in
collaboration-to develop laws and policies that address the needs and
problems of modern families. Rather, acknowledging the tradition of
federal family regulation opens a space for that important work to take
place or, at the very least, requires modern-day federalists to provide a
principled defense of the continued vitality of the state sovereignty
paradigm.
By arguing that the early historical sources do not provide support
for the state sovereignty paradigm, I do not mean to suggest that history
should play no role whatsoever in an analysis of the proper allocation of
authority between state and federal governments with respect to the
family. Indeed, one of the benefits of reclaiming the history of early
federal involvement in the family is that we can begin to understand the
various ways that federal actors participated in the recognition and
gradual disestablishment of status hierarchies enshrined in domestic
relations laws and policies. In debates over family pensions, for
example, early federal legislators recognized that women's marital
status-their status within families and the status of their familiesimplicated important republican values, and that those values (as
understood at the time) were to shape Congress's creation and
administration of federal family war pensions. Likewise, the relatively
broad enforcement of married women's separate estates by federal
courts challenged the hierarchies and inequalities created by the
common law rules governing marital property, and may have very well
helped encourage the disestablishment of those rules by state legislators
through enactment of the married women's property acts.
Obviously, these examples do not provide any specific direction
for the resolution of modern disagreement concerning the proper or
optimal role of the federal government in current family law and policy.
And, of course, we should not to be too sanguine about the progressive
influence of republicanism (or liberalism, or any other political theory)
on married women's status, or that of other family dependents, during
the pre-Civil War period. 383 Nevertheless, early federal family
383 As Linda Kerber cautions:
Traditional republican theory could not help either Jeffersonians or Federalists think
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regulation provides an alternative to the commonplace vision of family
law as a site of "truly local" values and norms. In this alternative model
of federalism, the federal government plays a part in the ongoing
process of evaluating how laws and policies relating to family are
sometimes in tension with basic liberal values. Thus, for example, to
the extent that VAWA and FMLA concerned domestic relations, both
fit comfortably within this tradition as laws that were intended to
redress gender discrimination that, at least in part, grew out of social
practices and laws relating to domestic relations: in the case of VAWA,
interspousal immunity with respect to domestic violence, and in the case
of FMLA, gender-based allocation of care-giving responsibilities within
384
families.
Just as important, acknowledging the fact that the state sovereignty
paradigm of domestic relations is an invented theory of federalism that
developed as an expedient tool in the context of political debate helps us
to identify-and perhaps avoid-some of the potential pitfalls of
First, we can understand the indeterminate
formalist federalism.
application of the state sovereignty paradigm-as evidenced by the
385 and the inchoate
protean nature of the domestic relations exception,
limits on Congress's authority to pass legislation that bears on domestic
be a consequence of the paradigm's improvised
relations 386-to
character. For example, seen as part of a longer contest over the proper
place of domestic relations in our federal system, the dissonance
between Hibbs and Morrison, described at the outset of this article,
appears as part of a pattern of incongruence between the federal
government's long-standing involvement in domestic relations, and the
simultaneous insistence that such involvement interferes with the states'
special sovereignty. While this explanation offers no solution to the
indeterminacy that typifies this area of federalism jurisprudence, it
offers a counternarrative to any suggestion that current indeterminacy is
simply a result of the expansion of federal regulatory power into "areas
of traditional state sovereignty," such as domestic relations.
Second, because the localist vision of the family developed as an
ad hoc response to dramatic changes in the legal and social norms
governing domestic relations-and was never formulated as a rational,

creatively about the place of women in republican society. The answer to the
conundrum of why Americans of the revolutionary generation found it so difficult to
think about women in revolutionary terms... lies in part in the extent to which
American political discourse was embedded in its republican sources.
Making Republicanism Useful, 97 YALE L.J. 1663, 1669 (1988).
384 For an analysis of VAWA's civil rights remedy as a response to the continued vitality of
the doctrine of interspousal immunity, see Siegel, Rule of Love, supra note 42, at 2201-02; see
also sources cited in supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
385 See text accompanying supra notes 200-03.
386 See supra Part I.
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principled doctrine-there is no reason to expect that present or future
application of the state sovereignty paradigm will adhere to predictable
rules or standards. Inconsistency and indeterminacy in the application
of the state sovereignty paradigm are troublesome for litigants and
lawmakers, who are left without guidance as to the proper scope of
federal judicial and legislative authority in matters relating to domestic
relations. Such indeterminacy is also worrisome because of its tendency
to give the Supreme Court, and, to a lesser extent, lower federal courts,
standardless discretion in determining the metes and bounds of
federalism. For example, in deciding Hibbs and Morrison, the Court
was unrestrained by any precedent that consciously differentiates
between proper and improper applications of the state sovereignty
paradigm. As a consequence, the justices were free to invoke or ignore
the purported tradition of deference to the states without offering any
explanation as to why Congress may sometimes enact laws bearing on
domestic relations, but is in other instances precluded from doing so.
Of course, we could develop a theory to explain why certain
federal forays into family law and policy are deemed acceptable, and
others are not (and there have been some laudable attempts to do just
that). 387 However, given that the application of the state sovereignty
paradigm has proven very difficult to control, it would be naive to think
that any theory would actually have a moderating influence. 388
Moreover, and perhaps more important, any explanatory theory would
provide a post hoc explanation for differentiated assessment of the
propriety of federal domestic relations regulation that the Court itself
has been unwilling to embrace as a limitation on its own authority to
circumscribe the powers of Congress and the lower federal courts. In
other words, by maintaining a broad and indeterminate conception of
the state sovereignty paradigm, the Court has preserved its own
discretion and power at the expense of predictability, transparency, and
accountability.
Paradoxically, then, the state sovereignty paradigm undermines
many of the principles of governance touted by proponents of formalist
federalism. This state of affairs does not promote deference to state
governments.
Rather, it promotes creative gerrymandering of
categories and rhetorical grandstanding by federal actors.
These
considerations should give us pause before we embrace the state
sovereignty paradigm of domestic relations as a standard by which
federal lawmaking and adjudicative actions are judged or, especially,
invalidated. Certainly, the state sovereignty paradigm should not be
387 See, e.g., Dailey, supra note 22, at 1880-87; Barbara Ann Attwood, Domestic Relations
Cases in Federal Court: Toward a Principled Exercise of Jurisdiction,35 HASTINGS L.J. 571,
604-628 (1984).
388 See supra Part 1.
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used to erase a history of federal regulatory and adjudicative practices
that helped to dismantle-if incrementally-exclusionary practices and
status-based hierarchies that, for many decades, emanated from local
domestic relations laws and policies, and, by many accounts, still do.

